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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis explores representations of the child in contemporary literature, 
culture, and criticism. The authors and texts considered are primarily British and 
post-1979, but the thesis situates them within the context of post-war cultural 
history, and particularly in relation to changes to perceptions of the ‘post-war’ itself 
in the 1980s. From these texts, representations of the child that dramatise the 
child’s entrance into authority as a problem for the adult, one characterised by 
symbolic or actual violence, ground a case that the child is required to correlate with 
a recognisable image of himself, one that actually limits his political potential, as the 
condition for his political or aesthetic representation. Violence against the child is 
the all-pervasive threat for failure to meet this condition.  
Reading these depictions of violence towards the child, notably by Alan 
Hollinghurst, Ian McEwan, Peter Ackroyd, and Kazuo Ishiguro, this thesis builds upon 
existing critical work on the child as a current and continuing problem for authority. 
The theoretical framework derives from cultural history, from the political theory of 
Hannah Arendt, and from psychoanalysis, particularly as mediated through 
contemporary Queer Studies. This range positions literary authors as sometimes 
mediating between psychoanalytic understandings of the child and the political use 
of the child as representation of the future, a connection already central to the work 
of seminal contemporary theorists such as Lee Edelman.  
The thesis argues that we face a historically specific and psychoanalytically 
resonant problem of the child and authority: a problem demanding attention to the 
way we read the child, and with broader implications for reading as the practice of 
literary analysis and interpretation (one with, as we shall find, a complicated relation 
to how political authorities require particular ‘readings’ of the child). Several texts 
discussed here constitute not only uncanny versions of cultural history, but also 
interventions against their own reading. These dramatise and resist a pronounced 
tendency to demand that the child becomes available for recognition, as the 
condition for its political and aesthetic representation, with violence ensuing for the 
child who refuses to meet this condition.   
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Chapter 1: The Problem of the Child and Authority  
The contemporary problem of the child and authority is one of 
representation – in literature and in politics. Recent political culture has grappled 
with the issue of how to give due representation to the child, whose rights are 
derived from a special claim to the future (see Edelman, No Future, 3).  
This demands that those currently in authority imagine the future on behalf 
of the child - a future necessarily, precisely because it is identified with the child who 
one day will be an adult, not wholly under the authorities’ control. Literary authors, 
similarly, write texts that may well be read beyond their own lives; they presume a 
future reader, a literal or metaphorical child. One of the most recent novels to play 
upon this trope, as of this writing, is Alan Hollinghurst’s The Stranger’s Child (2011), 
which dramatises the afterlife of a poem as itself a quasi-child read and reproduced 
through the lives of real children. In this situation, to write something for the child to 
read (the act which initiates events in Hollinghurst’s novel) or tell the child how to 
read (a basic function of literary criticism that Hollinghurst often targets for parody) 
is simultaneously also to read the child, and through the child, the future – an 
imperative simultaneously rehearsed and complicated by many of the texts 
discussed here.  
In this thesis I will give an account of some representations of the child, 
particularly those exploring a traumatic and even violent form of reading the child, 
one they suggest plays a central (if often repressed) role in contemporary culture – 
even in the critical culture that makes a special claim for the authority to read. This 
shared arena of politics and critical reading, with the child as their common object, 
was summarised by Frank Kermode’s remark that “problems of interpretation” are 
“problems of importance, for, broadly conceived, the power to make interpretations 
is an indispensable instrument of survival in the world, and it works there as it works 
on literary texts” (The Genesis of Secrecy, xi). There is no greater problem of 
interpretation than the child defined as embodiment of the future that has not yet 
arrived.  
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Kermode’s comment resonates with the broader sense in which I use 
“authority” here. The OED treats “authority” as encompassing both power and right; 
accordingly, I use it here to mean the capacity to give an order or demand for the 
future, located in the subject who is speaking from a position of knowledge about 
the world, the subject imagined as ‘adult’. The child is evidently the object of such 
authority, but also – in his very association with a future that will likely exclude the 
adult, if the adult will die first – challenges its basis in knowledge of the world. 
Hence the problem of interpretation becomes the problem of reading the child.  
I will go on to describe how this imperative works against the child’s interest 
in becoming an adult, and in ultimately assuming the authority the adult currently, 
but temporarily, holds; how it works, in fact, against representing the child’s 
interests in the future, even, paradoxically, as it attempts to visualise the future. The 
future, of course (in a fact Arendt viewed as central to all political activity) is defined 
by the (adult) subject’s mortality. The adult essentially has two operations available 
to him to address the child’s potentially traumatising embodiment of a future that 
will not include him, two options to project his authority beyond his mortal body.  
The first of these is education. The adult can teach the child to read the 
world in the terms he sets, as a means of representing himself beyond his own 
death.  This is the process of integration into what Lacan called the symbolic order, 
which underpins both language and culture (Lacan, Écrits, 67), though this order 
exists before the child’s birth and continues after the adult’s death. ‘Education’ is an 
attempt to rationalise this order for the child, and the child for it. It requires not only 
the adult teaching the child to read the world, but his own simultaneous reading of 
the child, to assure himself that the process is working. In this sense, education is 
based on making the child recognisably reproduce a set of values or body of 
knowledge as the condition for his ultimate representation in adult society, his 
entrance into authority. This includes his political representation, by which I mean 
the ability to access a space where some form of negotiation for control over the 
future takes place, and the right to speak within that dialogue. For Hannah Arendt, 
“politics” implicitly acknowledges the need to negotiate, and thus potentially revise, 
the arrangements for the future (The Human Condition, 44-45).  
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The second option for the adult facing the child is subject to one of our 
greatest taboos: the use of violence upon the child. If the future the adult desires for 
the child is perceived as at risk, the imperative to both teach the child correctly and 
to read the child correctly – to ensure he is absorbing the ‘proper’ authority and not 
some other influence – is greatly intensified. The difficulty of truly knowing what the 
child is thinking, then, is prone to raise this possibility of violence.  
Nor are the exercises of violence and education always neatly separated; I 
shall go on to argue that the demand for recognition inherent in (at least certain 
versions of) education itself provokes violence towards the child who fails to 
conform to the demand. One of the most famous literary accounts of this scenario 
and of the shocking mutual contamination of education and violence is found in 
Henry James’ The Turn of the Screw (1898), a novella with, as I shall discuss later, a 
profound influence on both popular and critical ideas of the child as a problem for 
authority in the later twentieth century.  
In The Turn of the Screw an educator, the Governess, is driven to paranoia by 
the suspicion that the children in her care are not disclosing what they know. A later 
re-working of the novella on film, Jack Clayton’s The Innocents, explicitly suggests 
that the only way for her to eliminate the traumatically private space of the child’s 
thoughts (themselves apparently contaminated, though to what degree she cannot 
know, with adult influence), is to kill the child. The Turn of the Screw thus offers a 
potential ur-text for the modern entanglement of education and violence towards 
the child, or at least for how that entanglement emerges in literary criticism. It is this 
particular entanglement, arising from the authoritative adult’s knowledge of his own 
death and his necessarily incomplete knowledge of the child, that in significant part 
forms the problem of the child and authority I am setting out to study here.  
In a political culture that claims to prioritise the rights of the child (a claim 
marked in British law by the Children Act 1989, which emphasises the paramount 
value of the child’s interests), any tendency to imagine violence towards the child 
(the tendency we shall find variously rehearsed, parodied and critiqued in the texts 
discussed here) surely compels attention. Such an aberration signals the 
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contradictions in the way our culture seeks to represent the child and, through the 
child, the future.  
I will pursue this aberration, this violence between the child and authority, in 
several works of literary fiction that situate it in the political and cultural history of 
late twentieth- and early twenty-first century Britain. I aim to update the body of 
critical analysis on the child in contemporary literature by demonstrating the 
significance of these texts, including those by Alan Hollinghurst, Ian McEwan, Peter 
Ackroyd, and particularly Kazuo Ishiguro, as well as by other earlier authors (such as 
James, and Rose Macaulay in Chapter Two) whose work provides important 
contextualisation. This builds upon existing critical work on the child as a problem 
for authority, including psychoanalytic and historical studies of the child and 
representation by Lee Edelman, Jacqueline Rose, Kathryn Bond Stockton, Vicky 
Lebeau, Steven Bruhm, and several others.   
From this, I will argue that we indeed face a historically specific problem of 
the child and authority, one where problems of literary or visual interpretation are 
problems of political significance (and one with a complicated relation to how 
political authorities demand particular ‘readings’ of the child).  
This first chapter is in two parts. Part One offers a thematic introduction, 
substantiating the claims, and developing the argument, initiated above. Within this 
I will refer to a wide range of sources - from film and television, and political history, 
as well as literature, which all demand to be read in order to historicise and 
contextualise how the appearances of the child and authority appear in the later 
chapters.  
Part Two places this argument in its scholarly context, describing the 
framework and structure of the thesis; it explains the selection of material, showing 
how my argument builds on continuing debates around the child in literature and at 
the intersections of psychoanalysis and literary and cultural history.  
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The thematic introduction begins below with an exploration of how the 
child’s representation depends on her being available for recognition – on her 
conforming with an image of the child.  
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Part One 
1. Have you seen this little girl? The demand to recognise the child  
If there is widespread sexual abuse of children, then it is not so much 
the innocence of childhood as the boundary between adult and child, 
their status as stable and knowable entities, which starts to shake. 
(Rose, The Case of Peter Pan, or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction, 
xi) 
Edward III: I offer up this wicked traitor’s head; […] 
Be witness of my grief and innocency! 
(Marlowe, Edward II 5.6.93-102)  
The rights of the child are now more fully enshrined in law than ever before. 
This testifies to an unprecedented legislative agenda in the child’s name, developing 
in the ‘West’ since the 1960s, and in international law since the late 1980s (Arnott,  
Family Law, 814-815).1  The United Kingdom’s own extensive recent child protection 
legislation includes the Children Act (1989 - and the titular subject of a 2014 Ian 
McEwan novel), the Adoption and Children Act (2002), the Children Act (2004), the 
Children and Adoption Act (2006), the Children and Young Peoples Act (2008), and 
the Children and Families Act (2014). As Lebeau notes with irony, “formally, at least, 
the rights of the child appear to be uncontentious” (Childhood and Cinema, 135).  
This legislation indicates that the child has achieved a measure of political 
representation, though in a form restricted by her status as child – she is less a 
subject entitled to democratic participation than the object of law and policy, 
though of laws that at least attempt to protect her spaces and provide for her 
education. 
The legislation in the name of the child is complemented by other laws 
named after individual children: The so-called ‘Sarah’s Law’ (2011, in the United 
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Kingdom) and ‘Megan’s Law’ (1994), the Jacob Wetterling Act (1994), and the Adam 
Walsh Act (2006) (all in the United States), exemplify this. (Mowlabocus notes the 
dark irony of how “these child victims […] live on in the cultural imagination as 
signifiers of […] sex offending” (2)).  These laws promote a necessary recognition 
(they often seek to ensure that child abusers can be identified before they can 
harm), and make this recognition the basis of the child’s political representation.  
Ostensibly, this imperative for recognition is directed towards the abuser, but as the 
use of individual children’s names for the legislation betrays, recognition of the child 
is also demanded: The child must be recognised as presenting a value worthy of, and 
available for, protection. The child is typically defined as always, by definition, 
constituting this value, as a famous piece of education legislation in the United 
States, the “No Child Left Behind” Act (2001) indicated.  
 Such value might conventionally be expected to be taken for granted; yet 
several assumptions here have historically proved questionable: that we can 
recognise (and define) the child; that we can recognise what constitutes harm to 
her; and that we can similarly recognise, and therefore potentially predict, the likely 
source of that harm. The deep need in contemporary culture to recognise the 
overwhelming value of the child is clearly evident if we consider the abducted child, 
a figure widely acknowledged as providing a site for working through anxieties over 
the status of the child, even over who counts as a child and on what terms (Rose, 
The Case of Peter Pan, xvii; Lebeau, Childhood and Cinema, 115-119; Rutter, 
Shakespeare and Child’s Play, 172-173; Cousin, Playing for Time, 74-86).  
The image of Madeleine McCann, abducted in 2007, was the principal tool of 
a massive (as of this writing, continuing) campaign to seek her recovery. In this 
campaign, scrutiny of the child’s face for the purposes of recognition was an 
unequivocal and moral imperative. Posters, distributed on an unprecedented scale, 
reproduced close-ups of Madeleine’s face and of her distinctive right eye. “Have You 
Seen This Little Girl?” demanded one poster; “Look Into My Eyes!” said another.   
These posters demand not just that we recognise Madeleine, but that we 
recognise the significance of Madeleine, precisely as a child and nothing other than a 
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child (I’ll return to this point in Chapter 4, in discussing the use of images of refugee 
children). To recognise Madeleine (as, horrifically, no one has yet done) would be to 
save her; but before that wished-for future recognition we have to recognise her in 
the present, as image and imperative: the particular child has to conform with a 
general and overdetermined image of the child. In fact, the precise nature of the 
image’s meaning is more flexible than the imperative to conformity in order to 
enable recognition: a compulsion to scrutinise in order to save. 
Yet this imperative has repeatedly failed, and not only (so far) in the McCann 
case. One of the most obvious of these failures has become apparent in the 
repeated exposure of child abuse by powerful individuals and within powerful 
institutions; as Jacqueline Rose comments:  
The crisis of child sexual abuse in the 1980s has made it harder and 
harder to know, when we describe a child and even more our 
relationship to it, what we are talking about. (The Case of Peter Pan, 
xvii) 
Yet as the ‘find Madeleine’ posters show, we must assume that we know 
what we are talking about in order to save the child. We have to undertake that first, 
interior recognition in order to have the capacity to recognise the real Madeleine 
later. We have to look at Madeleine, and see the child. But what if that initial 
recognition for some reason goes wrong? What if, as Jacqueline Rose speculates, we 
are always at risk of being frustrated or threatened in our attempt to recognise the 
child? 
For Rose, this is not only a fundamental but a historically specific issue, one 
resonating across at least two decades of prominent child abuse and disappearance 
scares with a powerful hold on British media, and public, attention. If, as Rose 
writes, the “discovery” of child sexual abuse “can fairly be called one of the traumas 
of the 1980s” (xi), it certainly also still remains a constant feature of contemporary 
news reporting (Meyer, The Child at Risk, 164). 
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 The fear of children as being at particular risk from ‘predators’ intensified 
alongside the period of reaction against the supposed sexual (and other) revolutions 
of the 1960s that became, effectively, official in the 1980s (Pilcher and Wagg, 
Thatcher’s Children, 13; we’ll explore this chronology further in Chapter 3). When 
this crisis emerges within a visual and political culture that has its own reasons for 
persistently looking at the child, it appears primarily through an excessive re-
assertion of the imperative for recognition. 
 By now, the attempts to protect the child in the 1980s have themselves 
been recognised as, at least in certain cases and certain respects, spectacular and 
traumatic failures. This has been made evident by a number of high-profile 
revelations of child abuse, with one recent and particularly notable case in the 2012-
13 exposure of Jimmy Savile as one of the most prolific known abusers of children.2  
I shall dwell briefly on the Savile exposures because they present us with an 
uncannily, gruesomely literal account of a crisis of recognition. The ostensible failure 
of recognition is, of course, of Savile himself as a source of harm to the child; yet, I 
shall argue, this also involves a failure to recognise the child, even in the very 
attempt to look at the child.  
2. I should so love to see his face, if you could make his dreams come true. 
The Savile revelations exposed a contamination of political, cultural and 
medical institutions by a failure of recognition; as Carole Cadwalladr wondered in 
the Guardian, “have we actually processed the fact that a serial sex offender was at 
the heart of our culture, our national institutions, for 50 years?” (1). One of the most 
prominent individuals in post-war British popular culture, whose career peaked in 
the 1970s and 1980s with ‘making children’s dreams come true’ on Jim’ll Fix It, was 
exposed as a relentless and calculating abuser of a vast number of children.3 The 
most detailed account of Savile’s crimes published to date (Davies, In Plain Sight) 
tellingly resorts to imagery borrowed from Conrad’s Heart of Darkness to frame his 
biography and posthumous exposure.4  
The British media presented the Savile revelations as a kind of double-take, 
the shocking realisation of a failure of basic recognition. Articulating this sense of a 
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visual failure, as the exposures accelerated the phrase “hiding in plain sight” began 
to be used in the coverage with increasing frequency, eventually even as the title of 
the official Metropolitan Police/NSPCC report on the allegations (6). Despite Savile’s 
media prominence, and his visually arresting appearance (of a type, it was now 
noted, stereotypically associated with the paedophile)5 and how he even often 
made verbal reference to the sexual attractiveness of underage women, he was 
never publically ‘recognised’ during his lifetime. For at least some people, the post-
mortem realisation of what Savile was really getting out of his career of “fix-its” 
prompted a re-evaluation of what they, the audience, were themselves getting out 
of them, and out of him – and perhaps, by implication but left unspoken, what they 
were getting out of the children he ‘presented’.  
Taken seriously, this need to re-evaluate the past should be understood as 
simultaneously reiterating the imperative to look at the child and compromising that 
imperative - because Savile’s career, which so successfully obscured his recognition 
as an abuser, was in significant respects based upon promoting looking at the child.  
The failure of recognition of real childhood experience, as exposed by the 
Savile revelations, showed the terrible inadequacy of the protection of the child’s 
rights during Savile’s lifetime, despite the legislative, political and social efforts 
made. ChildLine founder Esther Rantzen was one of Savile’s prominent associates. 
Another was the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher – according to whom Savile was 
"a stunning example of opportunity Britain, a dynamic example of enterprise Britain, 
and […] of responsible Britain" (qtd. in Davies 49). An example, specifically, of the 
forces (enterprise, opportunity, responsibility) celebrated and promoted by 
Thatcherism and identified by it as imperatives for children’s upbringing, as we shall 
explore further in Chapter 3.  
The Thatcher-Savile friendship is grimly ironic, in the context of the Thatcher 
government’s vocal concerns over the dangers of predatory individuals sexually 
corrupting children. The notorious Clause 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act 
arose from an equation of the (in reality very tentative) education on non-
heterosexual relationships with the actual corruption - and by association, sexual 
16 
 
abuse - of children. Yet Mrs. Thatcher dismissed arguments that an unmarried man, 
who by his own account preferred promiscuity to sustained relationships (whilst 
presenting the most significant TV show centred on children at the time) might be 
inappropriate for a state honour.  
Clause 28 is the formalisation of a thread in political and cultural thought 
linking Savile, and his popular show Jim’ll Fix It, to the suspected abuse and 
abduction of the child – not retrospectively, but at the time, in the show’s 
celebration of ‘innocence’. This innocence is in fact the positive identification of 
child’s value, of the child as child and as embodying the future, that still motivates 
the demand to save the child by recognising her, a demand evidently still with us 
today, even if Savile has been exposed and the official homophobia represented by 
Clause 28 has ostensibly passed into history. This innocence, and its demand, is at 
the core of the specifically visual crisis of the child and authority, the crisis of seeing-
as-reading. Savile’s retrospective identification as embodying this crisis, on a scale 
and in a literal form previously unanticipated, is a darkly ironic opportunity to do 
precisely the cultural re-evaluation the crisis demands.  
In order to understand this, it is necessary to also understand Clause 28 as 
demanding wilful non-recognition: the strategic refusal of recognition, a refusal to 
see what was visibly there in order to visualise something else that perhaps was not 
– the innocence of the child. The clause refused local authorities permission to - 
(a) Intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with 
the intention of promoting homosexuality;  
(b) Promote the teaching in any maintained school of the 
acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family 
relationship. (Local Government Act 1988, Clause 28).  
 
The unspoken logic behind Clause 28’s response to an imagined homosexual 
infiltration of education, the assumption that to know is to be corrupted, is reflected 
in this deliberate refusal of recognition on the child’s behalf. Thatcher here takes on 
the character of The Turn of the Screw’s Governess, unable to separate the 
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possibility of sexual knowledge from abuse (indeed, Thatcher’s persona was often 
compared to that of a governess or schoolmistress; see, for example, Aitken 295). 
Savile, curiously, reversed this refusal of recognition. He constantly made innuendo 
references to his sexuality and in other ways foregrounded its appearance, whilst 
denying its reality; he offered an alternative sex education where even visible 
actions demanded no knowledge, his behaviour supposedly innocent of all its 
obvious implications.  
This odd, but politically charged, situation associates the immediate 
questions about Savile to a broader dynamic between seeing and reading – and 
between authority and the child. How did ‘we’ miss that Savile was doing what he 
did even though there was, with hindsight, so much visible suggestion of exactly 
that? Could it be that the desire for recognition of the child did not so much fail with 
Savile as it was actually fulfilled through what he provided to popular and political 
culture? Could the imperative to recognise itself be dependent, somehow, on a 
compulsion not to recognise, as in Clause 28?  
It’s an audacious suggestion, but one we are compelled to take seriously if 
approached through Jim’ll Fix It, the TV show presented by Savile from 1975 to 1994.  
The programme’s conceit saw children writing in to ask “Jim” to “fix it” for them to 
achieve their desires. The resulting “fix its” were then performed, either as pre-
taped video segments or sometimes in the studio, with Savile presiding as the 
symbolic figure with the supposed mysterious ability to fulfil children’s desires, 
whether bizarre or merely ambitious. In the Christmas 1986 episode, for example, a 
girl being posted to her friend inside a parcel was followed by another who wished 
to run a clinic for a day, acting as a doctor. The language used by one adult who 
wrote into the same episode asking that her nephew be taken to “a real life 
Aladdin’s cave” was telling: “I should so love to see his face, if you could make his 
dreams come true, and fix it for him”. The anticipation of looking at the child’s face 
is the desire driving the whole show, as viewing any episode now makes clear.  
Vicky Lebeau, in Childhood and Cinema, has described the history of an 
interest, present since the earliest films, in capturing children’s faces on camera – 
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delighted, blowing bubbles, smiling and giggling (sometimes also crying and wailing). 
Analysing this in a tradition of studying the violent gaze of the camera deriving from 
Laura Mulvey, Lebeau records how the child codes both apolitical redemption and 
anxiety about the future throughout twentieth-century cinema, a code grounded in 
close scrutiny of the child’s face.  
This same overwhelming visual interest in this face is still underway in Jim’ll 
Fix It (perhaps intensified by the contemporary discourses of loss of innocence, in 
which Savile himself engaged), where the camera fixates obsessively on the faces of 
children reacting with confusion and then with delight (identifying, through the 
expectation it generates, with the ability to manipulate the child’s emotions, the 
manipulation carried out figuratively by Savile himself). Suggestively, the camera 
also focussed on Savile’s own facial expressions, which tended to mimic those of the 
children, with huge grins and cod-shock.  
At first glance this gaze on the child is not the imperative to see the child at 
risk but rather to celebrate the desiring, ambitious, even entrepreneurial child. Yet 
just as we can’t watch the show ‘innocently’ today, knowing what we know about 
Savile, so too the very innocence the show performs requires a different, and more 
sceptical, attention. After all, if the show is about the child as ambitious, how can it 
also be about the innocent child? Is ambition – the desire to be other than one’s 
current function and position – compatible with innocence? In the show it is indeed 
presented as compatible; and it is precisely in this respect, in fact, that we find both 
a subtle violence towards the child and the realisation that there is a repressed risk 
to (and, more dangerously, from) the child present here.  
Watching the programme today, it clearly aims to confirm adult knowledge 
of (and therefore power over) the child, whose desires were typically trivialised on 
the show: Many of the “fix-its” selected to be staged concerned young children’s 
ambitions for their own futures - to enter exciting careers, make new discoveries, 
and perform unusual and extreme feats - though these were played out alongside 
such requests as eating lunch on a rollercoaster or getting a biscuit box stuffed with 
only the child’s particular favourite biscuit. Irrespective of the nature of the request, 
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it received a lack of the serious intent that, as Adam Phillips argues (The Beast in the 
Nursery, 21), characterises childhood play: children rarely consider their play trivial, 
but Jim’ll Fix It relies on an adult knowingness that reduces all the child’s ambitions 
and creativity to the trivial. By staging the more profound ambitions as satisfied by a 
brief set-up ‘experience’ rather than actually advanced in any way, the “fix-its” 
obscured the fact that the most frequent and urgent wish of all, the ambition of the 
child to be other than ‘just’ a child, was being rebuffed, and implicitly mocked (not 
least by the babyish voice and vocal mannerisms adopted by Savile’s narration).  
There is a cruelty present in this, in that not only are the children’s ambitions 
actually repelled in the performance of being fulfilled, but the whole action takes 
place (of course) on camera, making the audience participants in the cruelty through 
their own gaze on the child’s face and the anticipation of that child’s reactions, 
which is the motivation for the whole show, as the letter quoted above indicates. 
This reading of the show fits with the history of the violence of the gaze described by 
Lebeau; here, importantly, the gaze functions specifically as an anticipation, 
facilitating control of the future. This is in fact the key mechanism and motive of the 
show: to know what is to come is both to know the child and to know better than 
the child. The mechanism shadows the show’s underlying interest in the future and 
its determination to prevent the child’s creativity and ambition making the future 
different to the past.  
As Adam Phillips astutely argues following Freud (and against Lacanians) in 
The Beast in the Nursery, the child’s desire to be other than just a child is distinctive 
from a desire to be not a child (Phillips 20); in a combination of curiosity and 
ambition, the child seeks to live as child and adult simultaneously: and it is this 
combination, this entanglement that, I argue, adult culture of the type at work 
behind Jim’ll Fix It seeks to eradicate. What is actually being ‘fixed’ here is the child’s 
wish to be other than the child whilst visibly remaining as a child, and the potential 
of this combination to disturb the social and political order. As with Clause 28, the 
possibility that children might represent a potential difference demanding revised 
political representation is eradicated here through a process of recognition – both its 
extension and its denial.  
20 
 
This potentially disturbing difference arises from how childhood desire to 
grow up and intervene in the world was not an ordinary fact of life in the 1980s, but 
rather a heavily politicised basic element of Thatcherism’s emphasis on social 
mobility, entrepreneurship, and individual ambition (Pilcher and Wagg 2). The child’s 
supposed natural and essential embodiment of these qualities reflected a revised 
future, based on a retrieved ‘Victorian’ past, that would end the post-war period as 
a misconceived response to twentieth-century horrors (the same horrors Lebeau 
finds determining the gaze upon the child).  
This Thatcherite politics contained a paradox, though (one that did not go 
unnoticed either at the time or subsequently), where moral and social conservatism 
sat alongside celebration of a ‘free market’ reliant on innovation and disregard for 
the constraints of tradition. In other words, ambition was to be celebrated, but only 
if it aimed to fulfil some pre-existing identity or set of essential values: this was 
disruption paradoxically valued only as the source of security.  
Sinfield notes that Thatcher dealt with this by evoking “Victorian values” 
from “a time when aggressive competition co-existed with tradition, family, religion, 
respectability and deference” (296), which consequently tied her in knots over 
whether the despised 1960s were or were not “individualist” in character (297). The 
rhetoric used by supportive politicians around Clause 28 identified gays with a selfish 
individualism, and the law itself, in denying the recognition of gay families, implicitly 
cast gays as victims of their own individualist desires. Thatcher’s will to resolve this 
schizophrenic attitude towards individual ambition and creativity is evident in her 
promotion of none other than Jimmy Savile himself.  
Certainly socially mobile, Savile had accumulated power, fame and money 
through enacting a form of childishness; his lack of interest in marriage or even 
serious personal relationships, together with his career focus on, first, the ‘youth 
culture’ of the 1960s and 1970s and later on even younger children in Jim’ll Fix It, 
made him figuratively a kind of permanent child, as the comparisons of him to Peter 
Pan and the Pied Piper recognised (John Hall, 1; Davies, 292). Yet this individualist 
simultaneously proved his loyalty to the establishment aspects of the Thatcherite 
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project. He always insisted on the totally apolitical nature of his charitable work; yet 
he was depoliticising in a deeper sense, acting (in his pre-Jim’ll Fix It roles as a DJ and 
influential figure in the pop music industry) as a mediator between some of the 
counter-cultural elements of the 1960s and 1970s and the mainstream institutions 
of post-war Britain, particularly BBC Television and the NHS. In all this, a childish 
innocence was supposedly at work, subtly asserting that there is nothing that need 
evade recognition, least of all in the child, even the child whose apparent openness 
to the sexual, societal and artistic creativity of the 1960s might otherwise trouble 
social conservatives. Jim’ll Fix It was so successful because it, via Savile himself, 
provided a solution to a problem, a problem both derived from and now resolved by 
looking at – and reading – the child. In the exposure of the link between the show’s 
aims and Savile’s abuse, the protection of the child abuser is ironically revealed as 
dependent upon public appetite for a kind of reading of the child, directed towards 
containment of the child’s future.  
Looking at the child’s delighted face and reading his words, as the Jim’ll Fix It 
camera makes us do, we are encouraged to feel a satisfying innocence in the whole 
thing: the innocence of the child’s wishes, and our innocence in granting them. 
Somehow, despite the vast ambitions accessed by the show, and Thatcherism’s 
ostensible affirmation of this capacity for ambition as the basis for its vision of the 
future, the world is exactly the same at the end of the show as it was at the start. In 
a curious reversal of the paranoid homophobic belief that knowledge will inevitably 
produce action, we have seen actions happen in front of us – some quite spectacular 
– and yet these have no effect upon us - nor on the child, who is no further towards 
being an explorer, a pop star, a pilot, than before he wrote in to the show.  In 
recognising the innocent child here, we simultaneously refuse recognition to the 
political significance, the potential future difference, introduced by the child’s 
desires. In fact, desire has been reduced to mere pleasure; with Lacan in mind, we 
might observe that it’s a pleasure with no possible of jouissance, no capacity for 
disturbing excess. 
This has been achieved through specifically visual means. Confronted with an 
underlying set of conflicting meanings associated with the child – the child as 
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ambitious individual, deserving of freedom from the post-war social democratic 
state but also compelled to loyalty to the renewed ‘Victorian’ nation, the child as 
fantasist and the child as good worker – the show works to set up, to literally fix a 
scenario where the child demonstrates the compatibility of these impulses for the 
viewers.  
She does so by enacting the innocence of her ambitions, and thus her own 
status as child, which confirms her availability for moulding by the adult authorities; 
in becoming recognisable herself, she demonstrates her own susceptibility to 
recognise what the adult gives her, and not to recognise anything outside of it. As 
well as working visually, this also operates temporally; the immediate anticipation of 
the child’s reactions allegorises a broader recognition of a knowable, consoling 
future: a future defined by ambition for pleasure but also, paradoxically, by 
innocence.  
This resonates powerful with the long and conflicted history of childhood 
innocence in visual culture, as described by Lebeau from the origins of film and by 
Anne Higonnet, in Pictures of Innocence, from eighteen-century “Romantic” 
painting. In Jim’ll Fix It, the innocent child who (like the earliest subjects of film, as 
Lebeau records) is known through his facial reactions – giggling, grinning, staring – is 
revived to serve a specifically Thatcherite function: the reassurance that the child 
‘entrepreneurial’ ambition and frank greed (is it suggestive, in thisp eriod, that the 
show draws no distinction between the two?) need not trouble a conservative social 
vision, one founded on, amongst other things, the enforced non-recognition of 
sexual difference, as Clause 28 made clear. (We’ll return to this tension in Chapter 
3). Both child and adult are thus protected here from such ‘politicisations’ of 
ambition as the demands for recognition of gay relationships that Clause 28 sought 
to shut down. (Famously, another part of the BBC was invaded by anti-Clause 28 
protestors, who interrupted the 6pm news on 23rd May 1988 (Robinson, Gay Men 
and the Left in Post-War Britain, 174). They did not disrupt Jim’ll Fix It.)  
Reading Jim’ll Fix It in these terms echoes a critical passage about education, 
knowledge and childhood ambition in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel and uncanny 
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alternative history of post-war Britain, Never Let Me Go, which I’ll explore further in 
Chapter 4. This passage appears when a teacher breaks away from the authorised 
account of the future to tell her group of peculiar students what they can really 
expect:  
The problem, as I see it, is that you’ve been told and not told […] and 
I dare say, some people are quite happy to leave it that way. But I’m 
not. If you’re going to have decent lives, then you’ve got to know 
and know properly. None of you will go to America, none of you will 
be film stars. […] Your lives are set out for you. (Ishiguro, Never Let 
Me Go, 80) 
Your lives are set out for you: a blunt rejection of the conventional value 
placed on opportunity, self-fulfilment and social mobility in ‘western’ societies from, 
broadly, the second half of the twentieth century, and accelerated in 1980s Britain 
under Thatcherism. In Ishiguro’s novel, the children have, in this sense, no future. 
This resonates with Lee Edelman’s argument in No Future: Queer Theory and the 
Death Drive (2-3, and throughout) that contemporary society is organised around an 
apolitical promise of the future transmitted through the image of the child, but 
which actually acts to contain, trivialise, and deny the possibility of any politics at 
all.6 This is enacted through a kind of violent (and, as in the production of Jim’ll Fix It, 
heavily rigged) reading of the child, one in which the teacher in Never Let Me Go 
briefly refuses to participate.  
Suggestively, reading Ishiguro’s uncanny retrospective of 1970s and 80s 
Britain alongside the unintentionally uncanny effect of viewing Jim’ll Fix It today, we 
find that Edelman’s influential perception of the image of the child as enacting a 
powerfully reactionary politics plays out in direct and visual form, in ways best 
understood through drawing not only on his queer theory but on the (similarly 
psychoanalytically-based) fields of film theory and history. We also find that the 
child’s ambition is a sticking-point here, simultaneously confirming and threatening 
that child’s reassuringly accessible embodiment of the future as under the control of 
essential realities (‘Victorian’ or otherwise). Hence the gaze upon the child is never 
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satisfied, because the child’s imaginative ambitions for the future disturb such 
satisfaction even when they promise it. Jim’ll Fix It made a thorough attempt at 
providing such satisfaction: today, such satisfaction from the child’s reactions has 
been irreversibly and inevitably contaminated.  
As Ishiguro passage suggests, this tension over the child’s ambition is also 
located in the processes of education of which Jim’ll Fix It forms a bizarre parody: 
education as the formal preparation of the child for the future; the teaching of the 
child to ‘read’ (in both the narrow and the broad sense) that is itself determined, as 
in Thatcher’s Clause 28, by how adults read the child. In Never Let Me Go, Kathy’s 
teacher is moved to speak by the visual horror of watching the children misread 
their situation, even though she is supposed to be facilitating precisely that 
misreading. Instead, she enables the children’s ambition (albeit necessarily in an 
ironically compromised way) by telling them the truth. She cannot look at the 
children and see what authority tells her to see – that they deserve a false education 
because of what adult society believes it knows about their nature, about the set of 
values read into the child’s image. The adult’s anticipation, a figurative looking 
ahead that translates into a physical looking at the child, aims for control of the 
future; this is what Adorno and Horkheimer identified as fascist, in that it elicits and 
monitors for a prescribed reaction (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 124-125).  
‘Recognition’ is thus both a literal and a signifying act.  
The child’s growing up - at one and the same time as still being a child - his 
creativity and ambition, is what Thatcherism claims to value as the source of social 
mobility and entrepreneurial achievement, but which British culture under its reign 
refuses to actually imagine, refuses to recognise. The texts we’ll consider throughout 
the thesis depict this refusal but also complicate it, implicate it, parody it; and they 
relentlessly dramatise its consequences as the abuse or disappearance of the child. 
For reasons which are now becoming clearer, they repeatedly do so through an 
ambivalent relationship between seeing and reading.  
In this thesis I explore a number of texts, almost all British and published 
from the early 1980s to the present, which demand our attention because of their 
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shared interest in violent failures in this relationship – failures which manifest a 
persistent anxiety in the child’s embodiment of the future and a willingness to 
imagine violence against the child to force her to conform with a reading of herself. 
At this point I want to consider more fundamentally how the child embodies 
the future in both politics and literature.  
3. End on the Child, See the Future  
Utopianism follows the child around like a family pet. The child exists 
as a site of almost limitless potential […] But because the utopian 
fantasy is the property of adults, not necessarily of children, it is 
accompanied by its Doppelgänger, nostalgia. (Bruhm and Hurley, 
Curioser: On the Queerness of Children, xiii)  
Jim’ll Fix It could be dismissed as a piece of dated popular culture, one 
sometimes viewed as both trivial and exploitative even in its own time (Davies 312), 
and which will never again perform the innocence it once presented. However, the 
possibility of a violent reading behind the gaze on the child, and the need for 
recognition as anticipation, resonates with many cultural representations of the 
child, from both ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, and politically from both Right and Left. As 
Jim’ll Fix It unavoidably now represents a crisis of recognition in at least one sense, it 
prompts us to consider whether the more fundamental and inherent crisis of 
recognition I’ve found within it is supported by a broader analysis of the child’s 
visual relation to the future in cultural history. I particularly want to pursue Bruhm 
and Hurley’s contention, quoted above, that even ostensibly radical cultural and 
political projects, even whilst they lay claim to a future significantly different to the 
present, are susceptible to the attraction of making the future recognisable through 
the child.  
As we’ve observed, for the adult, the child represents a future in which, all 
other things being equal, he will not participate; he anticipates that the child will 
outlive him. Bersani proposes that “the perversion of adults” is “the sickness of 
uncompleted narratives” (32), and that the child risks embodying this threat – and as 
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we shall see, this risk attracts severe adult violence, real and imagined. 
Nevertheless, the child can all too easily enable a perfectly completed narrative. The 
(fictional) child is readily available to act as the closing image of a text, teleologically 
incorporating the potentially infinite future into a narrative that must, at some 
point, stop. This is particularly marked in the use of a messianic or prophetic child to 
conclude an apocalyptic narrative: a widespread trope, where the child appears 
across texts that conclude with the child in the centre of screen, stage or page: 
figure for a future (whether apocalyptic or utopian) beyond the text but 
nevertheless, through the child, included within it.  
In later twentieth-century film alone, versions of this trope have appeared in 
Tennessee Williams’ A Streetcar Named Desire (play 1947; film 1951);7 Stanley 
Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968); Disney’s Bambi (1942) and The Lion King 
(1994); Woody Allen’s Match Point (2006); Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men (2006). 
(This is, of course, far from an exhaustive list.) The child here functions in line with 
the consolation of endings famously identified by Frank Kermode in The Sense of an 
Ending (1967) but it perhaps resonates even more deeply with the function of 
critical reading he developed in The Genesis of Secrecy (1979). As Kermode argued 
there, the crucial thing is not only the narrative offered for interpretation itself, but 
the authority the critic gains by way of this interpretation – an authority generating 
the imperative to read what one sees, to find an invisible yet necessary meaning – 
necessary, indeed, even for salvation.  
In The Lion King, the apparent utopianism of the child as ending affirms a 
perfect future, but (as Bruhm and Hurley suggested) one also totally identified with 
the past, through the final scene’s direct visual repetition of the film’s opening 
sequence, concluding with the presentation of an infant on Pride Rock accompanied 
by the soundtrack of Elton John’s The Circle of Life (see Edelman’s critique of the 
movie as an example of reproductive futurism, 170). The Lion King is based, of 
course, on Hamlet; and this is a signal of the longevity of the trope of the child-as-
future, which Shakespeare actually uses widely. For example, the young Elizabeth at 
the end of Shakespeare’s Henry VIII resolves (ahistorically) the conflicts of her 
father’s reign, as a prophetic Archbishop Cranmer declares-  
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This royal infant--heaven still move about her!-- 
Though in her cradle, yet now promises 
Upon this land a thousand thousand blessings 
(Henry VIII, 5.4.21-23) 
The sight of this child provides a vision of a utopian future created by a 
perpetual cycle of reproduction:  
[…] but as when 
The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix, 
Her ashes new create another heir, […] 
And so stand fix'd: peace, plenty, love, truth, terror, 
That were the servants to this chosen infant, 
Shall then be his [...] 
[....] our children's children 
Shall see this, and bless heaven. 
(Henry VIII, 5.4.43-59) 
To visualise an infinitely expanding future, one well beyond our mortal sight, 
all one need do is look at the child. Re-affirming how the utopian is accompanied by 
nostalgia, Jonathan Bate notes that the scene actually reflects “a time of nostalgia 
for the age of Queen Elizabeth” (1382); the apparent vision of the future is actually a 
recognition of a version of the past.  
Elsewhere, Shakespeare takes the trope of the child as visual embodiment of 
the future in the context of monarchical succession and ironically perverts it - in 
Macbeth it is even the source of the title character’s downfall. Shakespeare’s 
willingness not only to use but to problematise the child-as-ending indicates a 
potential for playing off the trope that became useful in the later twentieth century, 
in a time when the future had become the object of acute anxiety, in the post-
Holocaust era of Cold War and Mutually Assured Destruction. Here the child as 
survivor of a disaster gained renewed importance as an embodiment of the future in 
the present. Jan Kott accordingly thought that Hamlet should be closer to the child 
than the adult, symbol of a future both hopeful and endangered: “the youth, deeply 
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involved in politics […] a young rebel […] his passion sometimes seems childish” 
(Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary, 62).  Yet, of course, not this child but another 
would finally provide the ambiguously threatening trope for the future at the end of 
the play, as Kott points out: 
People fought, plotted, killed one another, committed crimes for love 
[…] Even their crimes had a certain greatness. And then a vigorous 
young lad comes, and says with a charming smile: “Take away these 
corpses. Now I shall be your king.” (Kott, Shakespeare Our 
Contemporary, 73)  
This potential irony available from the trope was discerned by others who 
followed Kott. Julie Taymor’s film based on Titus Andronicus, Titus (1999), ends 
when Young Lucius, himself a child but also carrying an even younger child, Aaron’s 
baby, leaves the arena of violence and exits into sunrise, perhaps returning 
hopefully to the American ‘post-war’ future from whence he came at the movie’s 
opening. (See Rutter 74-86; as she points out, the film begins with scrutiny of a 
child’s face, which, because it is masked, cannot be read).  
Such moments evoke, whether hopefully or ironically, the child embodying a 
value or values that may or may not offer some salvation from a disaster, and thus 
provide the potential for a different future. Of course, this appears far beyond 
adaptations of Shakespeare. In Cormac McCarthy's novel The Road (2006), and its 
film version (2009), the survival of a child in an apocalyptic landscape repeats the 
trope; hence Lydia Cooper reads The Road as a Grail narrative where “ultimately [...] 
the grail is pictured as a small child walking down a road. The novel thus [...] proffers 
an affirmation of the individual's ability to experience a transcendent, and perhaps 
ultimately redemptive, empathic connection with others” (234). Cooper casually 
indicates the ready availability of this powerful trope – she assumes our 
understanding, from its cultural prevalence, of what it means.  
The compulsion, the potential moral absolutism, behind this demand to 
recognise the child as the future, is criticised by Edelman in No Future, where he 
draws attention to its role in underpinning an authoritarian social and political order 
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based on deferral of pleasure and the abjection of the queer (2-3). One of the texts 
he criticises as perfectly exhibiting this use of the child is P.D. James’ 1992 novel 
Children of Men, which “perfectly brings out the function of the child as the secular 
theology on which our social reality rests” (No Future, 12).  
Two years after Edelman published No Future, Children of Men was adapted 
as a movie, one which applied exactly the moral structure he identified on to the 
political concerns of its own time. Children of Men ends on the trope of the child as 
future in a direct rehearsal of its origins in the narratives of the infant Christ. The 
figure of the child is present long before his actual appearance here, though; we 
have to read him behind what we see – as the plot will certainly force us to do 
unless, as Edelman remarks with deliberate irony, we were born yesterday (12).  
The film depicts an outbreak of total human infertility. In the absence of any 
children being born, and with associated economic and environmental catastrophes 
underway, an apocalyptic sequence of violence and authoritarian oppression has 
begun. However, a single new baby has been born in secret, and a small group of 
initiates (echoing both the Holy Family and the disciples of Christ) must keep the 
child safely concealed amidst the violence and persecutions. After evading various 
perils, the child is eventually spirited to safety on a boat called Tomorrow, and the 
final sequence shows the child being carried through an awed crowd towards this 
boat. Cuarón uses the plot from James’ novel to dramatise left-wing concerns 
dominating the time of the film’s production in 2006, especially the oppression of 
migrants, the Iraq War, state complicity in torture and other abuses, and 
environmental damage. Set in 2027 following a period of global infertility beginning 
in 2009, the film was a full-volume, unsubtle warning to the 2006 audience of what 
the future might bring if western politics failed to change course.  
The child’s function in the film is accordingly unsubtle: he embodies an 
alternative, utopian future, and the ending heavily implies that the recognition of 
this function is the first step towards realising that future. Drawing heavily upon the 
Christian tradition’s celebration of gazing upon a divine infant who embodies 
eternity and salvation, the film participates in the hermeneutics Kermode discerned 
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at the root of institutionalised literary criticism, the imperative to read what one 
sees in order to save and be saved.  
Across all these examples, then, the imperative to read a value or set of 
qualities behind the sight of the child is sufficiently powerful to create a shared 
moral and cultural vocabulary, one that emphasises both the value of the child and 
clearly distinguishes between the child and the source of risks to the future the child 
represents. Even Children of Men maintains this distinction; the child is certainly at 
risk, but only because the absence of children has proved their value, and that value 
is universally recognised by the crowd when the child finally appears at the ending.  
However, we might take this as a sign that the politics of Children of Men are 
not really as radical as the film suggests at face value; an appeal to a universal 
sensibility (as Edelman cues us to point out) clearly does not encompass the sort of 
disruption to the political order that the Thatcher government was concerned with 
in Clause 28, for example.  
Ultimately, the child who embodies the future at the ending of a text must 
be recognised because time is short; because the adults – including we, the viewers 
and readers - will die, and in order for some form of moral reproduction to allow us 
to transcend this fact, we must recognise that reproduction in the child. Mario Feit 
has described, in Democratic Anxieties, how apparently secular moralities adopt 
quasi-religious notions of immortality as their basis, and tend to figure this (as in 
Children of Men) as heterosexual reproduction, which becomes the central value 
determining political representation. Combining this with Edelman’s Lacanian and 
queer analysis of the phenomenon and Lebeau’s history of the child on screen, we 
can see the child-as-ending as invoking urgency in the demand to recognise the 
child.  
Edelman, Bersani and Feit all theorise the child’s apparent embodiment of 
immortality as a conservative, even reactionary phenomenon. Edelman advocates 
that against such teleology one should embrace the association of the queer with 
death, with a refusal of any future, an imperative he theorises through the Lacanian 
Death Drive. Here, I want to propose a different reading of the child’s embodiment 
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of the future: that this embodiment is in important respects real, but that it is as 
much a problem for the adults in authority as it is their salvation. Indeed, as with the 
function of the child’s ambition in Jim’ll Fix It, the quality on which a moral order 
apparently rests may be the very one it secretly fears. As Bruhm says, the child is 
often inscribed “as both the thing we wish the child to be and the thing that actively 
resists [it,] as both the quality of a child and that quality’s undoing” (“The 
Counterfeit Child”, 28). 
I want to test this idea through the resonant figure of the queer child, both 
as apparent mortal opponent of the conservative futurism represented by Savile’s 
pop-culture Thatcherism and as a central figure for modes of reading the child in 
general within contemporary literary criticism.  
 
4. Dusty Pasts and Dangerous Futures: Jarman’s Edward II 
One text produced to oppose Clause 28 pursues its politics by demanding 
that we recognise the queer child. This is Derek Jarman’s queer re-writing of 
Christopher Marlowe’s play Edward II in his 1991 film of the same title. Jarman’s 
Edward II, produced shortly after Margaret Thatcher’s departure from office, and 
whilst Clause 28 legislation was still a recent introduction, combines popular and 
literary culture to dramatise the queer child, for whom Jarman demands 
recognition. In this demand, he subverts the normal conservative use of the visual 
trope of the child who embodies the future, and specifically its mobilisation for the 
introduction of Clause 28 and broader political homophobia.  
Jarman’s film concludes with an idealistic vision of a queer future, one that 
(ironically undermining Thatcherite nationalism) locates the future in a version of 
the national past, re-imagined as queer to its core; here, the queer man even sits on 
the throne (and occasionally shares it with the child). This film’s consistent visual 
and thematic interest in the child’s gaze and reactions hints that such a future might 
be achieved through the child’s education, in the broadest sense; it’s a reading of 
the future through reading the child, reading the world.  
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In this, Jarman appears to embrace precisely the potential for political 
disruption that Thatcherism tries to remove from the child’s ambitions. His attitude 
to his source material was, indeed, explicitly disruptive:  
How to make a film of a gay love affair and get it commissioned? Find 
a dusty old play and violate it [. . .]  Marlowe outs the past—why 
don’t we out the present? (Jarman, Queer Edward II, epigraph) 
This has something in common with contemporary modes of queer reading 
(for which Jarman’s Edward II is a seminal text (Guy-Bray, Edward II Revised, xii)) 
where one basic aim is often to identify queerness in literary and cultural history, to 
‘out’ it. To ‘out’ is to recognise, and this film is concerned with recognising that to 
which Thatcherism aggressively refused recognition: the queer child. As Jarman’s 
metaphorical desire to “violate” Marlowe suggests, the film reclaims the feared act 
of anal penetration from the homophobic imagination, and portrays knowledge of 
such sexuality as, counter to Clause 28, unharmful to the child, whose future is 
instead compromised by the violence of homophobia itself. “Outing” is the exposure 
of this reality; it is the act of education that the film pursues through the child.  
Accordingly, in the final sequence, which like Marlowe’s play depicts the 
usurpation and murder by anal stabbing of Edward II of England, here his son (the 
young Edward III), appears as a triumphantly queer child, made up and wearing 
beautiful jewellery, playing above the now caged and humiliated homophobic 
persecutors of his father: his mother, Queen Isabella, and her lover, Mortimer. The 
whole film, then, and its aim to “out the past”, hinges on this act of recognition, in 
which we are all encouraged to participate – to out past and present. This is why, in 
fact, the film – and the reading of Marlowe it effectively undertakes – has become 
such a central text for queer studies in literature. The film encourages us to 
recognise the child in order to recognise the reality he represents – the reality that 
queerness exists, that it can bring joy, and that the future need not necessarily be 
constrained by a homophobic loyalty to the national past - particularly because, 
Jarman hints, that conservative fantasy of the past is thoroughly contaminated by 
the realities of queerness anyway.  
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As Alexandra Parsons points out, in the child Edward III’s final appearance, 
“he wears a smart, black suit but with Isabella’s earrings and high heels” (420). This 
denotes both the child’s agency in overcoming heterosexist categories and a future 
where those categories will prove, as Martin Quinn-Meyler observes, “ultimately 
futile” (126). In this respect the child overcomes categories in a way even his queer 
father and his lover cannot (as Aebischer says, they remain “masculine even as their 
desires are same-sex” (Screening Early Modern Drama, 54)), resolving the 
misogynistic conflict over Isabella by symbolically moderating the condemnation of 
her betrayal of her unloving husband. (Jarman adds a scene where Edward and 
Isabella uncomfortably and unsuccessfully attempt to have sex). To access this 
future beyond the pain of these events, we need to recognise the child, and his 
significance.  
On its free-ranging re-writing of Marlowe’s play, the film is in fact a ‘play’ on 
recognition throughout: the audience is compelled to recognise (and “out”) the 
presence of the queer in Edward II the king, Edward III the child, Edward II the play, 
and in Marlowe, the playwright. To not recognise the queer, to seek to exile it or 
destroy it, risks our becoming like Mortimer and Isabella, fools humiliated by history. 
Jarman explicitly presents this as the consequence of the wilful refusal of recognition 
underpinning Thatcherite homophobia, including, in particular, the failure to 
recognise the association (or even, in his film, the alliance) between the child and 
the queer, the potential alliance that Clause 28 implicitly acknowledges even in 
attempting to destroy it.  
The child conjured by Clause 28, and later theorised by Edelman, is present in 
the film, in Edward III’s initial incomprehension at his father’s relationship with 
Gaveston, but also in some children who appear even before he does. When 
Gaveston confronts the Bishop (a confrontation taken from the Marlowe play, but, 
as Parsons suggests (422), in Jarman’s version hinting at more recent Church of 
England homophobia), Jarman’s bishop is accompanied by two choirboys, dressed in 
white and bearing candles. They act as visual signifiers of the bishop’s authority as 
he immediately begins condemning Gaveston – the innocent, even angelic child a 
literal prop for the angry old man.  
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Shortly after this, the young Prince Edward, played by Jody Graber, appears 
for the first time in his pyjamas with his uncle Kent; he goes to Gaveston, on the 
throne, to play with a sword. This is a much earlier entrance for the Prince than in 
the Marlowe source-text, where the Prince does not appear until halfway through 
Scene 11 (11.57). This early entrance signifies Jarman’s determination to give this 
child a central place throughout, foregrounding questions of education and the 
future, acting as a framing witness to the homophobic violence that suggests both 
judgement (children are watching your actions; will you be on the right side of 
history?) and hope (the child’s constant questioning suggests that he, at least, is 
already thinking differently).   
Prince Edward is constantly watching and often questioning events in this 
film, from his early entrance onwards. He is also often playing, with toys (like the 
sword, and like a robot soldier with which he plays shortly afterwards) that alternate 
between coding aggressive masculinity and colourful femininity. Yet even the 
choirboys attendant on the Bishop are also notably watching events in their scene; 
they turn between him and Gaveston, they look up inquisitively. Under Jarman’s 
direction and editing, the children in his film are never just props even when – 
especially when - various adult characters attempt to use them as such; their looking 
and playing constantly suggests a process of education, of fascination with the 
events around them, followed by re-playing and re-making them. We, the audience, 
are compelled to follow the child’s facial reactions, and to guess at their significance, 
by the scrutiny they receive from the camera.  
The child’s ability to watch and to re-make the world, the spirit of play that 
Jarman has Prince Edward share with Gaveston on his first appearance, is central to 
the film’s political promise. The textual companion to the film, Queer Edward II, 
indicates that Jarman originally intended to make the film actually open on this 
point, having Prince Edward “look[ing] on holding a torch that casts eerie shadows” 
(2) whilst his grandfather, Edward I, dies (the event with which both Marlowe’s play 
and Jarman’s film begins but which is ultimately only reported in both). Jarman’s 
text, with an accompanying photograph of the scene being staged though it did not 
make the final cut of the film, suggests that Edward I would appear as a walking suit 
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of armour that “crashes around a room” as he has a heart attack, before “blood 
oozes through the King’s visor” (2). As well as this animatronic vision conveying the 
monstrosity of a “straight […] and very cruel” (2) patriarch, it also identifies 
sovereign authority – the authority of the state and of the past – as a suit that can 
be put on, discarded or transgressively re-arranged by the child, as indeed Prince 
Edward goes on to do with other items of clothing and regalia.  
With this scene cut, the film’s opening nevertheless emphasises the potential 
for change presented by Edward I’s death. “My father is deceased” (the opening line 
of Marlowe’s play, but spoken only once there) is repeated twice, and then a third 
time after the titles, by Gaveston whilst two nude men frolic on a bed behind him; 
thus the possibility of change (potentially to the benefit of queers) is emphasised 
from the start.  
The child Prince Edward is the main locus of this possibility, but it is also 
identified with a certain child-ness (a kind of innocence, in fact, in that it constitutes 
an explicit rejection of political participation in favour of private play) present in the 
relationship between his father and Gaveston, who himself plays with the young 
Prince. When Gaveston confronts Mortimer, he does so swinging, nude, on the 
throne in just such an act of childlike play; and this confrontation cuts to a shot of 
Prince Edward playing with his own toys. The Prince is not only playful, but also 
prone to exploration: in one scene he comes across a strange circle of nude figures 
in the darkness, pushing against each other in something resembling a 
choreographed rugby scrum, ambiguously suggestive of both sexuality and violence. 
In another scene, this child peers out from behind a beef carcass hanging in the 
centre of the room in a visual echo of the throne; later he watches his mother drink 
blood from the neck of the tortured Kent.  
Although the Prince curiously questions his father’s relationship with 
Gaveston (“Why do you love him whom the world despises so?”, a line Jarman takes 
from Mortimer in Marlowe’s playtext (4.76) and gives to the Prince),8 his actions at 
the ending show that he has thoroughly identified with queer love - and so the 
violence towards queers becomes implicitly associated with abuse of the child, 
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collapsing the most acceptable and the most taboo forms of violence into one 
another. The Prince, though, seems able to transfigure the perpetual violence and 
antagonism of the adults; given militaristic toys to play with and brutal scenes to 
witness, his own ‘violence’ towards Isabella and Mortimer is playfully and harmlessly 
enacted with flour.  
Prince Edward’s identification with the queer becomes complete in his 
decisive choice not to go along with his mother and Mortimer (despite their coaxing 
and coercion), but rather to identify with his father and celebrate the murderous 
heterosexual lovers’ downfall. The final scene introduces his father’s final words, “If I 
live, let me forget myself”, spoken as the camera pans over a crowd of OutRage-
style gay rights protestors. As implied by both the staging of the King’s murder and 
its reversal as a dream, life and death are as one here in this vision of a future (which 
is also the dream of an “outed” past). The child’s role in bringing this about hints 
that education and a willingness to play, to puncture the pompous hypocrisies of 
heterosexual morality (identified here with Thatcherite authority), will be the 
practical tools for achievement of this utopian vision.  
The utopianism is enacted through a reading of the child, then, but hints that 
in practice, progress will be achieved through the child’s reading; his curiosity will 
eventually defeat the imperative to non-recognition of the queer presented by the 
authorities attempting (and failing) to direct his education. As Parsons points out 
(418), the photographic images in Queer Edward II re-arrange Marlowe’s scenes to 
bring in Prince Edward at moments when he is not present in Marlowe, and even 
make the focus “the on-looker, the young Edward” (418) and this is as true of the 
film itself as of the companion-piece. 
 This codes, of course, the defeat of the control over the child’s reading in 
Clause 28, and of its homophobic will to ban queers from recognition as families, 
from capacity for the kind of parenting both Edward II and Gaveston visibly 
demonstrate here upon the Prince.  
Whilst this indicates a renewed possibility of political progress, something 
altogether more utopian, rather than merely progressive, is at work in Jarman’s 
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ending, in which Edward II wakes up from (what now turns out to have been) only 
the dream of his murder. Curiously, this stops historical time in the act of 
recognition: The would-be murderer, realising the repressed desire behind the 
violent penetration he was about to make, throws away his poker and kisses Edward 
instead. Not only homophobia but history is joyously abandoned as a utopian time 
emerges from recognition of (queer) reality.  
This is confirmed by the young Edward III, dancing to Tchaikovsky’s Dance of 
the Sugar Plum Fairy in feminine make-up and jewellery on top of the cage in which 
Mortimer and Isabella are held (having taken from them, as Parsons noted, 
elements of both their masculine and feminine performativity). This time after 
history has stopped is a time of play and freedom; of individual creativity and the 
social united not through conservative loyalty to the state but the child’s capacity to 
re-make social arrangements – a capacity produced by his looking at, and reading of, 
the events around him.  
 This ending of time is not only a dream of the end of the period of 
Thatcherite homophobia in which the film was made. It also implicitly reads that 
period as a response to earlier and disastrous authoritarianisms, as evoked by the 
fascistic appearance of the uniforms worn by Mortimer’s followers. Here, then, the 
ambitious and creative child, who reads the world around him in order to become 
something other than himself, is the source of salvation not only from Clause 28 
(with its fear of precisely this child) but also from earlier political projects that did 
great violence to the future in the name of securing it. This salvation extends not 
only to us, the viewers, but to Edward II himself, who is saved through the 
recognition of the queer that his would-be executioner achieves and which is 
symbolically and literally performed by his son’s dance. This results in a reversal of 
the film’s (and Marlowe’s) opening line: the father is not dead, but the queer can 
nevertheless return, triumphant, in the son.  
Jarman achieves this ending through a strategically selective use (or, 
according to the film’s opening titles, “improvement”) of Marlowe’s playtext. If we 
explore what Jarman’s film omits from his source, we find that not only the child 
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who emerges from this but the child who is left behind has implications for the 
politics of his film, and how those politics are achieved. We also find, in Marlowe’s 
play, a very different child, with different implications for politics and time. This 
provokes questions about the use of visual recognition as the basis for a utopian 
change to political representation.  
Prince Edward’s role differs significantly between Marlowe’s playtext and 
Jarman’s film (though he is crucial to the endings, in particular, of both). Of course, 
these endings are deliberately different, with Jarman’s serving a distinct activist 
purpose through its utopian vision, with the consequence that, unlike in Marlowe, 
his Prince Edward never exactly accedes to the throne. Despite the heavily 
politicised nature of Jarman’s film, real politics are as a result, I shall argue, actually 
obscured by the foreclosing of time with which the film ends (and which the child 
codes).  
Time is violent in Marlowe’s Edward II. As the play opens, Edward I has 
ordered the exile of his son’s lover Piers Gaveston, but that son, having just become 
King Edward II, has immediately recalled Gaveston. The time is out of joint, the will 
of an individual king conflicting with the monarchy’s function in managing time 
through the production of heirs: even whilst Edward II’s “my father is deceased” 
(1.1.) appears to consign Edward I to the past, Mortimer affirms that he was “sworn 
to your father at his death” (1.82). Given this rupture in political time, it is not 
surprising that the next heir is himself the object of competing attempts to control 
him and his education.  
Jarman’s particular positionings of the Prince as a witness in several scenes, 
where he gradually develops his identification with his queer father (as evidenced by 
his clothing choices) are Jarman’s own work: they reflect the significance, but not 
the content, of the Prince’s role in the Marlowe playtext.   
The Prince’s appearances differ significantly in number, timing and content 
between Marlowe’s playtext and Jarman’s film. Whereas in the latter the Prince 
appears within the first twenty minutes, and is invited up to the throne to play with 
Gaveston in the background of the adults’ conversation, in Marlowe he does not 
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appear until Scene 11 – not only relatively late in the action, but after Gaveston has 
already been executed. The kind of education this child receives from his father is 
also very different from that given to Jarman’s Prince. Whereas the latter gets both 
play and conversation from King Edward, Marlowe’s Prince appears for the first time 
only to be sent away by his father to go with Isabella to mollify the King of France, 
who has seized Normandy (11.64). The King appears preoccupied with Gaveston 
(11.67) and refers to the Prince as “your [Isabella’s] little son” (11.70).  
Marlowe scholars like Marie Rutkoski have increasingly recognised the 
centrality of the Prince in the play, whilst Lisa Hopkins remarks: “If we judge him by 
the devotion to him evinced by his son, Edward II is the best parent in [Marlowe’s] 
plays” (Christopher Marlowe, 32). Historically, Marlowe’s portrayal of this filial 
devotion complicates any homophobic reading of Edward II’s failures; for the son 
who loves him grew up to be the celebrated Plantagenet warrior-king, Edward III. 
(The knowledge that Prince Edward would grow up to be this king is, of course, an 
example of the inclusion of the future in the present through the figure of the child). 
However, Hopkins’ formulation is puzzling: Why would we judge the father by his 
son’s devotion, since it appears not to be reciprocated?  
The order that Isabella goes to France, taking the Prince, to negotiate has 
disastrous effects. It ends any even partly convincing appearance of Isabella’s loyalty 
to the King and gives her (and thus eventually Mortimer) a valuable tool in physical 
possession of the heir. Jarman’s Edward II, though certainly passionately in love with 
Gaveston, incapable of loving Isabella, and capable of visceral hatred of his enemies 
(in one scene he even murders a member of the homophobic police force), is never 
unequivocally a bad king. The brutally homophobic Mortimer and the bitter, vicious 
Isabella are the irrational actors in Jarman’s events, not the King. 
Yet in Marlowe, even if Edward is in many respects sympathetic (Guy-Bray 
makes a vigorous case against uncritical acceptance of the idea that he is bad ruler in 
Edward II Revised), he makes poor choices, at least in the context in which he lives, 
even if that context is a violent and often absurd world (particularly so in the play’s 
core irony, that the barons claim to want a strong and legitimate ruler, yet 
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constantly oppose the legitimately-titled Edward’s attempts to exercise his 
strength). King Edward’s sending Isabella and the Prince abroad is foolish, and 
directly caused by his distraction by Gaveston (who, in another grim irony, is, 
unknown to King Edward, already dead at this point). It also demonstrates the King’s 
apparent disregard for his son (the chances of the Prince actually helping his father 
in France are low). Marlowe’s Prince Edward thus cannot access a humane and 
truthful version of events in the way that Jarman’s Prince does. Whereas the latter 
talks openly with his sensitive father and plays with Gaveston, the former is sent 
away by his father as soon as we see them together. Yet as Hopkins says, the Prince 
himself does display devotion to his father; however, this looks foolish (or poignant) 
when he states his belief that his father “loves me better than a thousand Spencers” 
(15.7), against the evidence the audience has seen. The Prince repeatedly indicates a 
love and honour for his father that Marlowe shows to be not only unrequited, but 
evidently based on a purely imaginary version of his relationship to his father 
(though Jarman, tellingly, makes it real in his film).  
This indicates how, in Marlowe’s Edward II, there is no healing of the 
temporal rupture with which the play begins. Edward II’s interest in difference, in 
the illegitimate, and what we now call the queer, as destabilising factors in the 
political order, emerges with particular force in the child and remains ironically 
present even in his final restoration of order.  Edward III’s spectacular and sudden 
assertion of authority through violence concludes the play, giving it the ending 
Jarman erased from his movie.  
In deposing Edward II and ruling in the name of his son, Mortimer claims to 
be restoring the natural order guaranteed by the monarchy, but this claim depends 
on deferring the child’s right to rule in his own right – on ignoring, in fact, that this 
child is already growing up - an ignorance that costs Mortimer his power and his life: 
Queen: Ah, Mortimer, the king my son hath news 
His father’s dead, and we have murdered him. 
Mortimer: What if he have? The king is yet a child. 
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(26.15-17) 
Time is the critical issue for the exercise of authority here, as is apparent 
when the play’s fundamentally disjointed time is physically staged through the 
proclamation of Edward III as king in one scene (in a charade stage-managed by 
Mortimer), only for the still-living Edward II to reappear in the next. This reflects a 
temporal crisis that cannot be eradicated with the death of Gaveston, of Edward II, 
or of Mortimer, and which has been at work from the play’s opening. Edward I’s 
order for Gaveston’s exile is voided (or is it?) by his death and his son’s succession; 
Edward II is the legitimate king, but rules with a tyrannical disregard for the future; 
Mortimer deposes the rightful king in the name of the legitimacy of the monarchy 
itself, but in reality can only rule as a tyrant. There is also something excessive about 
Mortimer and Isabella’s passion for one another (and perverted at its source, in that 
Isabella ultimately welcomes the murder of her husband by her lover) that ironically 
echoes the passion between Edward II and Gaveston. Their rule is ultimately just as 
much a disruption of the imagined natural and legitimate temporal order as is 
caused by the relationship of Edward and Gaveston.  
It is not unreasonable today to read this temporal disruption, as Jarman 
does, as queerness. It is directly associated with the crisis of legitimacy represented 
in Edward’s obsessive passion for Gaveston - which is also, ironically, reflected in 
Mortimer and Isabella’s relationship and even in Prince Edward’s devotion to his 
father. The Prince perceives himself as a rival to his father’s new favourite, Spencer, 
and has a love for his father that appears just as irrational (and ultimately as 
disruptive in its effects) as the adults’ affairs. Where Marlowe differs from Jarman, 
though – and therefore becomes subject to the latter’s re-writing – is that this 
temporal disruption does not presage any entrance into utopian time, any return to 
natural and legitimate time, or any progress. In important respects, the child who 
assumes the throne at the play’s end has learned nothing.  
 The trope of the child who resolves the future in the present, as discussed 
earlier, might lead us to anticipate that Prince Edward’s accession will finally 
reconcile the crisis in time that has afflicted England. Instead, the young Edward III 
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turns the act of usurpation and the violence of execution (but now also combined 
with the retrieved authority of kingship) back upon Mortimer, carrying out his own 
coup against Mortimer in the final scene.  
Prior to this, in preparing a written note through which to order Edward II’s 
murder, Mortimer anticipates the child’s reading and plans to control it, and through 
this to control time. Correctly foreseeing the risk of Prince Edward seeking revenge 
for his father’s death, Mortimer uses some ambiguous Latin to instruct the murder 
whilst simultaneously disguising the order, in a form of plausible deniability:  
Mortimer: This letter, written by a friend of ours,  
  Contains his death, yet bids them save his life.  
 ‘Edwardum occidere nolite timere, bonum est’, 
  ‘Fear not to kill the king, ‘tis good he die.’ 
  But read it thus, and that’s another sense:  
 ‘Edwardum occidere nolite, timere bonum est,’ 
‘Kill not the king, ‘tis good to fear the worst.’ 
  (Edward II, 24.6-12)  
Thus through a linguistic trick based on the placing of a comma, Mortimer 
attempts to control the child’s reading and through that control the future. 
However, he has simultaneously failed to ‘read’ the child, and the result is a very 
different future to the one he anticipated:  
First Lord: My lord, here is the head of Mortimer.  
Edward III: Go fetch my father’s hearse, where it shall lie,  
And bring my funeral robes. Accursed head,  
Could I have ruled thee then as I do now,  
Thou hadst not hatched this monstrous treachery!  
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(Enter some with Edward II’s hearse) 
Here comes the hearse. Help me to mourn, my lords.  
Sweet father, here unto thy murdered ghost 
I offer up this wicked traitor’s head;  
And let these tears distilling from mine eyes 
Be witness of my grief and innocency! 
(Exeunt, bearing in the hearse)  
(Edward II, 26.93-102)  
The failure of Mortimer’s note to have any effect ironically suggests the 
naivety of any assumption that the child’s reading can be easily controlled; this child 
has been reading what he was seeing in ways not penetrable to the adult. The final 
scene makes ironic reference to this simultaneous power and recalcitrance in the 
gaze, as it works from the dead eyes of Mortimer, to the witnessing eyes of the 
Prince, to the display of those eyes for the imagined gaze of his dead father and for 
the audience.  
In fact, the suspicion of a clandestine education through sight has been 
present throughout the playtext. This child, for whom the events of Edward II have 
been a perverse Bildungsroman, seems to have absorbed a fetish for destruction of 
the heads of others from his surroundings. Violence to the head has proliferated 
throughout the play: Lancaster demands that Edward II “look to see the throne 
where you should sit/ To float in blood, and at thy wanton head/The glozing head of 
thy base minion thrown” (1.130-132). The method of Gaveston’s execution, 
promised early in 1.131-2, is beheading (not a natural fit with the desire to expose 
him as a commoner). Mortimer’s own beheading finally fulfils Kent’s demand for 
revenge on the rebels from amongst whom he emerged: “let these their 
heads/Preach upon poles for trespass of their tongues” (1.116-117). Although the 
Prince is not present on stage for all these moments, they are so persistent that he 
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seems to have merely absorbed the surrounding culture when, whilst in France, he 
announces that he will not leave his mother “Till I be strong enough to break a staff,/ 
And then have at the proudest Spencer’s head” (15.24-5).  
The play’s concluding lines suggest a prolonged ceremony between the head 
and the child. Contemplating Mortimer’s head, Edward determines that the nature 
of his own “rule” should be best figured as an act of visual recognition, and of a 
containment of the subject within an animated yet essentially dead skull. All this 
self-reflexive violence towards the head suggests a desire to use the gaze to dissolve 
the boundary between subject and object as a means of anticipating the future.  
As Marie Rutkoski demonstrates (284), Marlowe appears to have deliberately 
intensified the contrast between Edward’s age and the violence of his accession, 
making him appear much younger than the historical Edward III and thus 
emphasising the sense that Mortimer’s critical error was to misread Edward -
precisely because his of his childhood: “What if he have [learned of his father’s 
murder]?” Mortimer asks rhetorically: “The king is yet a child” (26.17) 
This is not just any accession, nor is this just any royal child. The ironic 
accompaniment of Edward III’s accession with an appeal to “witness of my […] 
innocency”– that is, the invitation to the audience to read this new king as a child 
precisely at the moment of his violence, as he ‘offers up’ the detached head - 
underlines the perversity of his supposed restoration of the legitimate (monarchical) 
temporal and political order. This could not have happened as it does were it not for 
the very child-ness of the new ruler, whose action against Mortimer provides 
startling evidence of childhood ambition and creativity, emerging from his 
imagination to form the final act of a ‘play’ in a double sense. Yet it’s also evidence 
of a certain terrifyingly successful naivety, in that this restoration of the ‘legitimate’ 
order ignores the plentiful evidence of that order’s failures, whilst nevertheless 
realising that anticipation of others will be essential to the appearance of legitimacy 
and thus the maintenance of Edward III’s own rule.  
Edward III, following the example called for by his beloved (now, ironically, 
also beheaded) uncle Kent, situates his rule on the limit between body and mind, the 
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point of decapitation. He aims to rule men’s heads as securely during their lifetimes 
as if they were severed in death. His accession-by-execution thus demands a form of 
violent reading – but of us, not of him. We, like Mortimer, probably did not read this 
child in time.  
Edward III’s announcement of his intentions on gaining the throne shows 
that perfect recognition can only be achieved when the object of that recognition is 
denied all privacy and all agency; and he has absorbed this belief through living in a 
culture that seeks to deny the potential difference inherent in the inability to ever 
fully recognise the living, thinking subject. Ironically, this inability was most evident 
in Mortimer’s inability to recognise him as a subject, because he was a child.  
This is suggestive, then, for the question of why Jarman – working to an 
imperative to recognise the child that arose from a different political intention but 
ultimately functions in the same way – turned away from these elements of the 
Marlowe text to construct another ending – one with the young Edward III still 
centre-stage/screen, but serving a different purpose, and embodying a very 
different future. In the film, in order to create a utopian and atemporal moment 
through the King’s resurrection, the succession of his son and the violence 
associated with it in Marlowe have to be abandoned. Jarman eliminates Marlowe’s 
interest in the paranoid reading of the child, the constant scrutiny of his face for 
signs of growing up (for the seeds of usurpation) and replaces it with an ‘innocent’ 
reading of the child as the recognisable embodiment of salvation (who saves, 
indeed, through his own capacity to recognise). Ironically, Jarman’s protest against 
the withdrawal of recognition to the queer child represented by Clause 28 finds itself 
compulsively withdrawing recognition from another child: the Prince Edward of the 
Marlowe playtext, who is in some respects just as queer as Jarman’s Prince, but who 
refuses to embody the future in a recognisably positive way. In fact, as we’ve found, 
not only does he refuse this, his own actions ironically point to the role of 
recognition in political power. This child is too difficult for Jarman’s politicised re-
working, precisely because he demonstrates the fallacy, and latent violence, of 
making political representation conditional on being available for recognition. 
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Accordingly, he must himself be disappeared, dismissed as part of the dusty past, 
incompatible with Jarman’s “improvement”.  
Jarman’s film finally ends on a tracking shot over the assembled protesters 
while Edward II delivers these words in voiceover:  
But what are Kings, when regiment is gone,  
But perfect shadows in a sunshine day?  
I know not, but of this I am assured,  
That death ends all, and I can die but once.  
Come death, and with thy fingers close my eyes,  
Or if I live let me forget myself. 
Interestingly, Jarman appears to have revised his intentions for this ending, 
having considered having the above lines spoken by Edward III whilst reading them 
from a book, presumably after his father’s death, locating the act of recognition 
more clearly in the child’s education (see Aebischer, Screening Early Modern Drama, 
443). Ultimately, Jarman chose to emphasise instead the utopian, indeed almost 
eschatological, aesthetic with which the film now concludes. He also made use of 
the intensity attached to the trope of the child who embodies the future at the 
ending of a text. 
As the final vision of an eternal and atemporal moment is, paradoxically, 
achieved only as the culmination of a plot that (despite Jarman’s innovations) 
develops sequentially, in time, in practice the imperative with which the film leaves 
us somehow combines this vision of the eternal with a demand to act in time. This 
reconciliation is achieved through how the imperative for recognition of the child 
functions as an anticipation, as a constant presence of the utopian moment in the 
here and now – someone to be seen, but always simultaneously to be read. This 
availability for reading becomes, in fact, the prerequisite for both aesthetic and 
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political representation here. The child’s value for Jarman is his function in bringing 
in a utopian future.  
If Jarman’s child really is the queer child, then he seems to be one who 
curiously loses his dangerous edge (after all, the worst that happens even to 
Mortimer and Isabella in his version is that they are left caged and covered in flour), 
demanding only that we recognise him in order to access a better future, even in the 
present.  His capacity for political disruption (clearly associated by Marlowe with his 
recalcitrance to knowledge, his capacity for secret and invisible thoughts behind his 
face) is lost here. There is something in this that reflects an ambivalence towards 
recognition and identification in queer readings. For example, in Guy-Bray’s reading 
of Jarman’s ‘outing’ of the play, he declares:  
Jarman demonstrates that it is misleading to speak […] of a private 
life, and this connection of the public (politics) and the private 
(sexuality) is indeed one of the distinguishing features of Marlowe’s 
Edward II. (Edward II Revised, xii) 
It is certainly true, as this claims, that the play asserts the inevitability of 
political and public consequences for private life; but the seriousness of those 
consequences are produced precisely through the very privacy of life – especially as 
located in the child. It is his (self-)awareness of this fact that leads Edward III to 
announce his own abolition of such life even in the moment of asking the audience 
to witness his “innocency”. It is therefore not misleading, but rather necessary, to 
speak of private life, for this life, in frustrating recognition, goes on to produce a 
whole (promised) public order based on the violence of recognition.  
As Edward III puts it, all violence could be avoided “could I have ruled thee 
then as I do now”; that is, if the violence already conditioned our existence before 
the act, or if recognition was the prerequisite for any political representation. There 
are, of course, no politics and therefore no future possible in this situation. It is 
telling that Jarman misses this implication from the Marlowe text in his desire to 
imagine a future beyond politics, beyond time and death; could there be something, 
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we might wonder, about the conditions of the 1980s and 1990s that explain why in 
this respect he unconsciously mirrors the strategies of his right-wing opponents?  
In a novel by another Thatcher-era re-writer of older texts, Peter Ackroyd (to 
whom we shall return later) there is another case of a rule beyond politics and with 
no need for a future - and curiously, as with Jarman, this vision takes the form of a 
collapse between Elizabethan and contemporary texts. (Ackroyd has a much more 
ambiguous (and less activist) attitude to his own queerness than did Jarman.) 
Ackroyd’s 1992 novel The House of Dr Dee reflects on the relationships 
between knowledge, violence, power, and time, through the child. In the novel, a 
fictionalised Dr John Dee is pursuing a project to allow human reproduction through 
artificial means, for the creation of a macabre quasi-child, the “homunculus”, at the 
same time as his marriage is collapsing (Dr Dee is obsessed throughout with a horror 
of the female and particularly the maternal as abject and grotesque). The creation of 
the homunculus is in fact aiming to destroy the relation between reproduction and 
loss that the maternal function introduces. 
 One chapter, called ‘The City’ (evoking both Ackroyd’s interest in London as 
a site of competing forms of knowledge, and the metonym specifically for the 
financial interests located in the City of London, the economic centre of the 
Thatcherite project) is entirely taken up with the narrator’s dream. He visits this city, 
the “world without love” (205), and there encounters a strange queen in the act of 
physically deconstructing a body:  
There before her lay a naked corpse with a white cloth over its head; 
the breast had been cut open and I could see within the flesh and the 
fat, the sinews and muscles, the membranes and fibres, all revealed. 
The queen stood with her hands sunk into the body up to her wrists. 
‘I am in great anxiety for the well-doing of things […] I will set wide 
open the closet door of nature’s secrets. For what is my realm but 
that of nature? See the power which I possess over all the parts and 
notable devices in the body of man. This is my true kingdom.’ (The 
House of Dr Dee, 215)  
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This Queen is in fact a monstrous dissolution of Margaret Thatcher into 
Elizabeth I as a single fantasised ruler of “the City” in the 1990s and 1590s 
simultaneously,9  and the dead body she is dissecting in the cause of knowledge and 
of her rule (which are one and the same) turns out to be the narrator’s own. Her 
aims are recognition and identification, but hers is also a realm that operates by the 
refusal of recognition, and the narrator fails to recognise his own body when first 
presented to him.  
The rule produced by this, curiously, cannot recognise its own violence; the 
body must be dissected so that the all-knowing queen can take possession of its 
secrets – and that it must become a dead body for this to take place is immaterial. 
When the narrator finds himself in the position of observing his dead body, the 
transition to a politics of the living dead is complete, Edward III’s vision realised.  
This realm is fundamentally atemporal and anti-political; as Ackroyd’s Queen 
says, it makes authoritarian rule the “realm of nature” (we might say, it’s a rule 
based on what Agamben influentially theorises, in Homo Sacer and elsewhere, as 
“bare life”).  It is accordingly opposed to the child growing up, and yet also opposed 
to the child remaining as the uncanny Other within the adult self – it must, instead, 
be located at the core of that self, but only within an aggressively restrictive and 
essentialist definition. There is to be no splitting, no difference, no division of public 
and private or meaningful distinction between adult and child in the subject of the 
Queen Ackroyd names as ruling over the City, which from the early modern to the 
Thatcherite remains in an unchanging, essential, loveless realm of the present. In 
attempting the promotion of recognition as the basis for political rule, even though 
recognition in psychoanalytic terms is the source of affective consolation, here all 
affect is banished; it is the “world without love”.  
Curiously, death is also banished from this world, in that death (the 
narrator’s, for instance) is never recognised; it does not function as significant in the 
political order. There is a sense here of how a different understanding of death 
might be necessary for a politics not based on the violence of recognition. This 
particular form of violence is aligned, in the novel as a whole, with Dee’s attempts to 
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gain masterful knowledge of the whole world and effectively defeat death itself, 
through eliminating the association of the child with loss, and producing an 
alternative child as perfect and permanent reproduction.  
It is highly suggestive that both Jarman and Ackroyd address the relation 
between politics, time and the child within the space of a single year in the early 
post-Thatcher 1990s; this adds to the sense that there is something about the 1980s 
and 1990s in Britain that emphasises the importance of this relation. It is also 
significant that Ackroyd portrays this in terms of an intolerance towards privacy that 
translates into a certain vision of the the child and a refusal of politics as distinct 
from ‘nature’ – that is, politics as a negotiation between subjects rather than the 
mere assertion and recognition of essential truths.  
Suggestively, in his 1986 novel The Remains of the Day, set around the 
Second World War but often read as, amongst other things, a coded reflection on 
Thatcherite Britain (see Sim, Globalisation and Dislocation in the Novels of Kazuo 
Ishiguro, chapter on Remains), Kazuo Ishiguro introduces a distinction between ‘real’ 
politics and a politics based on recognition and identity. This emerges clearly when 
he introduces a character who challenges the nature of the politics engaged in by 
the conference of European establishment operatives held at Darlington Hall, who 
proposes that they are a kind of fake politics, and inadequate to the future. This Mr 
Lewis, the American politician, declares at the conference’s final dinner – 
But his lordship here is an amateur. […] He is an amateur and 
international affairs today are no longer for gentleman amateurs. The 
sooner you here in Europe realise that the better. All you decent, 
well-meaning gentlemen, have you any idea what sort of place the 
world is becoming all around you? The days when you could just act 
out of your noble instincts, are over. (Ishiguro, The Remains of the 
Day, 106) 
In the 1993 film made based on Ishiguro’s novel, this speech is re-scripted to 
make the implications even clearer:  
51 
 
Congressman Lewis: Do you have any idea of what sort of place the 
world is becoming? The days when you could 
act out of noble instincts are over. Europe has 
become the arena of Realpolitik, the politics of 
reality. If you like, real politics. What you need 
is not gentlemen politicians, but real ones. 
This provokes a question: what is ‘real’ politics (and what is the false politics 
to which it is opposed), and why is Ishiguro concerned with this? For Ishiguro real 
politics appear to be the opposite of a politics of identity (the politics, in this 
particular example, of the “well-meaning gentleman”) or more precisely of 
identification, or in our terms, recognition. Such a politics aims for the rehearsal of 
values and truths imagined as pre-existing; nature, not real politics. 
As the politics of (gentlemanly) identity result here in the dismissal of two 
Jewish girls (Remains, 155-158) and the deaths of several other children, there is a 
strong sense that the demand to positively identify the child has done great violence 
to real children. In Chapter 4, I will go on to discuss further how Ishiguro extends the 
critique of recognition as the prerequisite for political representation through 
parody and the uncanny.  
If the texts discussed above suggest that there is a particularly pronounced 
version of this issue in 1980s and 1990s Britain, they simultaneously suggest that it 
extends into history both before and after this period, just as the visual echoes of 
fascism in Jarman’s Edward II align Thatcherism with earlier twentieth-century 
authoritarianisms.  
I shall conclude this thematic introduction by turning to a slightly more 
recent text, but one that ties together the issues of the child, representation, 
recognition, ambition, violence, and time we have attended to thus far. In doing so, 
it locates the problem of the child and authority in the history of modernity, both its 
achievements and its disasters. It also echoes Marlowe in that it imagines a rule 
simultaneously ruled by the creative child and by violence, a rule which – like 
Edward III’s - actually produces death even in the act of making it synonymous with 
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life. The violence turns out to depend above all, though, on the desire to recognise 
(the child), and the determination to not recognise (the child who is contaminated 
by adulthood). Something similar to this scenario appears in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go (2005), as we’ll find in Chapter 4, but the text with which this introduction 
concludes is another film concerned with seeing and reading the child.  
5. Original Violence: The Prestige  
Christopher Nolan’s 2006 movie The Prestige is based on the 1995 novel of 
the same name by Christopher Priest, but is as much concerned with themes Nolan 
has developed throughout his directorial career: representation, ambition, 
creativity, and violence. In doing so, it joins a number of recent cultural texts to 
depict situations where the conditions of how an individual came into existence (in a 
fundamental rather than temporal sense, his status as a child) produces a fate for 
him that would not otherwise be morally acceptable. In such scenarios, the 
conditions of an individual’s birth and existence underpin his imagined embodiment 
of an essential reality.  
The Prestige (like Never Let Me Go, as we’ll see later) shows a culture of 
originality gone horribly wrong; originality here particularly denoting the unique 
identification of a product (often an aesthetic product or a text) with its creator - the 
authority that comes from authorship.  Rather than originality being a source of 
aesthetic merit, here it is repeatedly a function of narcissism, a driver of 
competition, and a source of violence. However, the idea of originality functions at a 
still deeper level; it signifies the proximity between the author and the source, the 
absolute identification that eradicates the possibility of loss. In this way – and in 
explicit forms within Nolan’s film – it replicates the gaze upon the child who 
promises such identification, but also frustrates it, for the adult. As with Jarman, the 
child contains a promise for the future that functions both in a historically specific 
context and in this fundamental and psychoanalytically suggestive way. For all this, 
in a paradox we’ll find throughout the thesis, the child is nevertheless the object of 
violent destruction in The Prestige, even though the film begins with an attempt to 
use the child for salvation and survival.  
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Like most of Nolan’s films, The Prestige hinges on an image – here the 
opening shot – that only makes sense at the point of its repetition much later. It 
opens on a panning shot across a hillside covered with - it gradually emerges - black 
Victorian-style top hats, apparently abandoned over a wide area. The image, whilst 
literally clear, is immediately resistant to interpretation; it has no obvious meaning, 
and as though teasing us a voiceover says, “Are you watching closely?” The 
combination of visual clarity and obscurity of meaning hints that the relationship 
between recognition and interpretation (interpretation appearing, as Kermode 
suspected, as a key mode for authority to assert itself) will come under scrutiny in 
the movie to follow.  
The scene also, though, evokes a site of devastation and mourning; the black 
hats are funereal, and their placement gives them the appearance of symbolic 
markers for absent people, in the same way abandoned personal objects are 
sometimes either preserved at the site at which they first fell (as at Chernobyl, for 
example) or assembled as memorials to the victims of atrocities (as at some 
Holocaust memorials), and they sit on the ground much like gravestones. Yet if they 
are memorialising lost individuals, it’s troubling to note just how many the dead 
must number; their anonymity is disturbing too, with each hat identical to every 
other. The anonymity of the apparently mass-produced hats, and the suspicion that 
they code some human loss, some mysterious knowledge of death indicated even in 
the apparently endless reproduction of the hats, uneasily hints at the 
representations given, or refused, to the human individual in modern disasters like 
genocide and nuclear warfare.  
The film’s interest is in fact in a particular function of the magic trick, 
announced in the title. Immediately after the opening sequence, a different voice 
(later named as belonging to Mr Cutter, played by Michael Caine) begins explaining 
the nature of a successful magic trick, his monologue cut with a sequence of scenes 
showing one such trick going somehow wrong, but in a mysterious and uncanny 
way, again resistant to immediate interpretation. Cutter explains that every magic 
trick is a manipulation of absence and presence, consisting of three parts: the 
“pledge”, consisting of the demonstration of an object as real and normal (for 
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example, by getting the audience to inspect it); the “turn”, consisting of the 
disappearance of the object or of something within it; and finally the third act, the 
“prestige”: the recovery of the lost object in another place or a transformed state. 
As Cutter explains the prestige, the film cuts to an image of its apparent failure: the 
magician Angier, drowning in a water tank from which he is supposed to have 
escaped, under the stage. The scene then changes to Cutter making his explanations 
in a courtroom where Angier’s rival, Borden, is on trial for his rival’s murder.  
The explanation of the prestige is replete with ambiguity and irony: Cutter 
explains that it is about the reconstitution of a lost object, but its more common 
sense of ‘esteem’, of someone ‘prestigious’, is also behind the specific act being 
played out, and behind the plot as a whole. In Lacanian terms, it’s ambivalently 
situated between the child’s original sense of loss (initially, maternal loss) and the 
phallus as signifying both creative capacity and recognition within the symbolic 
order, within the authoritative order that stabilises the chaotic forces of desire and 
aggressive ambition by a process of making words and actions available for 
anticipation.  Here the magic trick, of course, creates ‘prestige’ in all senses; it gives 
reconstitution for a loss, it makes an exhibitionist spectacle of the magician’s phallic 
creativity, and it relies upon an anticipation available to the magician but not to the 
viewer. This control over time as fundamental to the trick is established in the film’s 
opening sequence, where a child watches the trick described by Cutter. Suggestively, 
this anticipation allows the adult to hold the gaze of the child, to produce his facial 
expressions, and so make him available to be read.  
The film is interested in the child’s face throughout. The visual nature of the 
prestige emphasises that this is all about looking; in one scene, a boy is shown a trick 
involving the apparent destruction of a small bird, only for the bird to reappear. The 
camera lingers on his face as he reacts to the trick and to the prestige, a reaction 
determined precisely by his lack of the anticipation the adult possesses. Even after 
the prestige, this child still doubts that the loss has really been reconstituted, that 
the bird who has reappeared is the same as the one who disappeared. The child’s 
intuition in this respect turns out to be of both symbolic and practical significance 
later on; it also hints that he is looking more closely than the adult expects, and is 
55 
 
perhaps less susceptible to replacing the visual thing before him with the delightful 
vision than is the adult.  
Borden’s trial, what he now stands to lose is in fact the child – his young 
daughter. (That he stands to lose both his own life and his daughter in one go 
acknowledges how the child is classically imagined as projecting the subject beyond 
his own mortality (as Edelman, following Foucault, argues in “Against Survival”)).  
The film centres on two rival magicians, Borden (played by Christian Bale) 
and Angier (played by Hugh Jackman). Both brilliant, their deadly rivalry begins 
when, whilst they’re working together as junior shills for another magician, Angier’s 
wife, Julia, is accidentally killed during a performance of a trick that involves her 
being trapped in a tank of water. Angier believes Borden to be responsible for Julia’s 
death, suspecting him of having tied an inescapable knot around her hands, though 
Borden professes inability to remember which knot he actually tied. The key events 
of the film thus begin from a death, and are driven by Angier’s attempt to make that 
death meaningful through ascribing blame. Angier and Borden embark on a series of 
revenge attacks on one another, each consisting of violent sabotage of the other’s 
trick (and career).  
Borden appears to gain a decisive advantage when he performs the trick 
known as the Transported Man with particular brilliance; Angier attempts to 
replicate this trick, but can only do so by using a double, which he suspects is not 
Borden’s method. Angier is persuaded, following an interrogation of a mysterious 
man who works for Borden designing his tricks, known only as Fallon, that the 
method is in fact some kind of genuine transportation carried out by a mysterious 
use of electricity, based on secret knowledge shared with Borden by the scientist 
Nikola Tesla. Having gained possession of Borden’s diary, Angier travels to Tesla to 
attempt to gain the secret for his own use, and ultimately succeeds in getting hold of 
a transportation machine that will enable him to achieve this.  
Simultaneously, the success of which Angier is so jealous is shown to present 
its own costs. Borden’s wife Sarah, frustrated by his inconsistency in his love for her 
and his overwhelming dedication to his own prestige, kills herself, leaving him with 
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their daughter (the same one he later, at the point of the film’s opening and to 
which it eventually returns, stands to lose following his execution). This narrative is 
interspersed with returns to the contemporary moment following Angier’s death, 
when Borden is in prison awaiting the death sentence. His greatest concern is for his 
daughter, and her continuing life after his death is associated with the ‘bringing 
back’ Cutter spoke of as the prestige itself (it turns out that his opening explanation, 
delivered in voiceover, was in fact directed towards her). It is also evident that 
Borden also views his child as a reconstitution of the lost love object that is his dead 
wife; yet in a cruel trick, following his execution she is to become a ward of ‘Lord 
Callow’, who turns out to be a disguised Angier himself: despite the latter’s apparent 
death, he has somehow survived, and Borden rightly suspects that his survival owes 
itself to the same transportation device he used in his magic.  
Here the child, and the battle over her, emphasises the film’s interest in 
identity, originality and recognition as both inexorably producing violence and 
generating some of the central developments in modernity. Identity appears here as 
the destructively possessive impulse that accompanies the sense of wonder and 
ambition, which the film repeatedly locates in the child, that drives the creation of 
magic as spectacle.   
During the final scenes of the film, Angier’s methodology for performing his 
trick – the same one, it turns out, that is now about to allow him to take possession 
of his rival’s child – is revealed. Angier did indeed gain a transportation machine 
from Tesla, and every time he performs his trick ‘he’ really is drowned, whilst 
simultaneously being reproduced, in perfect replica, in another part of the theatre 
(and thus coming out again to re-appear to the audience, in the ultimate prestige). 
The drowning man seen in the opening shots of the film really did die; and not once, 
but many times (and in agony, according to Cutter). There is therefore a perverse 
and ironic mirroring between the reproductions that allow ‘Angier’ to live, and the 
child he is seeking to possess. 
 Total control through knowledge, producing an equivalence between life 
and death that promises him the control of the future even as it eliminates the first 
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death (the one actually producing affect and trauma), that of Borden’s wife, is the 
object of desire in The Prestige. It is a perfect form of ‘violent reading’ (reading 
having featured in the film through Borden’s diary). This reading changes reality to 
allow the self total mastery, but as the cost of a violence that is, paradoxically, 
ultimately targeted towards the self too (all the reproductions or clones are, 
necessarily, completely identical to Angier). Ironically, it turns out that Borden did 
not use the transportation device at all – his trick succeeded by the help of his 
identical twin brother.  
Identity and originality are the consequences of an attempt to overcome 
death, in the interests of creating an aesthetic representation (the perfect magic 
trick) based on the extension and the withdrawal of recognition. There is also a 
subtle political implication here, one arising from Nolan’s exploration of how the 
psychological conditions that create the prestige, with their contradictory and 
mutually contaminated displays of chaotic, creative desire and of authoritarian and 
violent order, also function in the history of modernity. Situated in the 1890s fin-de-
siècle, the film’s interest in electrification and its consequences (visualised 
beautifully through shots of a field of electric light bulbs that unexpectedly lights up 
out of the night, and then through a whole town (Colorado Springs) that does the 
same, conveys this interest in both the fascination and the hidden violence of 
modernity. The electric lights – all absolutely identical yet beautiful, their spread 
across the field evoking traditional imagery of radiant (and equally identical) haloes 
representing individual souls – uncannily mirror the field of abandoned hats in the 
opening sequence and the systematised row of drowned corpses through which the 
camera travels in the final sequence. In fact, of course, all these phenomena finally 
turn out to be the creations of the same technology, technology of which its creator, 
Tesla, ultimately urges the destruction. Yet the technology merely enables, Nolan 
suggests, drives that are fundamental to the subject and to the ambivalent relation 
between the creative, ambitious, observant child and the need for authority through 
anticipation, and indeed replication. To produce some object is after all the basis of 
creativity; to predict and control its reproduction is the business of authoritarianism 
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and totalitarianism; but as these characters find, the practical ability to disentangle 
the two is not easily available.  
The film shows this through visual references to real history of genocidal 
totalitarianisms (which had, of course, their own real ambivalences towards 
technologies of replication, reproduction, and destruction). One such visual 
reference appears in the ending with the appearance of neatly organised rows of 
drowned bodies, twisted in contorted agony, the Doppelgängers of the lost hats in 
the opening. 
These bodies exist simultaneously to produce something for recognition – 
the reborn Angier who appears in the theatre – and to refuse recognition to 
something else, the drowned bodies themselves lying (like hell in the Renaissance 
theatre) underneath the stage, ‘watched’ only (in Nolan’s perfect image) by a blind 
man.  
This ultimately remains a question of reading the child, as confirmed by the 
ironic juxtaposition between the camera’s interest in the face of Borden’s daughter 
and its final shot, which dwells on the agonised, distorted face of the drowning man; 
the image of the child can only be saved by violence towards the uncanny yet real 
child – the child who may not look like a child any more, and whose status as a 
reproduction enables the most systemic violence towards him. This is the ultimate 
form of the problem of the child and authority, and it’s one we’ll see again, 
particularly in Never Let Me Go. In both Nolan’s film and Ishiguro’s novel we see the 
conventional face of the child presented for a supposedly moral act of scrutiny, one 
supposed to save both the child and oneself, the viewer, from the consequences of 
death.  
Both Nolan and Ishiguro demand that we consider what we’re not seeing – 
what we’re being distracted from or ourselves refusing to see – which turns out to 
be a normalised violence, everywhere and nowhere at once, taking place in the 
name of the child only at the cost of killing the child as he really is – which is to say, 
always both the child and not the child simultaneously. What is being symbolically 
killed off here is the child’s contamination by the adult, her ambition to be other 
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than the child – which is, ironically, the very ambition that creates the prestige (and, 
perhaps, the spectacle of directorial virtuosity that is The Prestige) in the first place. 
Whereas in the image of the abducted child we are required to see both the child 
and the threat to the child through that same image, now we find that they cannot 
be so easily disentangled. Like Marlowe’s Edward III, this demonstrates viscerally 
that recognition of the child as a source of both salvation for the future and of 
political representation operates only through a culture of violence and an apparent 
eradication of death that actually makes death present throughout life.  
Having seen this, the scrutinising gaze of the child we were invited to enjoy 
at first becomes exposed as a kind of violent reading. Throughout this thesis I will 
describe this violent reading and how many texts manage, despite its cultural and 
political dominance, to work back against it, to dislodge the alignment between 
representation and recognition and force us to contemplate the possibility of a 
future that may be created not through replication of an essential identity, but 
through politics. This is politics in Arendt’s formulation, depending explicitly on the 
refusal of recognition as the basis of representation, a refusal of precisely the 
demand we’ll persistently find here. 
In the later chapters, I will go on to explore how this demand works 
historically, politically, and psychoanalytically – and how others, like Nolan, have 
intervened against this through the uncanny, through parody, and through 
reassertion of the difference, the privacy, of the child. This difference is not 
protected, I shall argue, through its celebratory recognition (as some versions of 
queer studies, for example, attempt), but through the extension of representation 
without recognition, for the child.  
Part Two  
1. Selection of Texts and Chapter Structure 
Having introduced the thesis thematically and conceptually, I shall briefly 
describe how this has shaped my selection of texts for further analysis.  
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I make reference to texts from a variety of periods, as will be already evident. 
Nevertheless, a relatively tight chronological frame applies in the following chapters. 
This frame centres on the 1980s as an imagined ‘end of the post-war’, with effects 
on the (imagined) future and thus on the child, and as a point when an essentialist 
idea of the ambitious child becomes culturally significant, and accompanied by 
significant tensions. This has already begun to emerge in this chapter and is a key 
focus of Chapter 3, in particular. In the next chapter (2), I discuss ‘post-war’ texts – 
but approached as the hinterland to A Pale View of Hills, published in 1982 – whilst 
the final chapters concentrate on post-1979 material.  Hollinghurst, McEwan, 
Ackroyd, and Ishiguro (the principal authors discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) each 
create an uncanny and often radically unsettling version of Britain in the ‘end of the 
post-war’ moment; and they not only dramatise these uncanny narratives through 
the child: they parody, critique and expose how the child is used, and abused, in 
authoritarian attempts to control time itself.  
Many of these texts depict a scenario where the child is in the process of 
entering authority, but where this process somehow becomes perverted and 
contaminated with violence, even the killing of the child. Given that the latter image 
is both highly taboo and central to my notion of a violent reading directed towards 
the child, I have therefore taken the appearance of this trope as a compelling reason 
for detailed attention to a particular text. This includes my explorations of Ishiguro’s 
novels A Pale View of Hills (1982) and Never Let Me Go (2005); Henry James’ The 
Turn of the Screw (1898) and its re-working as the horror movie The Innocents 
(1961); and Peter Ackroyd’s Hawksmoor (1985). In several of these (James, Ishiguro, 
and Ackroyd) the adult who is killing the child is, remarkably, also the narrator. 
Images of child killing and child disappearance also appear in McEwan’s The Child in 
Time (1985) and (as I argue in Chapter 3) in Hollinghurst’s The Line of Beauty (2004). 
The apparently opposite scenario, that of the child killing the adult, also appears in 
several of the texts included, notably in Rose Macaulay’s The World My Wilderness 
(1950); Don’t Look Now (1973), and Halloween (1980), and (more symbolically), 
again, Hawksmoor.  
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In the next chapter, I situate A Pale View of Hills (1982) in relation to images 
of children associated with twentieth-century disasters (through the visuals of Cold 
War-era politics, through Macaulay’s The World my Wilderness, and the later 
twentieth-century horror film) and against the rise of psychoanalysis as a framework 
for both popular and critical readings of the child. Throughout this, I develop an 
analysis of the scene of child killing as a key site for the problem of the child and 
authority. 
In the third chapter, I examine a variant on this scene, the repeated 
prominence of child disappearance in literary representations of the child under 
Thatcherism (particularly McEwan’s The Child in Time and Ackroyd’s Hawksmoor), I 
argue that the authors use the child disappearance motif to embody Thatcherism’s 
authoritarian abolition of the political future – that is, of the future as significantly 
different to the present. Reading Hawksmoor in the context of Ackroyd’s 
engagements with both Thatcherism and Theory, I argue that Ackroyd identifies a 
form of violent reading of the child in which, he audaciously proposes, both 
Thatcherism and Theory participate.  
The themes of violent reading and the killing of the child lead the final chapter, 
which focusses on Ishiguro. Throughout his literary career Ishiguro develops a 
persistent and unsettling critique, often through parody, of the use of the child 
(including the ‘child within’ the adult) to justify a violence towards the future and 
towards the possibility of political difference. Beyond this, Ishiguro exposes the still 
more unsettling concern behind this – the fear of death and the retreat to 
essentialist and supposedly permanent identities as a way of not only eradicating 
the future, but of eradicating death. With reference to Ishiguro’s critical reception, I 
argue that his interventions against violent, authoritarian and exploitative readings 
of the child often parody critical attitudes towards Ishiguro’s own work. On these 
grounds, I propose, we must see the problem of the child and authority as a problem 
for our own modes of reading.  
2. Theoretical and Critical Frameworks  
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I shall read the primary texts noted above through a number of 
interconnected contexts to give an account of the problem of the child and 
authority. These frameworks include psychoanalysis, studies of recent political 
history and its representation in literature, and over-arching studies of, or particular 
arguments about, the representation of the child in literature and culture.  
A number of existing monographs within literary and related studies 
ambitiously attempt an overall cultural history of the representation of the child – 
or, at least, of his representation in ‘western’ culture. Reinhard Kuhn’s Corruption in 
Paradise: The Child in Western Literature (1982) is a remarkable example of the 
latter, with a very wide frame of reference. As one might expect given its publication 
date, this study is particularly concerned with the child’s enigmatic and ambiguous 
qualities, and his resistance to adult interpretation. My interest in the child as 
resistant to reading, and the consequent potential for reading to align with violence, 
has been influenced by Kuhn. 
An earlier, but still useful, monograph about the child in culture is found in 
Peter Coveney’s The Image of Childhood (1957). Both Kuhn and Coveney explore the 
ambiguities and hypocrisies in the conventional imagery and discourse around the 
child, especially notions of ‘innocence’, with particularly extensive reference to 
nineteenth-century fiction. A more recent study on the latter subject is provided by 
Anne Higonnet, in Pictures of Innocence: The History and Crisis of Ideal Childhood 
(1998), who provides a history of the prevalence of the child in modern and 
contemporary culture, situating this in its economic and technological context. 
These studies either preclude or do not centre upon psychoanalytic or queer 
account of the child’s image and of childhood, which dominate the field today. They 
therefore help to show both the indebtedness of such queer readings to a broader 
history of analysis of the child’s function and to suggest queries and challenges to 
those readings.  
From the 1980s to the present, broad analyses of the child’s role in literature 
and culture have often been pursued under the framework of a politicised 
psychoanalysis. Jacqueline Rose’s The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of 
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Children’s Fiction (1984; republished 1993) sets out important ground for later critics 
by establishing, through the persuasive frame of the Peter Pan texts, the 
representation of the child as a function of adult desire, specifically situating some 
of this in the later twentieth-century. 
Lee Edelman is perhaps the most prominent critic of the child through such a 
politicised psychoanalysis; as noted, his influential 2004 work No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive draws on Lacan to advance a queer argument against 
the pervasive trope of the child as a moral absolute in contemporary culture, one 
that endlessly defers the interests of living subjects in favour of the image of the 
child, a process Edelman terms “reproductive futurism”. Edelman’s idea of the 
image of the Child being used in violence against the real child (who is always 
growing up, always becoming not the child) is important here, underpinning much of 
the basis of my own readings. Yet I also seek to qualify and critique Edelman, 
especially in my conclusion. This follows others who have expanded on Edelman’s 
work in the context of visual culture and have critiqued him in the process, such as 
Steven Bruhm, who I also cite here. Leo Bersani’s work, particularly The Freudian 
Body (1986) and Is the Rectum a Grave? (2010) is also referenced here as a key part 
of the nexus of psychoanalytic and queer work on the child. 
Other psychoanalytic literary critics prove important for this study even 
when their own primary focus is not on the child. Josh Cohen’s The Private Life: Why 
we Remain in the Dark (2013) makes a psychoanalytic argument specifically about 
the political conditions of early twenty-first century western (and particularly British) 
culture, which both drew in Arendt to this work – and suggested specific resonances 
of her theory with contemporary and recent politics – and led to an important 
connection I draw between the representation of the child and privacy, or its denial.  
Vicky Lebeau’s Childhood and Cinema (2008) explores the image of the child 
as cultural hypocrisy, ideals of ‘innocence’ providing cover for paedophilic desire and 
for the mediation of violence against the future. This includes an incisive reading of 
Don’t Look Now, discussed in my next chapter. From a number of specific visual 
dynamics surrounding the child, Lebeau draws a sense of paranoid and violent 
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reading, manifested in an obsessive attention to the child’s inscrutable face: this has 
informed my reading of A Pale View of Hillls in particular, but also informs the thesis 
as a whole. Lebeau’s own frame of reference is primarily Freudian.  
I have myself gone back to Freud (particularly the case studies, Three Essays 
on the Theory of Sexuality, and Civilisation and its Discontents), and to Lacan, making 
particular reference to Book Two of Lacan’s Seminar, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and 
in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-55 (English translation by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, 1988). Work by other theorists engaging with Lacan has been important here, 
including Serge Leclaire’s A Child is Being Killed: On Primary Narcissism and the 
Death Drive (1975) and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen’s Lacan: The Absolute Master (1991).  
The psychoanalytic writer and child psychologist Adam Phillips, and 
particularly his The Beast in the Nursery (1998), is important here for its iconoclastic 
argument about the relation of certain psychoanalytic authorities to the child’s 
ambition and creativity. Its implication of a complicity between political and critical 
authorities in this respect, even when they claim to celebrate children’s ambitions, is 
crucial to my argument.  
Bruhm and Hurley’s edited collection Curioser: On the Queerness of Children 
(2004), alongside Bruhm’s other works cited here, and Kathryn Bond Stockton’s The 
Queer Child, Or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century (2009), explores the 
child from what is perhaps currently his most productive home in contemporary 
literary and cultural analysis, in queer studies. They argue that culture has to go to 
cruel (if not unusual) efforts to repress, excuse and explain away the queerness of 
the child -  a queerness they identify with the child’s basic differences from the 
adult. For Bruhm and Hurley, these differences are all the queerer because they do 
not make a child who is recognisably distinct from the adult; rather the child 
transgresses the boundaries laid down by her own definition. The political and 
cultural response to this, which perpetually seeks to rebuild those boundaries, does 
fundamental damage to the rights of both adult and child. This has been highly 
influential for my own study, but I also develop an argument about recognition of 
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the child as the basis for representation that seeks to question the practical effects 
of queer readings and advocates a more expansive approach.  
Alongside such psychoanalytically-informed accounts of the child, I also draw 
upon more historicist narratives of children in late-twentieth and early twenty-first 
century British culture, such as those by Geraldine Cousin and Carol Chillington 
Rutter. Whilst Rutter’s focus is Shakespeare, her interest in contemporary 
performance and its engagement with politics and with (as a related issue) violence 
towards the child, make this an important reference point for me.  
Alongside British political history from the 1980s to the present, I also refer 
to some works of political theory that have influenced literary and cultural studies. 
This principally concerns Hannah Arendt and her arguments on politics as the 
consequence of a certain relation between public and private life, particularly as 
described in The Human Condition (1958), which Cohen makes the basis for some of 
his arguments about privacy in contemporary life in The Private Life. Mario Feit 
argues for Arendt as an important figure for the politics of queerness in Democratic 
Anxieties: Same-Sex Marriage, Death, and Citizenship (2011), where his focus on the 
roles of reproduction and death transcendence for Arendt and her relevance to 
contemporary politics, and his engagements with Edelman, have informed my own 
approach, though I reach different conclusions on their implications.  
In using particular literary texts I have naturally often referred to existing 
criticism on those texts, whether explicitly concerned with my themes or not. This is 
especially the case for Ackroyd, who has attracted considerably detailed critical 
attention but from a relatively limited number of people (notably Susannah Onega, 
Jeremy Gibson and Julian Wolfreys), and Ishiguro, who is now established as a 
significant object of critical attention in contemporary literature. I discuss his critical 
reception in detail in Chapter Four, making an argument that Ishiguro’s work 
sometimes parodies his own reception. Critics on Ishiguro and who are particularly 
important for this argument include Alexander Bain, Rebecca Walkowitz, and Wai-
Chew Sim. 
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This study is not, of course, anything approaching a comprehensive study of 
the child in fiction, even in British fiction since the 1980s. Equally, the psychoanalytic 
framework is primarily present in order to discuss current modes of critical reading 
and their political implications; this work does not aim for any comprehensive 
psychoanalytic reading of the child in contemporary literature, even for any 
particular theorist or school. I am rarely concerned with ‘children’s literature’, but 
rather on the child’s representation in (adult) fiction.  
This study aims to add to existing scholarship on the representation of the 
child in literature and culture, by demonstrating a link between adult motivation for 
violence towards the child and the political treatment of the future, especially as 
specifically formulated in British culture from the 1980s to the present. The key 
consequence of this link, I argue, is that the child is required to be endlessly 
available for recognition as the condition of his political or aesthetic representation, 
but as these texts and their readings – mine and others - indicate, this is a condition 
the child can never wholly meet.  
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Chapter 2 The Horror Child and History   
The horror of that image has never diminished, but [...] it is possible 
to develop an intimacy with the most disturbing of things. (Ishiguro, A 
Pale View of Hills, 54) 
1. Scenes of Child Murder  
In the previous chapter, I explored a particular visual imperative that 
demands the child’s embodiment of the future. The child’s failure to do this, his 
recalcitrance towards the adult gaze, requires his proper education but also opens 
the possibility of violence. In the case of Edward II, we found that Jarman’s attempt 
to eradicate this violence from Marlowe’s play curiously reproduced the violence 
towards another child, albeit a violent one himself: Marlowe’s Edward III. In this 
chapter, we will find other children where the threat of violence both from the child 
and to the child is curiously ambivalent.  
Here I shall further historicise the issue of the child and authority by showing 
how the ultimate taboo of violence against the child repeatedly becomes 
imaginable, even justifiable, within the literary and popular culture of the later 
twentieth century. In these scenes of child murder – often ambiguously poised 
between murders by the child and of the child – the securing of the future demands 
violence, and the need to represent the future, both politically and aesthetically, 
depends on correct recognition of the child.  
This chapter begins with the first novel of a key author for this thesis, Kazuo 
Ishiguro, and works back from this to examine its inheritance from specific versions 
of, and concerns over, the child from the Second World War to the present. 
Ishiguro’s novel A Pale View of Hills (1982) plays upon the understanding that the 
wars and genocide of the twentieth century pose an unprecedented crisis in the 
imagination of the future, one that emerges as a violence towards the future’s 
embodiment, the child. Once again, this violence is often entangled in the process of 
the child’s education. A Pale View of Hills dramatises exactly this in exploring the 
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function of the child for adult authority in both the ‘post-war’ and the ‘end of the 
post-war’ moments. Curiously, this novel also makes a late twentieth-century belief 
in the value of the child’s entrepreneurial and creative personal ambitions – the 
child evoked in the previous chapter by Jim’ll Fix It – a (conflicted) response to the 
earlier global traumas of the mid-century, which not only thus contaminate a later 
period, but spread geographically too, from immediate post-war Japan to Surrey in 
the 1980s.  
Pale View perceives the British 1980s as psychologically marked by 
remembrance of the global horrors from a period of war whose significance was 
fundamentally re-interpreted in Thatcherism’s renunciation of the politics of the 
long post-war period. It presents the turn to the child as both the psychological and 
the political imperative this anxious moment produces. At the same time, the child’s 
awkward hovering between reality and text – and between being the killer and the 
killed – betrays the fundamental problems in using the child to secure the future. 
This child also crosses the border between literary and popular culture (and 
particularly cinema), giving Ishiguro to set up a scenario where the desire to base 
political and aesthetic representation on the correct recognition of the child 
descends into a crisis where seeing and reading are not, despite the promises of the 
novel’s cinematic frame, reconcilable.  
I shall argue that this is best understood by tracing the figure of the ‘horror 
child’ who played a dominant part in cinema (particularly but not only within the 
‘horror’ genre itself) of the second half of the twentieth century. This horror child 
ties together two central frameworks for how the child is viewed, and viewed 
specifically as embodying the future, in the twentieth century after the Second 
World War. These are psychoanalysis, and the possibility of totalitarian violence - 
realised under Nazism, constantly anticipated, and occasionally realised again, 
throughout the Cold War.  
In this chapter we’ll find the trope of the horror child visualising a link 
between Freud’s introduction of perversity into infancy (here always imagined as a 
potentially violent perversity) with the actual, historical violence of particular 
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political orders. Lebeau notes that Freud described childhood as fundamentally 
concerned with the formation of images (104); the charge has frequently been made 
that totalitarian regimes are likewise essentially based on the formation and 
repetition of images (an argument made, for example, by Virilio in The Vision 
Machine (1994), and the association between the two repeatedly appears here. In 
the horror child, the supposed effect of images on the child (an effect ‘authorised’, 
accurately or not, by reference to Freud) is blurred into the effect of the child’s 
image on, and for, post-war society. This ambivalence between the demand made of 
the image and the image’s demand on oneself resonates with the schizophrenic 
treatment of the child who provides this image of the future, a treatment realised as 
both violence and education. 
 It is in the same ambivalent sense that I refer to ‘scenes of child murder’, 
where the child being killed and the child doing the killing is often one and the same. 
The question, clearly, is about time: who will kill or be killed first, and what does it 
mean to go on living under such circumstances?  
2. Time and the Horror Child  
Time in the horror movie, one of the principal interests in this chapter, is a 
matter of anticipation. Violence towards characters in horror movies almost always 
occurs because of a failure of anticipation, which is itself a failure of sight: they don’t 
see what’s coming (though the audience often does, of course, or is at least ahead of 
the characters in doing so, thus increasing the value placed on anticipation still 
further). This is also (once again) a failure to make seeing the same thing as reading; 
signs of some supernatural or quasi-supernatural threat are often visible to the 
characters in sufficient time for them to escape, but they fail to read them correctly, 
and so either fail to escape, or only narrowly do so. (Consider Marion Crane’s failure 
to read the multiple signs of danger in what Norman Bates does and says between 
her arrival at the motel and her murder in Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960)). This is, in a 
trope these movies repeatedly exploit, a particular problem when one is confronted 
with a threat concealed behind the innocent face of the child.  
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The need to read what one sees correctly and, crucially, to do so in time to 
avoid death, works both politically and psychoanalytically. In Kubrick’s The Shining 
(1980), for example, the characters’ initial failure to read their situation correctly has 
been understood as both a failure to comprehend Jack Torrance’s repressed rage 
and jealousy, and as an ignorance of the history of genocidal violence (with 
references to the Holocaust and to violence against the Native Americans). Historical 
and psychoanalytic knowledge is simultaneously essential for the correct reading 
that the horror film demands that we undertake at risk of our lives, as the influential 
Kubrick scholar Geoffrey Cocks argues of The Shining (172). An apparent opportunity 
to break this cycle of repeated violence emerges in the child, particularly the child 
who is attuned to the aspects of psychological and historical reality that the adults 
shut out. The telepathic ability to ‘shine’ secretly possessed by Danny Torrance is in 
this respect merely a stronger version of the child’s general openness to silent and 
private observation of the adult world.  
The imperative to read the child, and read the world through the child, in 
time to prevent violence, appears in the real politics of the post-war twentieth 
century, in ways that converge suggestively with its appearances in ‘fiction’. A 
powerful example appeared in the 1964 US Presidential Election, where the child 
repeatedly featured in television campaign advertising for the incumbent, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson.  
In one of the most notorious political adverts of that campaign, the infamous 
“Daisy Girl” (screened just once, on 7th September 1964), a little girl in a field, 
surrounded by birdsong, is shown picking the petals from a daisy. The camera moves 
up from a low position, staring up into her face as she counts the petals; then her 
voice suddenly blurs into the terrifying voice of a countdown to the launch of a 
nuclear weapon. As this new countdown begins and the camera settles level with 
the girl’s face, the visual dynamic also changes; whereas we began looking up at her, 
now she looks up towards the source of the voice, the audible confusion between 
the two voices mirrored in an uncanny visual uncertainty between our looking at the 
child and her looking towards something else. Her eyes widen in apparent terror and 
the camera closes in, going deeper into the pupil of the eye. The moment when we 
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are wholly lost in the darkness of the pupil, losing sight of the child precisely as our 
gaze merges into the child’s vision, is the same moment that this darkness is 
punctured by a bright flash, as the nuclear bomb explodes. Johnson’s own voice 
then delivers a brief homily over the darkness: “These are the stakes: To make a 
world in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the dark”.  
Clearly, this is the politically potent coercion by the child’s image, as 
identified by Edelman, at work. Yet it’s also more than that. The very proximity 
between the innocent child in the edenic space and the bomb is uncomfortable, the 
coercion being employed too direct. The child’s image ends up, in fact, 
contaminated by the very violence she is supposed to be warning us against. After 
all, if the advert ostensibly attempts to warn us against an apocalyptic future, it 
associates that future with sight; the disappearance into the eye suggests that just 
as the consequences of nuclear warfare could never be undone, so too the 
knowledge of such things would itself destroy the innocence of the child – and by 
extension, of the world – forever. Yet, of course, we have already seen the bomb: 
“Daisy Girl” itself shows it to us, through the child’s vision; and we lose sight of (and 
control over) the child just at the moment we disappear into what she is seeing. We 
must keep the child in sight, the advert hints, or go into the dark – a darkness the 
child has already seen, insofar as she knows of the bomb.  
The narrative was perceived as an attempt to align Johnson’s opponent, 
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, with the figure of Dr Strangelove (Menand 1) 
from the eponymous Kubrick film released only a few months earlier, in January 
1964.  If the latter provided a model for LBJ to use the child to characterise his 
opponent as a dangerous madman, it wasn’t the only such film with an influence on 
the perception of the child in the US of the early 1960s. In fact, another advert from 
Johnson’s 1964 campaign also centred on the child – indeed, visually it contained 
nothing but the child for its minute-long duration.  
This was the “Girl With Ice Cream Cone” advert, which showed a very young 
blond girl eating an ice cream while a voiceover discusses the chemical effects of 
radiation on children’s bodies before seguing to Goldwater’s opposition to the 
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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, drawing a contrast (or is it a comparison?) between the 
girl’s greedy consumption of the ice cream and the pollution of her body by nuclear 
radiation. Although presumably unintended, the extended shot of the girl licking the 
ice cream is a distinct visual echo of Lolita as portrayed in Kubrick’s 1962 movie. The 
shared vocabulary between these political adverts and the films on which they draw 
points to the crossover between suspected sources of harm to the child, between 
sexual awareness and from nuclear war. In both cases, there is a strong ambivalence 
about whether the threat is outside the child or somehow within her; just as the 
“Daisy Girl” camera disappears into the girl’s eye to find the bomb, so too Lolita – 
and “Girl With Ice Cream Cone” are ambiguous about whether the sexual threat is 
coming from new social forces or from some fundamental attraction of the child to 
those forces. Tellingly, the voiceover in “Girl With Ice Cream Cone” is apparently 
directed towards the child, but she seems not to hear it, instead remaining 
transfixed on her ice cream. It is up to us, the adult viewers, to recognise both the 
child and the threat correctly, which appear for us as a single image, the latter 
invisible within the former.  
This is indicative of the repertoire of visual images to work through the child 
as threat and the child at threat in the ‘post-war’ twentieth century.nI shall turn 
now to a novel published at the ideological ‘end’ of the post-war period, one which 
uses precisely this visual repertoire in order to make the imperative to look at the 
child, and the value of recognition of the child as the basis for her representation, 
violently troubling.  
3. A Pale View of Hills (1982) 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s first novel, A Pale View of Hills (1982), begins in the English 
Home Counties during the early Thatcher years, towards a narrator who has lived 
through the post-war ‘future’ and is looking towards her own final years and to the 
future represented by her child. Any future here, though, is still utterly conditioned 
by the past, particularly by the genocidal nationalisms, and the use of atomic 
weapons, earlier in the century. Where the future is so conditioned by history, it 
turns out, the child is contaminated by it. Events in Pale View are driven by the fear 
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of what is going on inside the child, behind her eyes and out of the adult’s sight, a 
concern that manifests itself through an obsessive gaze upon the child and into 
interior spaces, rooms both real and imagined, as adults wonder what is going on 
inside the child, whether it is disturbing or intimate, or both. As in “Daisy Girl”, the 
child’s interiority is identified with the atomic bomb itself.  
Ishiguro’s novel recycles, and renders uncanny, several tropes around 
children from the later twentieth-century horror film – tropes including a facial 
inscrutability to match the new intensity of the adult gaze; a role in revealing a 
repressed but fundamental dark reality; an intimate relation with death; and a 
central role in a final ‘twist’ ending. The most significant of these tropes is the 
visualised scene of child murder, which becomes a palimpsest for the conflicting 
ideas and suspicions of the child’s uncertain mediation between past and future. 
Films often appear in Ishiguro’s novels, including in Pale View’s own 
references to Hollywood, and elsewhere in instances such as the uncanny 
misrepresentation of 2001: A Space Odyssey in The Unconsoled (1995). Ishiguro 
(who has himself written several screenplays)10 described himself as “intrinsically” 
influenced by cinema, remarking that, “I didn’t read much when I was young, I 
watched films” (Thurley 1). Pale View identifies itself with the horror film only to 
finally play off the disjunction between its own medium and that of the film, both 
rehearsing and disrupting the equation between seeing and reading classically 
demanded by the horror film’s twist.  
In a more basic sense, Ishiguro’s style here is cinematic, in that the various 
scenes set out in the narrative are always ‘blocked’: the way in which characters 
walk, stand or sit in relation to one another, and to their immediate surroundings, 
are almost always fully (sometimes obsessively) recorded; yet we are nevertheless 
at crucial moments left unsure what we are looking at. Just as horror films often 
determine their meaning only retrospectively, providing a series of visual clues that 
only make sense in a repetition or revelation at the film’s ending (Hitchcock’s Psycho 
is a good example), Pale View works through the same mechanism, though it also 
transgresses it.  
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Ishiguro’s makes his novel so cinematic only for this sudden lack of what the 
cinema takes for granted, a sudden lack of ability to see, to prove essential. At the 
moment when the adult, alone with the child, is fully dedicated to the scrutiny of the 
child’s face, it suddenly turns out to be the adult narrator – whom we have been 
seeing through, yet never seeing – who requires scrutiny, which is terrifyingly denied 
to us. Whereas in the cinema the audience securely witnesses the action through 
the apparently ‘real’ and quasi-omniscient gaze of the camera, Ishiguro uses a 
narrator who is often every bit as penetrative as the camera, but who finally turns 
out to be fundamentally disconnected from reality. Later we will explore the film 
Don’t Look Now - but here, the problem is that we can’t look now, when we most 
desire to.  
Pale View is narrated in the first person by Etsuko, a Japanese woman who 
married an Englishman (now dead) and who at the opening is visited at home in an 
English Home Counties village by their daughter, Niki. Etsuko had another daughter, 
Keiko, who was “pure Japanese” (10) and who has recently committed suicide.  
Keiko’s old room in Etsuko’s house constantly troubles the latter’s sleep, becoming 
increasingly blurred into the image Etsuko has of her daughter’s suicide (though the 
latter actually took place elsewhere):  
I have found myself continually bringing to mind that picture – of my 
daughter hanging in her room for days on end. The horror of that 
image has never diminished, but it has long ceased to be a morbid 
matter [...] it is possible to develop an intimacy with the most 
disturbing of things. (Pale View, 54) 
The “picture” is further echoed in Etsuko’s recurring dream of a girl who at 
first appears to be sitting in a swing, but is revealed to be swinging from a noose 
(96). This horror scene does not preclude consolation; on the contrary, it allows for 
the natural ‘intimacy’ (in a gruesome irony, one lost during Keiko’s life) between the 
child and the parent. The room, an ‘interior’ space in a double sense, functions as a 
possessive frame for this intimacy. As an object of fascination, the room echoes 
many famous children’s bedrooms in the horror cinema, notably Regan’s in The 
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Exorcist (1973). In a psychoanalytically suggestive gesture (given its appearance in a 
dream), the room makes consolation available through repetition; it is only through 
repetition that Etsuko can develop the “intimacy” she enjoys.  This has an important 
effect on time; although a traumatic past still appears in the present, these 
eruptions are fundamentally controlled, made knowable – just as Keiko’s suicide has 
been oddly domesticated in Etsuko’s imagination, brought through the dream into a 
room in the mother’s house. It has also been brought under control temporally; it 
can be anticipated.                                                       
As Caroline Bennett remarks, Pale View presents “a cornucopia of repressive 
symptoms such as splitting, dissociation, rationalisation and projection” (“Children 
and Trauma in the Early Novels of Kazuo Ishiguro”, 88), and this is underpinned by 
the novel’s cinematic aspects. Even the swing/noose juxtaposition is immediately 
suggestive of both the return of the repressed and a basic technique of the horror 
movie - the unexpected, uncanny visual transformation of a stereotypical image of 
innocence (often specifically of childhood) into one of horror (we’ll see this again, 
notably in The Innocents). It is through anticipation, though, and the basic desire for 
control over time that this indicates, that the alignment between the novel and the 
horror movie becomes most pronounced. 
In the horror movie there are at least three kinds of anticipation at work, all 
of them ultimately an anticipation of violent death: that of the protagonists who 
encounter and must strive to evade a mortal threat; that of the killer or other force 
who constitutes that threat, and who lies watching the protagonists before making 
his move; and that of the audience, between the two, still behind the killer but often 
ahead of the protagonists (we typically see the face emerge from the shadows 
behind the victim before she does). Who anticipates, then, determines who lives or 
dies, and so it is here too.  
At the outset of the narrative, though, there is no forewarning of this. For no 
immediately clear reason, Niki’s visit in the 1980s narrative prompts Etsuko to 
remember her life in early post-war Nagasaki (11). In that earlier time, Etsuko is 
married to a Japanese husband, Jiro; she is expecting their first child, which may or 
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may not be Keiko. Etsuko gradually becomes acquainted with an initially 
“unfriendly” and “proud” woman, Sachiko, and the woman’s ten-year-old child, 
Mariko. Etsuko begins to occasionally help to look after Mariko, whom Etsuko 
appears to consider somewhat neglected as a result of her mother’s preoccupation 
with her American boyfriend, Frank. Meanwhile, Etsuko and Jiro host an extended 
visit by Jiro’s father, Ogata, who is obsessed with an article written by Jiro’s former 
classmate, Shigeo Matsuda, which has severely criticised Ogata, who in pre-war 
Japan was a senior, and aggressively nationalist, pedagogic leader. Sachiko plans to 
leave for America with Frank and her daughter: plans dropped only to be revived as 
her relationship with Frank fluctuates. Etsuko becomes increasingly concerned about 
Sachiko’s irresponsibility towards Mariko, whose frequent long absences become 
even more worrying as reports of serial child murders circulate around the city.  
This narrative is interrupted by brief returns to the 1980s, where Etsuko and 
her daughter Niki struggle to communicate; both are troubled by bad dreams and 
the proximity of Keiko’s old bedroom in the house. The novel climaxes in the 
Nagasaki narrative when Mariko goes missing yet again and Etsuko finds her. 
Following a disturbingly ambiguous passage, to which I’ll return shortly, the final 
chapter returns to the present as Niki and her mother discuss Etsuko’s move to 
England from Japan, a migration Niki considers a model of personal bravery.  Etsuko 
however sees her other, deceased, daughter as its victim: “I knew all along she 
wouldn’t be happy here. But I decided to bring her just the same” (176).  
The parallel ruptures between mother and child and between interior and 
exterior of the subject preoccupy the novel. Keiko’s paternity is never explained 
(though she is referred to by Etsuko as “pure Japanese”) and her sister, who lives a 
lifestyle and in a (apparently New Age-like) community of which her mother quietly 
disapproves, reflects a division created by Etsuko herself:  
Niki, the name we finally gave my younger daughter, is […] a 
compromise I reached with her father. For paradoxically it was he 
who wanted to give her a Japanese name, and I – perhaps out of 
some selfish desire not to be reminded of the past – insisted on an 
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English one. He finally agreed to Niki, thinking it had some vague 
echo of the East about it. (Pale View, 9) 
Naming is in a sense the first act of education, linking the child’s entrance 
into language to a particular signifying system, one which, as Lacan famously argued, 
exists before the child’s birth and will continue after the child’s death (Fink, The 
Lacanian Subject, 27). In such Lacanian terms, the killing of the child asserts the 
primacy of the symbolic order over the Real, an assertion taking place precisely 
when education fails (as Etsuko and her father-in-law believe it is failing in post-war 
Japan).  
Etsuko’s attitude to naming displays an unacknowledged ambivalence 
between the education of the child and the essence suspected within the child, one 
she associates with a traumatic past. This ambivalent suggestion of a latent quality 
within the child, which may or may not be manageable through education, hints at 
the importance of education within the novel. The anxiety and conflict over 
education here indicates its fundamental failure as a preparation for the future; the 
nationalist future that Ogata and others attempted to create through and in the 
children they taught has not come to pass. Given this, and the competing but 
uncertain sense that the Americans offer an alternative future that promises to 
indulge the child’s personal ambitions, there is a crisis in anticipation of the child’s 
future that repeatedly appears as an anxious, scrutinising gaze on the child herself.  
In an ironic reversal of the repeated attempts by adults throughout the novel 
to divert or silence the child’s critical faculties, the final function of Etsuko’s child is 
to block her own tentative critical assessment of the past. Niki is only too keen to 
promote a quite uncritical version of her mother’s past – particularly her migration 
from Japan to England - about which one of her friends is planning to write a poem. 
Etsuko views the proposed poem as attempting to disguise the supposedly obvious 
implication that her migration ultimately caused Keiko’s suicide (11). In fact, 
criticism (including in the literary sense, though with a broader application), or the 
lack of it, is in itself a theme of this novel; Etsuko recalls that her daughters’ piano 
tutor “was a very limited pianist and her attitude […] had often irritated me; for 
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instance, she would refer to works by Chopin and Tchaikovsky alike as ‘charming 
melodies’” (50).  
As often in Ishiguro, such apparently casual irritations as these consistently 
betray much more fundamental and unspoken anxieties, just as Mrs Walters’ banal 
and sentimental teaching is an ironic and bathetic echo of the much more serious 
failure of Etsuko’s father-in-law, Ogata, to promote any critical capacity in his 
teaching in pre-war Japan. They indicate both a deep anxiety over the capacity to 
think seriously about the future (or lack thereof), but also a desire for both aesthetic 
and political fulfilment and a frustration over their own ability to achieve this.  
Simultaneously, this is matched by Etsuko’s antagonism towards those who 
magnify the difference between the adult and the child, and between past and 
present. This emerges around Etsuko’s attitude to her father-in-law and his 
detractors, her tendency to support Ogata in the face of criticism from those who 
support the new democratic order. Etsuko’s personal resistance to the possibility of 
criticism and to democratised thought aligns with her deep-rooted fear of a division 
between the interior and exterior, the individual and the nation, the father and the 
son, the mother and the daughter: a fear mapped on to the anxious gaze towards 
the child, anxious in part because of the absence of the authoritarian ‘education’ 
Ogata proclaims.  
Mariko is the primarily object of this anxious gaze. This child is appropriated 
and used to advance competing moral positions, standing in for Etsuko’s own 
unborn child, growing inside the womb, and for a future that must heal the 
catastrophe of Japan’s defeat. Alongside this, she is used by the women to articulate 
both the attractions and anxieties of the possibilities for the fulfilment of ambition 
and personal advancement supposedly opened up by American capitalism. Mrs 
Fujiwara, who has accommodated the future by cheerfully abandoning her former 
social status to run a noodle-shop, readily uses this child as a conventional symbol of 
hope. Curiously, this hope is just as strong an imperative as the compulsive 
anticipation we observed elsewhere; both are concerned to foreclose the possibility 
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that the future might be threatening, and to do so through control of the child’s 
interiority:  
“You must keep your mind on happy things now. Your child. And the 
future [...] Your attitude makes all the difference. A mother can take 
all the physical care she likes, she needs a positive attitude to bring 
up a child. […] There’s a young woman I see every week,” Mrs 
Fujiwara went on. “She must be six or seven months pregnant now. I 
see her every time I go to visit the cemetery. [...] It’s a shame, a 
pregnant girl […] I know they’re being respectful, but all the same […] 
They should be thinking about the future.”  
“I suppose she finds it hard to forget.” […]  (Pale View, 24-25) 
This episode complicates the association between violence and the desire for 
meaning at work in the novel; whilst that association is certainly still present here, it 
is complicated by the sense that Mrs Fujiwara’s apparent willingness to abandon 
meaning (about the past, at least) is just as narrow; it shows a naïve degree of faith 
in the availability of someone’s interior condition for external knowledge, and its 
openness to manipulation. There is, in fact, more in common between the two 
women than is apparent at first glance; both fear the identification of the future 
with death (even though of course that is the only thing the future can ever 
guarantee, and is a necessary predicate of the child’s growing up). Their implicit 
agreement that the child’s welfare depends on the mother’s mental state also 
makes the child a purely internalised element of that mental state, rather than an 
external object. This is easily accepted at this point in the novel, of course, because 
the child is physically internal, but its significance, as with so many casual moments 
in Ishiguro, turns out to be far greater than its ostensible context suggests: Keiko is 
only ever internal in the novel, whether in the womb or in the memory of her death. 
She is, in a sense, only a name.  
Here Ishiguro, then, draws an almost unbearable parallel between the 
gestating ‘child within’ of Etsuko’s pregnancy and the ‘children within’ her memory 
of the dead Keiko and (ambiguously) Mariko. Even death, though, has a kind of dual 
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existence within this novel; in the Nagasaki narrative it is a matter of sacrifice and 
remembrance, and of Ogata’s pining for the abandoned ethno-nationalist 
inheritance between generations; here death is an ideological matter. In the 1980s 
English narrative, though, Etsuko is facing her own lonely, mundane decline towards, 
presumably, ordinary biological death, perhaps just of old age. (Etsuko’s desultory 
relationship with her surviving daughter, with all their failures of communication, 
emphasises this banality.)  
For Sachiko, however, the child is to be a means for a vicarious future 
emancipation from the conditions of post-war Japan:  
“Mariko will be fine in America, why won’t you believe that? It’s a 
better place for a child to grow up. And she’ll have far more 
opportunities there [..] She could become a business girl, or a film 
actress even […] so many things are possible.” (Pale View, 46)  
Sachiko demands that Etsuko look at the child and read the future through 
and in her. Etsuko (who we already know did migrate out of Japan herself, though to 
Britain rather than America – an unexplained turn from the ‘new’ to the ‘old’ 
western power) seems conflicted. She sides with Ogata’s disdain for the 
Americanisation of Japan (including the adoption of democracy and female suffrage) 
but is evidently fascinated by Sachiko’s willingness to migrate to America (itself 
ambiguous and inconsistent - immediately after the passage above, Sachiko 
mentions her decision to leave the noodle shop, emphasising her pain in 
undertaking the job given her hereditary social status, betraying a lack of realism in 
her enthusiasm for American meritocracy). The noodle shop’s symbolic opposition 
to the cemetery suggests how the child’s ambition is bound up in the repudiation of 
death even, as Etsuko intuits, it inevitably reminds the adult of that death (for after 
all, ambitions for the child are for the child’s life beyond her mother’s life).  
Education – about which Etsuko and Mrs Fujiwara argue – remains a key site 
of conflict between competing notions of authority, as Ogata implies in response to 
Shigeo Matsuda:  
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“We may have lost the war,” Ogata-San interrupted, “but that’s no 
reason to ape the ways of the enemy. We lost the war because we 
didn’t have enough guns and tanks, not because our people were 
cowardly [...] We [...] worked hard to ensure the correct values were 
preserved and handed on.” (Pale View, 147)  
According to Ogata, to maintain these values, they must be reproduced – in 
Japan’s children – but lie dormant or latent, making use of the inscrutability of the 
child, until the opportunity to re-establish outward authority for Japan (and to 
regain guns and tanks) emerges. Both individuals see the war as having exposed a 
reality beneath hypocritical and unsustainable social norms, but Ogata locates that 
hypocrisy in the post-war present, whereas Shigeo locates it in the pre-war past (in 
either scenario, war is the revelation of essential reality). In either case, the child is 
expected to demonstrate this reality, to make it available for recognition.  
*** 
Seeing and reading the child turns out, then, to be inevitably related to the 
war as a fundamental disruption to the expectation of ideological and personal 
reproduction through the child. For this reason, both the war and the child disrupt 
the authorities’ normal procedures for managing death, a fact betrayed by the 
repeated and anxious association of the child with death in the novel.  
When Mariko claims to have spent time with a woman living across the river, 
Sachiko at first claims this woman is entirely imaginary, but then reveals that the 
imagination – if that is what it is – is here a return of the repressed: 
 “This woman you’ve heard Mariko talk about. That was something 
Mariko saw in Tokyo [...] You see, Mariko went running off [...] down 
an alleyway, and I followed after her. There was a canal at the end 
and the woman was kneeling there, up to her elbows in water […] she 
turned round and smiled at Mariko [...] she had that kind of look, her 
eyes didn’t seem to actually see anything. Well, she brought her arms 
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out of the canal and showed us what she’d been holding under the 
water. It was a baby.” (Pale View, 74-75)  
This woman was found in the process of both hiding sight from a child and 
hiding the child from sight; she looks without seeing, but is nevertheless engaged in 
the act of child murder. The woman does not “actually see anything” because there 
is nothing, and certainly no future, to be seen. This refusal of recognition is 
transformed into violence against the child, something which the child transforms, 
apparently, into her own visual anxieties:  
 “She saw everything? She saw the baby?” 
“Yes.  Actually, for a long time I thought she hadn’t 
understood [...] She didn’t start talking about it until a month or so 
later. […] I woke up in the night and saw Mariko sitting up, staring at 
the doorway. [...] I asked Mariko what was wrong and she said a 
woman had been standing there watching us. I asked what sort of 
woman and Mariko said it was the one we’d seen that morning. 
Watching us from the doorway.” (Pale View, 74-75)  
The framing by the doorway indicates that the woman has become a defined 
image – or in Freudian or cinematic terms, a scene. Whilst this scene establishes a 
dynamic of looking, seeing, and meaning between Mariko and the murderous, and 
eventually ghostly, woman, it is actually about the mother’s gaze, about what she 
reads in her daughter’s face. The suspicion that certain scenes cannot be easily, if 
ever, abandoned (and the location of this fear in the child) emerges in such 
innocuous distortions as when Etsuko, discussing piano lessons, assures Niki that 
nothing learned at a young age is ever truly lost.  
If that is true, it identifies education with trauma. Shigeo Matsuda makes this 
explicit when he tells Ogata, “in your day, children in Japan were taught terrible 
things. They were taught lies of the most damaging kind [...] And that’s why the 
country was plunged into the most evil disaster in her entire history” (147, my 
italics). The murder of the child is a perverse act of education, for it forever 
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transforms the child by, and into, the ‘correct values’. In fact, the child’s death 
paradoxically confirms the child’s value, which otherwise is the object of anxious 
doubt: only in death is the child wholly available for meaning. Here the child 
becomes paradoxically identified with memory itself; Etsuko, as the mother of a 
daughter who has died, one identified with an essential but lost Japan, is always 
attempting to master the past – much as the child-killing woman made the war into 
a symbol under her authority in drowning her daughter.  
In order to facilitate their unburdened departure for America, Sachiko 
drowns Mariko’s kittens, recalling the drowning of the child in Tokyo. Following this, 
Mariko has run away; Etsuko searches, and when she finds her -  
“The insects were clustering around the lantern. I put it down 
in front of me, and the child’s face became more sharply illuminated. 
After a long silence, she said: “I don’t want to go away. I don’t want 
to go away tomorrow.” 
I gave a sigh. “But you’ll like it.” […] 
“In any case,” I went on, “if you don’t like it over there, we 
can always come back.” […] 
The little girl was watching me closely. “Why are you holding 
that?” she asked.  
“This? It just caught around my sandal, that’s all.” 
“Why are you holding it?”  
“I told you. It caught around my foot. What’s wrong with 
you?” I gave a short laugh. “Why are you looking at me like that? I’m 
not going to hurt you.”  
Without taking her eyes from me, she rose slowly to her feet. 
(Pale View, 173)  
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This is the final and most disturbing of the instances in the novel when we 
glimpse a difference between the (mostly) visually precise information Etsuko 
relates to us and the reactions of other characters to her actions. Etsuko suddenly 
starts talking as though she were Sachiko, referring to the plan to go to America in 
terms of “we.” It is impossible to securely interpret this uncanny change, the novel’s 
key “small but explosively significant slippage” (Bennett, “Children and Trauma in 
the Early Novels of Kazuo Ishiguro”, 84); the child – like us – looks up “questioningly” 
but it is not clear whether Etsuko is including herself in the family to reassure the 
child by pretending that she too is going to America, or whether Etsuko has taken on 
Sachiko’s voice because of some psychological slippage (the shocking possibility, 
indeed, that Sachiko was always only a projection of Etsuko’s). The combination of 
the reassurance of the child and the sudden collapse of identities produces a chilling 
effect, compounded in the revelation that Etsuko is carrying a rope, identifying her 
with the child-murderer preying upon Nagasaki (who killed the last victim by 
hanging). We might trust Mariko’s response because when Etsuko approached her 
alone once before, she also had something “caught around my foot”, which 
frightened the girl. 
Here Ishiguro – like Henry James in The Turn of the Screw, as we’ll find 
shortly – reverses the convention by which the reader is given access to the exterior 
elements of a scenario only to enjoy the gradual revelation of the interior, of the 
characters’ buried motivations. Here, instead, we begin ‘inside’ the narrator but only 
gradually come to the uncanny realisation that her gaze cannot be trusted. This 
interest in the interior (recognised as central to Ishiguro’s work by critics such as 
Walkowitz, Robinson, and Black) emerges, then, as a source of violence directed 
towards the capacity for creativity and ambition located in the self but projected on 
to the child.  
The child murderer turns out to have been closer to home than we initially 
suspected. The penetrative gaze, seeking to discover an essence inside the Other, 
uses violence as a way to ward off the fear of violence – and of the future - that 
actually produced it. The scene of the child’s death, whatever the adult’s precise role 
in it, offers the same consolation - as Etsuko hints when suggesting that Keiko’s 
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suicide confirmed her essentially Japanese interior quality within her – a reunion of 
the exterior and interior that refuses the possibility of interior thought as a source of 
disruption, creativity, or criticism - refuses, in fact, its very privacy. (The ghostly child 
murderer remembered from Tokyo appears in Mariko’s dreams in a doorway - on 
the threshold between interior and exterior).  
In Freudian terms, one would expect this fear of division between the 
interior and exterior self to reflect a desire to re-establish perfect, infantile, unity 
with the mother; and this hovering expectation haunts the ambiguity of Etsuko as a 
mother herself: in one timeframe, pregnant; in the other, contemplating her 
daughter’s suicide; but always with the child somehow ambiguously ‘within’ herself. 
Ishiguro thus uncannily transforms the perfect affective relation, this total 
identification between parent and child, into a capacity for violence.  
Just as Remains finds Nazis and the abuse of Jews not in Germany but in an 
English country house, so too Pale View insists that this killing of the child is not only 
found in post-war Japan but in 1980s Britain. What, we might wonder, is that Britain 
being accused of here, and why does this accusation take the form of a powerful 
taboo (a taboo which, as we saw in the previous chapter, 1980s Britain expended no 
little political energy defending) as violence towards the child?  
In one respect, this takes the place of the classic ‘twist’ at the end of a 
successful horror movie, the scene where the security of identities is fundamentally 
and sickeningly undermined. Think again of the moment in Psycho when Lila (and 
with her through the camera, the viewer) finally approaches Mrs Bates, the 
murderer we have observed throughout the movie, only for the chair to swing round 
and reveal that the real murderer is elsewhere. Something similar happens in this 
final ‘Japanese’ scene of Pale View, in the revelation that the narrator herself, whom 
we are dependent on for our view of the scene, is – perhaps – the murderer. This 
final scene of (attempted?) child murder, echoes and elides the earlier ‘scenes’ in 
Pale View:  the imagined suicide-scene within Keiko’s room, the dream of the child 
on the swing/the noose, and the image of the woman drowning her child as 
apparently witnessed in Tokyo by Sachiko and Mariko.  
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The excessive number of child killings in the novel (those being carried out by 
the serial killer in the background to the Japanese narrative; the drowning of the 
child by the mother in Tokyo; Etsuko’s apparent attempted murder of Mariko; and 
Keiko’s suicide) both elicit and resist reduction to a symbolic or psychoanalytic 
explanation. As events, they are neither comfortably interior not exterior, neither 
fully real nor securely unreal. (They are textual). The effect of this is to deny the 
desire for penetrative knowledge driving the visual gaze on the child throughout the 
novel. We’re left, I am suggesting, instead with the status of the novel as text, that is 
as something produced by a human subject, one appearing to grant access to the 
most intimate of things (to paraphrase Etsuko’s early comments), but who 
ultimately remains external to us. At this point, the novel’s use of tropes and devices 
from the horror film appears as an ironic tease, for what the film provides (visual 
penetration and the return of the dead) is what the novel most absolutely denies to 
us at its conclusion.  
Our attention is further drawn to the text’s relation to death at the ending of 
the novel through (as so often in Ishiguro) tragicomical means. This is in the proposal 
by one of Niki’s friends to write a poem about Etsuko’s life. Following the text we’ve 
just read, this proposal seems ludicrously misplaced: The planned poem presumes to 
access and represent Etsuko’s ‘journey’, both in the literal sense of her migration 
and in the contemporary pop-biographical sense of an individual’s “journey”. This 
irony underscores our own lack of access to the narrator. Although the novel begins 
by apparently giving us direct and unmediated access to Etsuko’s interior 
monologue, it ends with this access emerging as irrevocably compromised and 
ambiguous: Etsuko’s narrative may be haunting, but it also ultimately indicates the 
reality of death – because the ‘truth’ dies with her; it is not finally accessible to us, 
and thus the access to affective interiority presumed by the writer of the poem is 
shown to be foolish. This isolation from the ageing Etsuko reminds us of the fact of 
death itself, of the difference between her and the children in the novel; her own 
consolation in the face of Keiko’s death is achieved only through an internalised 
image that contains both her capacity for affect and her trauma, but no clear image 
is available to us from Etsuko herself.  
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Our final inability to recognise Etsuko herself renders her own frustration 
over her inability to recognise the child both ironic and traumatic.  Characteristically 
for Ishiguro, we are left stranded in a situation, where the divide between interior 
and exterior – and between the visual and the textual – remains irreparable; but we 
are nevertheless forced to rely on the narration of the individual. This poses a 
political question): who gets to speak, and on what terms? Who has the right and 
potential for representation, even where recognition is absent? What does this 
mean for the child? Ishiguro’s insistence that the imperative to recognise is 
intensified by the memory of twentieth-century traumas also requires us to consider 
further how this imperative plays out historically.  
As noted, much supporting evidence for this in cultural history comes from 
the child in the horror film. However, the post-war horror child who is the object of 
the adult’s anxious gaze is not only found in those films.  
4. The post-war horror child in The World My Wilderness (1950) 
Rose Macaulay’s The World My Wilderness takes the second world war’s 
effect upon children as the context for its presentation of a ‘horror child’. The novel 
is highly pertinent to this investigation because it is a particularly early example of 
the themes under discussion here, even including the ambivalence between the 
child who kills and the child who must be killed, the same child who constitutes the 
object of the adult’s anxious gaze and the embodiment of a future changed 
irrevocably by the violence of the war. 
 Macaulay’s novel is literally and thematically framed by quotations from The 
Waste Land – as an epigraph and as the last lines spoken – quotations charged with 
Macaulay’s preoccupation with ruins (given free rein in her illustrated essay, 
Pleasure of Ruins, 1953). Macaulay’s concerns also fixate upon another trope, the 
French maquis, a word literally referring to a wilderness – here used to name both 
rural Provence and bombsites in the City of London – and also a name for the 
wartime Resistance. The combined, often ambiguous, use of the word here 
naturalises and essentialises violent political resistance - and locates this 
essentialism firmly in the child. Like Etsuko, the adults in this novel also come to 
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suspect that the war has revealed a reality that the child now inescapably embodies, 
and that this presents a direct threat to them.  
The children in the novel live within a bewildering matrix of adult 
relationships.  Helen, an English woman living in France, has divorced her first 
husband, the English lawyer Sir Gulliver Deniston, and since re-married the French 
Maurice Michel, who has now recently died in odd circumstances. Helen lives in 
Maurice’s villa with three children: Barbary, her seventeen-year old daughter by 
Gulliver; Raoul, Maurice’s son by his first wife (now also dead); and Roland, the baby 
son of Helen and Maurice. Helen is soon also visited by her older son Richie, 
Gulliver’s heir from his marriage to Helen. 
During the war Barbary and Raoul, despite the former being seventeen and 
the latter even younger, have apparently been active members of the local 
Resistance (maquis) which, it emerges, is responsible for murdering Maurice as a 
collaborator.  The whole novel, then, is predicated and framed by another scene of 
‘child murder’, but one in which the child – however uncertainly – has become the 
perpetrator, not the victim, of the killing. Hence, the novel is in turn haunted by the 
logical conclusion of this when combined with the repeated assertions of the 
impossibility of retrieving Barbary from barbarism: the conclusion that the adult 
should contemplate the killing of the child to protect herself (the same suspicion 
found between the lines of Pale View).  
Partly due to their need for better education, Barbary and Raoul are both 
sent to London, Barbary to live with her father and Raoul to an uncle and aunt. Once 
she has arrived in London, Gulliver and Pamela (who also have their own new baby) 
have Barbary enrol to study art; but she secretly spends most of her time painting in 
the ruined bombsites of the City, in the company of Raoul and increasingly of petty 
criminals. Later, during a police raid in the ruins, Barbary runs away and, falling from 
a high wall, is temporarily left in a coma. Helen travels from France to hold a fraught 
discussion with Gulliver over Barbary’s future, during which finally Helen plays her 
trump card: Barbary, she claims - perhaps untruthfully - is not Gulliver’s daughter 
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but a former lover’s; he relinquishes Barbary to return to France with her mother – 
and to the maquis.  
This novel, framed by a mess of paternities, constantly reiterates the 
unreliability of the child as reproduction and her consequent inscrutability. A 
doubled case of such inscrutability appears when Helen walks in on her daughter 
watching her son:  
The room was dim; in the first moment she did not see 
Barbary crouched by the cot, still in her wet frock, her draggled hair 
drooping like dank seaweed round her face. She got up, startled, 
defensive, pushing her hair from her eyes.  
“I didn’t want to disturb him,” she whispered. “I only wanted 
to look.” (The World, 19)  
This scene of multiple looks is rather cinematic in its specifically visual 
dynamic; it possesses that “choreography of the look” (67) that Lebeau identifies as a 
defining feature of the child on screen. The child’s inscrutability, the focus of the 
looking, becomes a horror when Helen recalls Barbary’s early infancy, and starts to 
read her daughter’s gaze on the younger child through it: “waking in terror, 
screaming at shadows [...]Barbary had been a wild baby” (19). There is a suggestive 
change in the novel’s presentation of threat here: The mother is compelled to 
protect her child, but what does this mean when one child is threatened by another? 
Particularly when that other may have committed the most extreme violence?  
Barbary, and perhaps Raoul too, are to some ambiguous degree complicit in 
Maurice’s death; in a disturbing reference that echoes many other literary images of 
children’s play as coded and menacing (we’ll see this again, for example, in Ackroyd), 
Maurice failed to appreciate the real nature of the children’s ‘play’, supposing that 
“they were out playing [...] Red Indians” (12) when in fact they were part of an 
organised guerrilla unit that would ultimately capture and kill him. The menace in the 
child’s inscrutability emerges again in Barbary’s memory of a brief relationship with a 
German soldier: 
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She was silent; she would not tell him. A thin, fair young face, 
the face of the enemy, the harsh, broken French of the conqueror, 
the smell of the forest in October […]...later the maquis had killed 
him.  
No one had known. They knew that she had been caught by 
the Germans, beaten a little, released with a warning. They did not 
know that she had met again in the forest the one who had ordered 
her to be beaten and released; met him three times, and the third 
time it was a trap. (The World, 77) 
Childhood inscrutability here is itself the trap, a three-time threat to the 
adult: in the decision of the Germans to release Barbary, in her relationship with the 
young German man, and in her lack of disclosure of this relationship to her fellow 
maquis. This structure of three, and the fairy-tale-like surroundings of the forest, 
echo classic stories of the child’s dangerous and ambiguous entrance into sexuality.  
Barbary’s inscrutability also hints at an inability to escape from entrapment 
within childhood experience, particularly the experience of war. She is unwilling to 
make any distinction amongst the forces of established authority, considering the 
British police, a gamekeeper, her uncle, and even the housekeeper as ‘gestapo’ to be 
resisted, if necessary with violence; the experience of war has produced learned 
instincts that the adults eventually come to believe Barbary cannot overcome (25), a 
view Helen brutally ascribes to educational deficiency: “the child’s so ignorant, she 
can barely read” (25). Although Helen exaggerates, the overly ‘childish’ nature and 
content of Barbary’s reading as described elsewhere partly justify her comment (42). 
Barbary’s educational poverty compounds her ethical simplicity, which becomes 
menacing in her attitude to her father’s new wife: “She’s no business here […] she 
oughtn’t to be here” (44).  
Barbary remains dependent upon the morality of absolutes the war provided. 
The violence and loss this generates is related ironically by Helen as she plays with 
baby Roland: “But still he would remark at intervals, “Want Barby,” and she would 
soothe him with, “Barby coming soon.” To herself she added, Want Maurice. 
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Maurice is coming never” (36). The “wild” children Barbary and Raoul become 
proponents of a fundamentalist morality the adult world has, they believe, casually 
betrayed; the desire for political freedom, arising in reaction to totalitarian 
oppression, will – Macaulay hints – itself turn into a totalitarianism if immune to any 
process of humane education. Once again, we’re in the territory Marlowe establishes 
when the child Edward III assumes power: Proposing to preach from “one of the 
niches on the walls” of a ruined church, like a statuary child saint come alive, Barbary 
declares -  
 “I shall say how divorced people can’t really marry again. And I shall 
preach about hell […] They don’t have much hell in the English 
church, Richie says. But we’ll have hell in our church.” (The World, 58) 
This peculiar liaison between violent subversion and fundamentalist morality 
targets the culture represented by Barbary’s parents: Helen, the liberal, promiscuous 
widow of a collaborator, and Gulliver, the orthodox, patrician English lawyer. Both 
are targeted by Barbary’s violent sense of morality, determined by the war and 
symbolised by the Last Judgements she paints on to ruined buildings.  
The difference between Barbary and her older brother Richie, the difference 
that determines susceptibility to violence, is one of education, as Richie perceives: “I 
remember often thinking how differently I should have been treated at school for 
conduct such as yours. So I have grown up a civilised being, and you, so far, have 
not.” (33) Richie values a classical, literary education (24-25), from which he has 
developed a sort of patrician liberalism, one that provides for a realistic, accepting 
attitude towards his parents: “[...] He had no Oedipus complex, and was no more 
jealous of the man his mother loved than of the woman to whom his father was 
married. Let them both, by all means, be happy” (154). Unlike Barbary, he has grown 
up.  
Macaulay, writing in 1950, invokes a figure that will recur throughout later 
post-war culture, the horror child identified with a naturalised and essential 
violence. The theme of frustrated education, a pre-occupation for Macaulay as much 
as for Ishiguro and other authors discussed here hints, inter alia, that the adult’s 
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resumption of control over the child’s entrance into authority (the process called 
education) cannot happen until the adult resolves this problem – a resolution 
potentially available, shockingly, through the murder of the child.  
In Macaulay’s novel, this is left as a strictly symbolic potential. This does, 
however, suggest that Ishiguro’s much more ambiguous scene of child murder, 
which transgresses the boundary between symbolism and realism and offers no 
certainty, has a deep hinterland behind it – one evident, as Macaulay’s novel 
demonstrates, within only a few years of the Second World War. The reality of the 
world that adults choose to authorise is, in this scenario, necessarily conditioned by 
a capacity for violence derived from (or exposed by) the war, and ingrained within 
the child. Macaulay rather subversively associates this not only with the horrors of 
the Nazis and their collaborators, but with the moral absolutism she locates in the 
children of the maquis, emphasising the sense that the capacity for violence now 
evident in the world may not easily be re-educated out of existence.  
The maternal figure ambiguously identified with the killing of the child 
follows the twentieth-century horror child around; and not only as a result of the 
war, but also of Freud’s exposure of the child’s openness to sexuality.  
5. The Innocents (1961), the Freudian Horror Child, and violence  
Several critics have detected stylistic and thematic connections between 
Ishiguro and Henry James (Su, “Refiguring National Character”, 553; Walkowitz, 
“Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds”, 1049).  Keith McDonald draws a particular comparison 
between the two authors in their adoption – as in Pale View - of an autobiographical 
narration style that tends to gradually undermine its own authority (“Days of Past 
Futures”, 79). They also share what is (despite Macaulay’s suggestive example) a 
rare common theme in both imagining the killing of a child by their female narrators.  
 In both The Turn of the Screw and A Pale View of Hills, the reader might 
suspect – particularly following Shoshana Felman’s radical reading of The Turn of the 
Screw’s object as interpretation (or reading) itself - the child’s death to be a 
consequence of the narrator’s desire to find and fix meaning. James’ novel ends 
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when the Governess - having become increasingly convinced of the communication 
of her two young charges, Miles and Flora, with the dead valet, Peter Quint, and 
former governess, Miss Jessel - attempting to force Miles to confess his relationship 
with Quint, only for him to die in her arms. Paradoxically, as in Ishiguro, a violence 
suspected in the child here transforms, at the last moment, into violence upon the 
child by the adult assigned to protect her or him. Like Pale View, the overall dynamic 
of James’ novel – and the force of its traumatic ending – depends upon the related 
paradox of the novel’s deep investment in the visual whilst the ultimately key visual 
referent for the reader turns out to be what we cannot see: as in Ishiguro, the 
narrator’s face.  
This dynamic is at least partially reversed in The Innocents, the 1961 
adaptation of The Turn of the Screw directed by Jack Clayton, with a script written by 
Truman Capote along with Clayton himself and others. James’ Governess, whom he 
left unnamed, becomes “Miss Giddens” for the movie. Her initial elation at gaining 
the chance to raise her young charges turns into a scrutiny, a visual obsession, which  
the camera replicates in the film. This film is important both for studies of the queer 
child and for the history of the child in cinema because of the sheer persistence with 
which it looks at the child, and because that look is always met by the gaze of the 
child in turn.  
The film sits within the extensive and contested critical afterlife of James’ 
novella, which, as Felman remarks, must “qualify as one of the […] most effective 
texts of all time, judging by the quantity and intensity […] of the critical literature to 
which it has given rise” (“Turning the Screw of Interpretation”, 96). From the 1930s, 
critical battles pitted the “psychoanalysts”, who read The Turn of the Screw as a 
proto-Freudian study in the consequences of adult sexual repression and childhood 
perversity, against those “apparitionists” who considered it a ghost story, its 
untoward events the effects of malevolent supernatural influence (see Bontly, 
“Henry James’ ‘General Vision of Evil’”, 722). Later, critics increasingly identified the 
story’s ambiguity and indeterminability as, paradoxically, themselves constituting 
the meaning of the tale. The real evil of James’ story, they asserted, was the 
presumption of knowledge itself, as influentially argued by Shoshana Felman, 
94 
 
originally in her 1977 essay “Turning the Screw of Interpretation”, later expanded 
upon in Writing and Madness (2003).  
Jack Clayton, director of The Innocents, concurred with the Freudian reading 
of James’ story (he claimed to have come up with such a reading independently, and 
only later to have realised that the Freudian account of the story had already been 
fully developed, most notably by Edmund Wilson in his 1934 essay “The Ambiguity 
of Henry James”). Clayton felt the Governess “more or less creates the situation” 
(qtd. in Sinyard, Jack Clayton, 92), though (perhaps sensing the misogynistic 
potential of his assertion), he qualified this by claiming that he sought to give an 
equality between her perspective and that of the children.  
Clayton’s movie clearly punishes the Governess for lacking a Freudian realism 
with regard to both her own and the children’s sexuality. The sharp contrast it draws 
between the conventional, and probably hypocritical, bourgeois and Protestant 
morality the Governess expresses and the circle of queer men (The Master, Miles, 
Quint) who surround her (an image literalised in the film’s final sequence, where she 
is encircled by a series of statues interchangeable with the gazing ghost of Peter 
Quint), seems to adopt Freud’s authority - but with menaces.  
The film’s Freudian sensibility is most evident with regard to the possibility of 
seduction both of and by the child. Much of this is presented through the 
remarkable performance by Martin Stephens as Miles, a performance largely 
conveyed through facial reactions, often shown in close-up, and edited to create 
sinister juxtapositions through the film’s innovative use of dissolves and montages. 
The Miles this process creates repeatedly, queerly, foregrounds the 
instability of the child as category: Stephens looks like both a child and an adult 
simultaneously. He’s a physically small boy with cherubic features, but he dresses, 
acts and sounds like a gentleman; occasionally, he echoes the caddish demeanour of 
his uncle. The film gradually forces us to question, amongst many other things, the 
pleasure we take in the cute child who precociously but ingenuously acts the part of 
an adult. The problem with Miles is that he acts this part far too well; the Governess 
gradually - and probably we too, rather more quickly - comes to suspect that he 
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really is as knowing as he appears to be, that his kisses are, as it were, ‘real’ kisses. 
This suspicion is far more definite in the film than in the novella on which it’s based; 
Miles on screen seems like a genuine, even a physical, threat to the Governess, 
despite his young age and diminutive stature. (Soon after his arrival, he begins to 
suffocate the Governess during a game of hide-and-seek, and only stops when they 
are interrupted).  
The Innocents starred Deborah Kerr as Miss Giddens and was marketed as a 
competitor to the Hammer films dominating the period. Yet it was adapted from a 
‘difficult’ literary text - one already noted (though the film preceded Felman’s 
reading) for the ambiguity of its content, the impenetrability of its meaning, and the 
unreliability of its narrator, and which lacked much obvious dramatic action until its 
final moments. Why, then, adapt The Turn of the Screw as a mainstream horror film? 
Clayton’s own comments (Sinyard, Jack Clayton, 92-94) suggest that a significant 
attraction of The Turn of the Screw was precisely its provision of a relatively rare 
template for a movie to focus on children as the object of its horror.  
For reasons arising from their understanding of Freud and of contemporary 
social changes, Clayton, Capote and others were already turning their attention to 
the child and to child sexuality (Kubrick’s Lolita would be released one year later). 
The Innocents was one of the very first horror films to put a child centre-screen and 
constantly pursued, his face constantly scrutinised, for the major part of the film’s 
duration.  This was a significant initiative, as demonstrated by the films that came 
after it. 
The ubiquity of children in horror films can be dated to well into the post-
Second World War era, when the horror genre itself had been long established as a 
successful strand of cinema (which it had been since at least the Bela Lugosi Dracula 
and the Boris Karloff Frankenstein, both 1931). Children made few appearances in 
Hollywood horror movies until the early Cold War era, a period when the Second 
World War remained a recent memory, and the fear of a nuclear war of annihilation 
was potent.11 From this time onwards, increasingly young, often prepubescent, 
children frequently appear as the sources and objects of horror (see Phillips, 
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Projected Fears; Prince, The Horror Film). They typically embody an underlying 
reality emerging out of its failing repression by an increasingly weak and hypocritical 
society, in dramas of sexuality and violence that heavily, but not always with 
integrity, drew on Freud for their authority, as several famous examples show.  
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960) centred on an adult trapped in his supposed 
childhood relationship with his mother, in one of the most famous (and exploitative) 
use of Freudian themes in Hollywood cinema. In the same year, another film also 
turned to creepy children, but as embodiments of the risk of nuclear conflict rather 
than of Freudian sexuality: Wolf Rilla’s Village of the Damned (1960) depicted a 
series of bizarre unnatural pregnancies producing equally unnatural (and 
preternatural) children, ultimately identified as the products of an innovative Soviet 
bomb. One of those child actors, Martin Stephens, was chosen to play Miles in The 
Innocents.  
Roman Polanski’s Rosemary’s Baby (1968) drew the focus of horror to the 
unborn child gestating inside the womb. Night of the Living Dead (also 1968) showed 
a daughter eating her father and murdering her mother as one of its final atrocities. 
The Exorcist (1973) put an actual child very visibly centre-screen, creating a legacy of 
perpetually recycled images (such as Regan’s spinning head) in popular culture 
thereafter).  Don’t Look Now (1973) showed the child appearing both as the victim 
and as the agent of horror. The Wicker Man (1973) dispensed with such ambiguity, 
exposing the child who appears as apparent victim as in fact the bait to draw the 
adult towards a horrific death. The Omen (1976) made the child the incarnation of 
Satan. Halloween (1978), the original slasher movie, follows the rampage of a young 
murderer, after having located his violent impulses in a pop-Freudian childhood 
witnessing of sex; Halloween’s cruder successor ‘slashers’ maintained the 
prominence of these themes throughout the 1980s and beyond.  
The Shining (1980) had an abundance of children as ghosts, as victims, but 
most especially as possessors of Second Sight.  In 1995, John Carpenter, director of 
Halloween, re-made Village of the Damned, placing more (and more exploitative) 
emphasis on the scene of childbirth. Later The Sixth Sense (1999) again put a child 
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with Second Sight at its centre, and gave him one of the most prominent roles in the 
history of the genre, making his face the visual focus of almost all the scenes of the 
movie (whilst the movie’s other main character was a child psychologist). The child, 
Cole Sear, has visions that demonstrate the continuity of violence and cruelty as 
aspects of the human condition, yet which also suggest that recognition of this 
condition, through the child, is the means for salvation.  
This indicative account of the horror child on screen records the 
phenomenon of which The Innocents is an early and crucial case, one that stages a 
more extended gaze directly upon the child’s face than even the other films 
featuring horror children had undertaken by 1961. Throughout these movies, 
everywhere children are looking and being looked at, as though they might make 
visible the origin of the horror that threatens the adults. As Lebeau says, the adult is 
defined by the “capacity to know what to do with” the image of the child on film 
(Childhood and Cinema, 127). Simultaneously, the child as pre-socialised human 
allows the horror to be revealed as essential, natural, fundamental. Often, these two 
functions come to a climax in the scene of child murder, where the adult finally 
decides “what to do with” the child, yet in doing so and breaking the taboo against 
violence upon the child, becomes in some measure indistinct – morally, sometimes 
visually too - from the threat the child represented. The adult thus proves the truth 
of the essential reality revealed by the child.  
These horror films repeatedly use Freudian models and figures, even 
counter-intuitively enlisting Freudian psychoanalysis to assert recognition of the 
supernatural (such as Dr Loomis’ affirmation that it was “the bogeyman” who has 
brought about the horror in Halloween). In fact, the frequent appearances of the 
child as the focus and source of horror are virtually matched by the constant arrivals 
of psychoanalysts, psychologists and psychiatrists in these films, often as 
authoritative interpreter. Such figures appear in Psycho, The Exorcist, Halloween, 
The Sixth Sense (as the protagonist), for example. As Nathan Hale notes, in these 
films “psychoanalysis was often a magical cathartic cure” (The Rise and Crisis of 
Psychoanalysis in the United States, 290). In Psycho, the psychoanalyst both provides 
the conclusive decoding of the plot, explaining the previously concealed facts of 
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Norman Bates’ life, and authoritatively pronounces upon the origin of the horror:  a 
dangerously universal event of witnessing sex (the Freudian primal scene). Similarly, 
when the absent parents in Halloween return (too late into the scene), and cry, 
“Michael! What have you done?” they already know the answer; enlisting Freud, 
Halloween suggests that we all know the answer, because this is what the child is 
like.  
Although The Innocents has no psychoanalyst character, it is thoroughly 
infused by Freudian ideas, or at least a version of their perceived implications. In the 
focus on Quint’s charismatic attraction and Miles’ sadism, and the relative ease with 
which they jointly destroy the Governess’ self-possession, one can sense a disdain 
for bourgeois and rationalist modernity and perhaps (for reasons we’ll see in a 
moment) an implicit indictment of the Victorians for laying the ground for the 
catastrophic events of the twentieth century with a repressive social code.  
The Innocents foregrounds the Governess’ sexual desires and compulsive 
need for secure knowledge: the film conflates the two. She is willing to know only 
what she can recognise from within her own stable, morally rigid worldview 
(identified implicitly with her own childhood and upbringing). This need for stability 
emerges from her will to create a timeless state of being at Bly, one that promises 
permanent access to the ‘innocent’ joy of children, as well as control over their 
education. At Bly, time for a while indeed appears suspended, all the more when 
Miles returns after expulsion from school, taking him out of his educational 
development. Miss Giddens willingly suspends lessons in response to tantrums, and 
she makes no effort whatsoever to arrange Miles’ return to formal education – 
rather she asserts her desire for him to remain at Bly indefinitely. 
As Kuhn comments of The Turn of the Screw, “at Bly, the governess 
constructs the Victorian fairy-tale paradise […] from which the sullying realities of 
death and sex are banished” (146). Whether this is true in the film depends upon 
how “sex” is understood: Miss Giddens appears to want, and briefly to get, access to 
all the pleasures of jouissance, in the form of the delightful and pointless play of the 
children; but without the excess, the infusion of pleasure by pain (echoed in the 
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sado-masochistic relationship between Quint and Jessel) also classically associated 
with jouissance. Paradoxically, in order to preserve her total knowledge of the 
children (embodied in the apparent innocence of her play with them) Giddens must 
not permit herself any sexual knowledge. This is because to know of desire, the film 
hints, is to know of the existence of that which one cannot wholly perceive – here, 
to know of qualities of the child that are not visible in her or his face, however much 
the camera, following Giddens’ own gaze, lingers upon it.  
Miss Giddens responds with horror to her growing sense that the children 
may be hiding something from her, and she believes that their confession of this 
inner darkness will somehow redeem them, and her.  It is the force of this belief, 
transformed into violence, which appears ultimately to cause Miles’ death. Here 
violent killing appears oddly as a denial of the reality of death, because Miss Giddens 
associates it with Miles’ salvation, taking him out of a world that is living but 
contaminated by death, and where the child is contaminated by the adult. In 
practice, too, the killing is a moment of embrace, almost of envelopment of Miles 
into Miss Giddens’ body, and thus symbolically dissolves his otherness (rather as we 
earlier saw Etsuko perfect an “intimacy” with the originally “disturbing” vision of her 
daughter’s dead body; in both cases, the child’s dead body overcomes the 
frustrations its living version provoked in the adult).  
The film’s ending implies that Miles’ death is a result not of the Governess’ 
need to recognise the interior reality of an ultimately inscrutable child, but of her 
unwillingness to recognise the child who puts his own sexuality (and his ‘adulthood’) 
on display and through that demands that the “dirty-minded” Giddens (as he calls 
her shortly before his death) recognises her own sexuality, too. Rather than Miles’ 
death being the tragic result of a violent need for total recognition of an irretrievably 
ambivalent child as it is in Felman’s reading of the James novel, the film’s visible 
Freudian aesthetic sustains the sense that Miles is indeed rather a recognisably 
perverse child throughout.  
The dynamic between Miss Giddens and Miles (and behind him, Quint and 
the “Master”, the children’s uncle) is altogether more recognisable in terms of 
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Freudian repression and displacement in her film incarnation than in James’ 
Governess. When Miles implies that Giddens finds his “being naughty” exciting, she 
kisses him hard on the lips, in one of the film’s most famous scenes - and one not 
found in James. As noted, Miles himself gives an implicitly Freudian account of 
Giddens’ motives in the moments immediately before his death, calling her a 
“hussy” and a “dirty-minded hag”, accusations not put in his mouth by James (nor 
does James’ Miles use a similar vocabulary), and which introduce a direct note of 
sexual violence absent from the novel, the same violence Miles displayed earlier in 
seemingly attempting to strangle Giddens. At no point in the novel do Miles or Flora 
clearly pose an actual physical threat to the Governess; in the film, Miles visibly 
does. 
Clearer eruptions of sexuality and violence appear through subtle details. In 
both novel and film, under pressure from Giddens in the moments before his death, 
Miles finally admits the fault that caused his expulsion from school: he “said things.” 
Tellingly, Capote and Clayton add a crucial expansion on this to their script. In the 
film only, Giddens questions Miles about where these “things” came from, and he 
explains that he made them up: they came from within himself. Whilst Giddens 
apparently suspects that the “things” actually came from Quint, the ambiguity over 
the ghosts’ reality allows the possibility that he may have admitted the truth, and 
that the “things” were inherent to his own nature. Either way, he is contaminated 
with the adult. (The film’s Freudianism does not prevent the ghosts being presented 
with a degree of apparitionist realism; though we might suspect that they come 
from Giddens’ mind, they certainly aren’t secure there. The recognition that the 
ghosts of Quint and Jessel demand, though, is entirely sexual in its implications, so – 
as in the later horror films discussed above – here is no real conflict between Freud 
and the supernatural.)  
In the film, Miles’ willingness to seduce the Governess parallels the refusal of 
seduction by the Master, who invites the young woman in only immediately to send 
her away, and also the more ambiguous refusal by Quint, who refuses to appear to 
the Governess on demand and seems more interested in the children than in her. 
Miles offers a sexual openness the other men in the story deny, but its cost is that 
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Giddens will not only know herself as subject of (and to) desire, but will also know 
the child as, in Freud’s famous phrase, polymorphously perverse.  
There is a misogynistic implication here: the frigid woman has to admit her 
desire for these males, who assert their phallic control through their unpredictable 
appearances and disappearances, in order to escape the violence they enact upon 
her from within their closed circuit of male (homo)sexuality, an escape only possible 
through adopting the abject position of Miss Jessel (a position also apparently 
shared, horrifically, by Miles’ sister Flora). Suggestively, this would involve 
surrendering the authority she otherwise possesses over those men by virtue of 
practical ability (her advantage over the absent Master), of adulthood (her 
advantage over Miles), and of social class (her advantage over Quint).  All that must 
be set aside, and she must acknowledge herself as pure desiring woman, if she is to 
stop herself being tortured by these men (in the film, occasionally an actual physical 
torture at Miles’ hands).  
Another omission between novel and film is of an element so fundamental 
its absence, curiously, could easily be overlooked (as it largely has been in critical 
discussion). This is the removal of the frame narrative James uses, where a group of 
friends are telling ghosts stories only for one to introduce the story of the Governess 
who, he says, has herself since died. The absence of this frame in The Innocents 
removes the role of her death in confirming the final impenetrability of the 
narrative, and of the child. (The ironic implications of this for the Governess’ 
certainty of an afterlife are also lost.)  
Felman argues that –  
The question […] can no longer be simply to decide whether in 
effect the ‘Freudian’ reading is true or false, correct or incorrect. It 
can be both at the same time. It is no doubt correct, but it misses 
nonetheless the most important thing: it is blind to the very textuality 
of the text. (Writing and Madness, 163)  
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According to this, James plays on The Turn of the Screw’s very status as text – 
itself underlined by the framing death of its narrator - not only to make the 
frustration of recognition the novella’s central theme, but also something 
deliberately enacted upon its reader, too.  
Instead of James’ frame, though, the film begins in circular fashion with an 
anguished voiceover, beginning “All I want to do is save the children”, delivered by 
the Governess and an image of her wringing her hands; this is retrospectively 
understood as a flash-forward to after Miles’ death.  Whilst it would be unfair to 
downplay the level of ambiguity that the film retains, the removal of Giddens’ own 
death transfers responsibility for the deaths of the children from the Governess’ 
desire to recognise their true nature, to her failure to recognise her own supposed 
true nature, emphasised by the attempt at self-justification in her voiceover.  
The Innocents’ changes to its source material allow it, then, to produce an 
influential impression of the child as a sexual and violent threat, who reveals an 
underlying reality about the human condition. The novel’s emphasis (according to 
Felman and those following her) on the desire for recognition as the source of 
violence was subtly amended, through the written script, the performances and 
their editing, to make the failure to recognise these underlying truths about 
sexuality and the potential for violence the cause of actual violence in the film.  
The film’s use of the child star Martin Stevens adds resonance with the other 
forms of actual and feared violence dominating its period. Stephens was chosen for 
the part of Miles because of his previous successful role in Village of the Damned 
(1960), where a group of children embody both totalitarian power and the threat of 
nuclear warfare. However distant the Freudian-Victorian world of The Innocents 
seems from this context, the use of the child to embody an essential violent reality, 
and the imperative to recognise that reality, is common to both. The two films 
accordingly share a focus on Stephens’ face and gaze; whereas in The Innocents the 
disturbing effect of this is achieved through Stephens’ remarkable acting, in Village 
of the Damned it was cruder, with bright dilated pupils appearing in his own eyes, 
both alien-like and evoking the threat of the bomb’s flash.12  
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The visual echoes of this recent other role in Stephens’ performance as Miles 
accentuate The Innocents’ imperative for recognition of the child, linking its sexual 
violence to broader fears of destructive and newly revealed realities in the early 
1960s. Though the child thus revealed is highly disruptive of the existing order of 
aesthetic and social representation, above all because of his contamination with 
adult desires, recognition of his essential reality could, the film hints, contain this 
disruption. This hint is carried principally in Miles’ death, with which the film begins 
and ends; the death of the child is not really a loss when it is transformed into a 
general meaning, a meaning which even seems to transcend time itself, as indicated 
by the circularity of the film’s frame (as noted, a sharp departure from James) and, 
of course, by the ghosts active within it. Yet as both the arrival of an exploitative 
version of Freud in the horror cinema and the Cold War associations carried over by 
Stephens tell us, this desire to go outside time is itself, ironically, historically specific, 
born of the anxieties and aspirations of Clayton, Capote and their collaborators in 
the early 1960s. Like Jarman thirty years later, they chose to use the child to embody 
a future we need only recognise, it seems, in order to end time itself as a disruptive 
force.  
Yet at the same time, this reading of the film is not quite fair. The anxiety 
over the ambitious child, the child who can imagine and play out (as Stephens’ Miles 
literally does) a future version of himself, is not wholly eradicated by the circular 
time established at the film’s ending. Ironically, this residual anxiety appears 
perhaps most clearly in one of The Innocents’ non-Jamesian scenes. 
It shows Miles and Laura enacting a small performance for Miss Giddens and 
the cook, Mrs Groes, that culminates with Miles, wearing a crown, reciting a poem 
(actually a translated extract from The Rubaiyat of Omar Kayyam) that suggests both 
erotic longing and the invocation of a spectre. The poem calls on “my lord” (whom 
Giddens identifies with Quint) to rise from his grave and enter, and Miles proceeds 
with the disturbing performance until he is almost pressing his face up against the 
window. The poem implicates sexual desire – which is one function of time, of the 
child’s passing into adulthood – in death, another function and sign of time.  
104 
 
The scene’s implications remain as taboo today as they were in the 1960s, 
with a very young child shown as sexually aware and apparently a willing participant 
in an erotic relationship with an adult; that this situation appears in a supernatural 
guise could provide a cover for otherwise unacceptable themes (a suspicion directed 
towards some equally taboo elements of Don’t Look Now (Lebeau, Childhood and 
Cinema, 125), as we shall see later). Yet whether or not this is true, the summoning 
of the dead ‘lord’ is not just such a cover. Desire – which we could characterise as 
the disposition towards reproduction of the self through sexual relations – emerges 
here as intimately related to death, to absence; this is precisely the de-stabilising 
paradox that Giddens has attempted to banish from Bly. This paradox guarantees 
that the child’s ambition for his future will never be wholly knowable: this ambition 
is inspired by encounters with the dead, at least in the sense that a text provides an 
ambiguous trace or spectre of a dead author, as the indistinction between a poetry 
recital and the summoning of Quint indicates. The child’s ambition will also 
(perhaps) only be fully realised after the death of the adult who watches the child 
now.  
Ironically, though, this performance is also the point in the movie following 
which Giddens decisively views Miles as possessed by Quint. As this suggests, it is 
here that Miles appears to have made himself, at last, fully recognisable, in 
apparently communing with Quint before Giddens’ eyes. If Giddens desires to know 
Quint, to read him, Miles’ performance demonstrates the power that can accrue to 
those who promise to satisfy such cravings. Remembering the fact that Miles’ 
recitation is a performance for Giddens suggests a potential alternative reading of 
the scene. Is Miles manipulating or seducing Giddens by deliberately hinting that he 
possesses what, or whom, she desires? The child who is precociously aware of adult 
desires – who has gained ground, as it were, in the game of anticipation that is his 
education – is a dangerous one. In this he echoes the role of Edward III at the end of 
Edward II (and for spectators of both films, the crown provides a visual echo 
between the two). Thus, even as The Innocents demands that we recognise the child 
under threat of violence, it betrays an underlying realisation that our desire for 
recognition might itself be turned against us. In this, it reflects the stereotypical 
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horror child on screen whom it helped to popularise: this child cannot win; the killing 
of the child is paradoxically required to clearly see, and thereby save, the future.  
6. The horror child and the revelation of reality: Psycho (1960) and Halloween 
(1978) 
Freud, in Civilisation and its Discontents, describes the difficulties of 
recovering the child for analysis:  
The embryo cannot be demonstrated in the adult [...] in the marrow-
bone of a grown man I can, it is true, trace the outline of the childish 
bone-structure but this latter no longer survives in itself [...] The fact 
is that a survival of all the early stages alongside the final form is 
possible only in the mind, and that it is impossible for us to represent 
a phenomenon of this kind in visual terms. (Freud, Civilisation, 19-20)  
As heavily Freudian as Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960) is (its backstory 
centres on the primal scene), it does not hesitate to directly represent “a 
phenomenon of this kind in visual terms”; it even does so in the “childish bone-
structure.” This moment follows directly from the psychiatrist’s reading of Norman, 
when Norman’s head dissolves into the skull of his mother. This takes the viewer 
immediately and visually to the moment when Norman killed her (it is her dead skull 
that appears) and assumed her identity, the moment of originary childhood trauma 
and childhood crime. (Although Norman was an adolescent when this occurred, the 
murderous oedipal scenario keeps him effectively trapped in the dynamic of a 
childhood apparently dominated by his mother.) This final shot of Norman/mother is 
the cue for the viewer to do a kind of re-reading of the whole film in his own mind - 
through the image of the child. We recognise the reality previously hidden to us 
through the child, and vice-versa.  
This ambiguously endorses Norman’s psychotic delusion, that his mother is 
not really dead, or rather that death (despite the fear of violent death he provokes) 
is not a really significant thing, for he now exists in a state of indistinction between 
life and death – or a state (appropriately enough for Hitchcock) of ‘suspense’. In fact, 
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the revelation of the world as fundamentally and timelessly conditioned by sex, 
violence and sexual violence necessarily makes this the basis for any authority that 
seeks to be effective in the world.  
Kendall Phillips observes that in the first slasher film, John Carpenter’s 
Halloween (1970) “the monster no longer threatens to unleash chaos into an orderly 
world but, quite to the contrary, Michael Myers functions as a punishing avenger 
who imposes order in an otherwise chaotic world” (Projected Fears, 126); not unlike 
Macaulay’s Barbary, we might notice. Halloween is certainly concerned with the 
regulation and ordering of sex and violence. The ‘order’ sought by this young man 
who dominates the film is in fact a brutally conservative one, bringing back an 
atemporal reality to a society in the grip of a foolish version of the future - so weak it 
allows teenagers, themselves unsupervised and with the supervision of children 
delegated to them as babysitters, to have sex and take drugs; a society so weak it 
cannot keep Michael secure. The festival of Halloween itself, in its appropriation of 
horror for entertainment, betrays the precariousness of this society’s attempts to 
manage violent realities.  
Appropriately, Halloween’s final scene ends with a frenzy of looking, as four 
locations, all possible hiding places, appear simultaneously in a split screen, 
stretching our gaze beyond its ability; and still we cannot see Michael. In the 
knowledge that he is there but invisible, we have to keep a vision of him in the back 
of our minds at all times, everywhere. In fact, this vision is the image of Michael as a 
child, the only time we have actually seen his (unmasked) face and the moment of 
his own knowledge of the horrors of the world and the beginning of his resulting 
career of killing. (Michael has also never grown out of ‘infancy’ in the simple sense 
that he never speaks).  
Between 1950 and 1978, the idea of the child as killer, who can be defeated 
only by adults breaking the greatest taboo and killing the child, has gone from subtle 
symbolism in Macaulay to direct imperative in Halloween. Like The Innocents, the 
latter indicates that such control of an otherwise violently disruptive future can only 
really be achieved through recognising the child for what he is.  
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7. See – or die: Don’t Look Now (1973) 
Don’t Look Now establishes the image of the child who is both killer and 
killed as an object of adult obsession. Here the Red Riding Hood-esque child-figure in 
red is pursued obsessively in both the mind’s eye of the viewer and the margin of 
the screen.  Don’t Look Now ties a European literary heritage (Roeg’s film is based on 
a Daphne Du Maurier novel and is visually influenced by Luchino Visconti’s Death in 
Venice (1971; see Bradshaw)) with the mainstream horror movie. It became a highly 
influential film, initially popularised by its major Hollywood stars, Julie Christie and 
Donald Sutherland.  
An architectural historian and his wife, John (Sutherland) and Laura Baxter 
(Christie), have a daughter, Christine, who tragically dies in the opening scene by 
drowning in a pond. Moving from England to Venice where John, an architectural 
historian, is contracted to assist restoration of several churches, his wife Laura 
meets two elderly sisters staying at the same hotel, one of whom, Heather, has 
Second Sight. She is able to convey messages from the dead Christine; Laura is 
delighted by this, though John is sceptical.  
Whilst a series of murdered bodies are intermittently pulled from the canals 
in the margins of the action (as in Pale View, a serial killer is operating in the 
‘background’ – or is it?), John continues work on the churches’ restoration. (Roeg is 
an admiring reader of Peter Ackroyd (see Brooks, “Time and Time Again”), whose 
own narrative of child murders around a series of churches appears in the next 
chapter.) Various disturbing incidents occur during John’s work, and both Laura and 
the Bishop who has hired John suggest possible supernatural interference. John, 
however, asserts his rationalist scepticism, and becomes angry with Laura when she 
participates in a séance with the two sisters and receives a supposed warning from 
Christine, saying that John is in danger and should leave Venice.  
A call from England, reporting that their son (at boarding school) is unwell, 
prompts Laura’s return to England, leaving John alone in Venice. Walking the city at 
night, John occasionally spies a figure wearing a hooded red garment suggestive of 
the plastic red mackintosh Christine wore on the day she died. He pursues, but loses, 
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this figure in the maze of canals and alleyways.  One day he sees his wife, dressed in 
black, travelling on the canal on a barge with the two sisters; shocked (because 
Laura is supposed to be in England) he initiates a search for her that leads to the 
sisters being arrested, before a call from Laura establishes that she is, in fact, indeed 
still in England.  Embarrassed and demoralised, the same night John sees the figure 
in red yet again, and this time pursues it with greater determination, until it leads 
him into an abandoned palazzo. When cornered, its red cloak falls and it is suddenly 
revealed as not his daughter, but an ancient female dwarf who slaughters him with a 
knife.13  
At this macabre conclusion John is shown to have in fact possessed his own 
Second Sight all along, but also to have deliberately repressed it; as he staggers to 
the floor, losing blood rapidly, an extended flashback shows all the moments when 
his death was foreshadowed, only for him to ignore the premonitions. Further proof 
comes when the inexplicable vision John previously had of his wife in black on a 
barge turns out to have been actually a vision of his own funeral. Refusing to listen 
to his daughter’s voice when communicated by Heather, he was led astray by what 
appeared to be a vision of his daughter, the figure in red– an incarnate evil in this 
Manichean world. Although John speaks Italian better than Laura and, unlike her, is 
able to converse with the locals, this does not finally prevent him being lured to his 
death. To speak – the source of authority and political agency – is, the film suggests, 
useless if we cannot correctly read what we see – and what we find in Roeg’s Venice 
is a reality less political or historical than aesthetic.  
It is unsurprising, perhaps, that the child at the end of the movie, the false 
Christine, is revealed to be both young and ancient, for the essential reality we are 
compelled to recognise, under threat of violence, is a timeless one. Accordingly, 
death itself is only real here to the extent that one believes in its finality. When 
Christine’s supernatural presence is sensed by Heather, she is reported to be happy, 
laughing (including in her very first appearance, where Laura is reassured firmly that 
“she wants you to know that she’s happy.”) A powerful evil also exists, but Second 
Sight offers a chance to protect against it, and if death itself is not final – Laura 
smiles knowingly as she travels to her husband’s funeral – the victory of the good is 
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secure.  In this optimistic insistence on the supernatural and on the ‘other’ regions 
of consciousness, the film reflects its period and the celebrations of anti-
establishment and anti-rationalist, even esoteric, thinking then in circulation 
(‘Second Sight’, firmly endorsed by the film, implicitly references the use of drugs, as 
well as prayer and meditation). 
 In the opening scene, Laura is reading a fictitious esoteric book, Beyond the 
Fragile Geometry of Space.  Here the child is identified with both a liberalism that 
connotes optimism towards the future and an openness to the esoteric possibilities 
of reality. When Laura and John meet the bishop for the first time, in response to his 
querying whether she is a Christian, Laura responds that she is “kind to children and 
animals.” The child in question, Christine, is first seen pushing a wheelbarrow in the 
garden, and playing with a talking female soldier who identifies herself as a 
commandant, suggesting that this child is free to play unconstructed by gender 
conventions. Inside the house, Laura reveals that her reading has been prompted by 
her daughter: “Just trying to find the answer to a question Christine was asking me.” 
Thus, the events of the film begin, literally, with a question of education, though 
ultimately it compels the translation of the child’s ambition and creativity not into 
her future but into her afterlife.   
As Lebeau notes, “the film is renowned for its realistic depiction of the 
lovemaking that takes place between the bereaved couple after the mother has 
been assured that her dead daughter is with them, can see them” (Childhood and 
Cinema, 125). Christine’s presence here reverses the quasi-Freudian paradigm 
adopted by Psycho and many of its successors, for the child’s presence at (and 
implicit witnessing of) the sexual act does not cause harm – indeed by enabling 
Laura’s readiness for sex, the knowledge of her daughter’s presence provides a form 
of sexual liberation. This scene, famously, is presented as a visual duality as shots of 
vigorous sex acts are interspersed with the couple dressing for dinner afterwards. By 
thus manipulating time, the camera (which cuts repeatedly to the clock in the room 
amongst all the undressing and redressing and sexual action in between) identifies 
itself with Second Sight, and hints at its ability to punish for disregard of that Second 
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Sight: if the film, via Roeg’s peculiar editing, can (and of course it always can) change 
the course of time, then what it gives it can also take away, not least the lost child. 
This scene’s sense of the movement of time seems initially liberating within a 
film often trapped in repetition of image and words (the malaise is evident at the 
first dinner when Laura says she will “just have what I had last night”). Yet somehow 
even this movement into time is an eruption of semi-heavenly timelessness, 
provoked by Laura’s happy realisation of the indistinction between life and death, 
just as the departure of most people from Venice leaves the city as a timeless 
sepulchre, which Heather then finds to be full of the presence of the dead. It is 
rather the movement of ordinary, worldly time that seems oppressive.  
Shortly after this scene, the couple who have been (after an implied period of 
abstinence and emotional distance) briefly physically united, are separated. Laura 
returns to England to attend to their son, whilst John remains in Venice. Yet the 
separation is also metaphysical: from this point on, John, alone, is on a direct 
trajectory towards his violent death, whilst Laura remains in the state of faith in a 
timeless reality that is confirmed in the very final shots by her enigmatic smile at her 
husband’s funeral.   
Christine is associated with the symbolism of desire, both through her 
presence at the sexual act and through her Red Riding Hood-like appearance. The 
association is also emphasised through Roeg’s borrowing of the visual language of 
Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice and more specifically through Visconti’s then-recent 
(1971) film version of the same. The obsession with the gaze and the imagery of the 
hunt through Venice for an object of desire is shared between the two films, and in 
both too desire is irrevocably associated with death as a kind of punishment – both 
protagonists die whilst enjoying an uninterrupted gaze, long thwarted, on the 
desired object. The visual echoes of Visconti allow Roeg to have the viewer 
participate in John’s desire – and in his punishment – and for him to subjugate sex, 
like death, to the transhistorical universe he locates in Venice.  
The depth of the film’s antipathy towards the reality of death emerges inter 
alia through the ostensible naturalness and randomness of Christine’s death by 
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drowning – apparently an accident, with no one to blame but one of the basic 
elements of life, water, yet the sudden appearance of the red-cloaked dwarf on the 
slide immediately rebukes the viewer for any acceptance of the incident as such a 
natural occurrence. The point is endlessly reiterated through the presence of water 
throughout the film, which is never just water as it appears, but rather an active 
agent of the Manichean universe; as in Mann’s Death in Venice, this universe is 
almost classical in the extent to which its elements are anthropomorphised. Here 
the real target of the film emerges as not merely rationalist ‘single sight’ but the 
rationalist account of death itself, that is, simply of death as the end of 
consciousness.  
In this light, the film’s title takes on a more aggressive meaning – the 
command “don’t look now” directs us not to turn away from the dwarf and her 
violence, but to turn away from the reality of death, present in the unbearable 
image of the dead child Christine retrieved from the water with which the opening 
scene ends. By asserting the unreality of death, the film draws us away from the 
painful rupture represented by the dead child – the awareness that not only will our 
own consciousness, our own subjecthood, ultimately be ended by the fact of 
physical death we see embodied before us, but that the transfer of what we 
consider meaningful in the world – the process of education – from our 
consciousness to the surviving object that is the child, is itself uncertain and 
vulnerable. A school is on the periphery of this film, but the indistinction between 
education and violence is, once again, are at the centre.  
 
8. The Horror Child 
The horror child, we’ve found, compels us to turn seeing into a reading – 
and, as Don’t Look Now says, into believing. Only by a correct reading of the world, 
through the child, can we hope to ward off the violent future that the revealed 
nature of the world – revealed by psychoanalysis and by history – promises to us. 
Ishiguro, though, compels us from the start to wonder who is actually responsible 
for this essentialism, and what kind of choice we might be faced with in its absence; 
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or, as the Governess in The Turn of the Screw (but not, despite the title, The 
Innocents) puts it, “if he were innocent, then what on earth was I?” (119).  
In the next chapter we will continue this investigation by moving 
chronologically further into the 1980s and considering why this moment of an 
apparent ‘end of the post-war’ remains contaminated by twentieth century crises of 
authority and of the future. This period, the ‘Thatcher years’, are treated as a 
political and cultural end to the ‘post-war’ but they remain, as we shall find, 
profoundly anxious over the future. 
The need of authority to align representation with recognition, and the 
literary text’s capacity to resist that alignment (a resistance that may or may not be 
aided by the text’s critical readings) will remain our central concern. We shall 
continue to find the demand that children make themselves available for recognition 
as the condition of their political or aesthetic representation, and the capacity to 
imagine violence against them for their refusal to do so. Indeed, the demand to be 
available for recognition is more consistent than the presumed nature of what must 
be recognised as the child. The consistency, however, is found in the demand that 
the child embodies a future that is not really that much of a future at all, but rather 
wholly identifiable as an existing, if partly hidden, underlying reality. The horror child 
is both a key trope in recent cultural history and an invitation to ignore history itself, 
to desire a timeless space where seeing is reading. It’s an invitation to which some 
political projects profoundly feel the attraction.  
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Chapter 3: The Disappearing Child in Thatcherism and Theory  
A group of children were peering through the railings of the park […] 
“Some queer found him late last night,” the inspector was saying and 
then he added, since Hawksmoor did not reply, “Some queer might 
have done it”. (Ackroyd, Hawksmoor 110) 
In the previous chapter we explored the vast post-war hinterland behind the 
representation of violence towards the child in a 1980s novel, Ishiguro’s A Pale View 
of Hills. In this chapter, we shall move into the 1980s proper, sustaining our concern 
with violence towards the child, and with the relation of this to both the imperative 
for recognition of the child and her political representation.  
The ‘Thatcher years’ of 1979-1990 symbolically represent – indeed, were 
deliberately presented by Thatcherites themselves as representing – the end of the 
post-war period in Britain, supposedly characterised by a broadly social democratic 
‘consensus’ (Smith, “From Consensus to Conflict”, 64-65). They replaced a dominant 
political narrative of historical progress, and an acceptance that a future different to 
the past was both probable and desirable, with the proclamation of allegedly 
essentialist and timeless values; the future could still change, but only change 
towards a more perfect rehearsal of these fundamental and pre-existing values was 
approved. 
 As we shall see (and as we already began to find in the first chapter), 
Thatcherism had a special interest in the child as the repository of the ambition that 
would underpin her new (and yet timeless) social and economic order. In this 
political and cultural landscape, the child’s role as embodiment of the future 
naturally became explicitly contested ground, the site of culture wars.  
Thatcherism’s investment in the future – and therefore in the child – was, as we 
shall find, highly conflicted, claiming to celebrate both the child’s innocence, and his 
creativity and ambition.  
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Yet this period of political and cultural history, which the literary texts we’ll 
consider here variously represent, parody and undermine (often all at once), should 
not be considered in isolation or as historically discrete. Rather, as I shall show, 
Thatcherism constituted amongst other things a mode of reading, and of reading the 
child in particular – one that reflected other modes of reading struggling with the 
apparent failure of post-war progressive history. I shall discuss this here with 
reference to the rise of Theory in literary and cultural studies within 1980s Britain. 
Thatcherism and Theory share a profound interest in the child, one I explore through 
the disappearing child as a persistent, demanding trope across the literary texts 
discussed in this chapter. This child risks acting as a dangerous and uncanny 
reminder of the facts of death and desire to which Thatcherism seeks to deny 
recognition, and to which Theory wishes to extend recognition; the result in both 
cases, curiously, is imagined as the child’s disappearance.   
 
 
 
1. Thatcher(ism): Recognition as political power 
The dream of the leader’s presence seeped through to an unexpected 
depth. (Hollinghurst, The Line of Beauty, 59) 
Thatcherism’s attitude to the child was structured around a number of basic 
and unacknowledged tensions. Thatcherism asserted both the indulgence of the 
child’s ambition and the strict political limitation of the nature of that ambition; it 
viewed the child’s natural desires as aligned with capitalism and entrepreneurialism, 
with wealth creation and the free market (or, as popular culture more crudely but 
perhaps accurately termed it, with “loadsamoney”.14 Yet except in very particular 
formulations, even in particular places, that desire had to be perpetually deferred. 
Thatcherism was a promise for the future, a promise allegedly denied under the 
post-war social democratic consensus. It sought the restoration of a natural order, 
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but the benefits of that order required both faith and imagination to be seen, 
particularly in the early 1980s before the ‘Big Bang’.   
 In these conditions a promise risks becoming something close to a fantasy or 
a dream, as several of the most successful literary representations of Thatcherism 
suggest. They take us into an unresolved tension between reality and fantasy that 
perhaps explains the obsessive element in Thatcherism’s on-going hold on British 
intellectual culture, as Su observes:  
Literary texts continue to portray the “Thatcher revolution” as the 
most significant shift in British politics and culture since the so-called 
post-war settlement […] contemporary British literature is defined in 
terms of responses to a set of political, economic, and cultural forces 
associated with Margaret Thatcher. (Su, “Beauty and the Beastly 
Prime Minister”, 1083) 
According to this, we are all Thatcher’s Children – including literary authors 
and their critical readers. The predominant (though not universal) attitude of those 
writers and critics who have contributed to the literary representation of 
Thatcherism remains oppositional, reflecting the views of much of the British 
cultural establishment of Thatcher’s rule as both dangerously authoritarian (see, for 
example: Hall, Stuart, 15; Rogers, 106-108) and thoroughly philistine (see, for 
example: Burgess, 147-148; Charmley, 239). 
Whether or not we are really all Thatcher’s children, both Margaret Thatcher 
and her government, and the society they governed, had a profound interest in 
actual children. In the real political history of the ‘Thatcher years’, the child, far from 
disappearing, increased in prominence in political discourse and legislation, as 
Rutter notes: “Bastardy was removed from the law books (1989), and caning 
outlawed in schools (1982) […in 1989] Parliament passed the Children Act and the 
United Nations declared its Convention on the Rights of the Child” (Shakespeare and 
Child’s Play, 172). This constituted a drive to represent the child in law and policy. 
Yet at least some of this drive was prompted by an apparently urgent need to 
recognise what had allegedly been unrecognised before: the facts of child abuse and 
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abduction. Now the overlapping themes of the child at threat and the child as threat 
generated obsession, even moral panic, in public life:  
Four major inquiries into child abuse and a number of sensational 
individual cases showed the traditional British family to be terminally 
dysfunctional, children its victim [...] And out of the tangled mass of 
accusation and counter-accusation […] came national self-
examination. What kind of adult could perpetrate child abuse, we 
wondered. And, more anxiously, the questions we almost didn’t dare 
to ask, What kind of child could participate in it? What kind of child 
was its product? (Rutter, Shakespeare and Child’s Play, 173)  
The 1987 Cleveland scandal, to which Rutter refers above, arose from a new 
unwillingness to let secrets about children remain in the dark; following it, the 1989 
Children Act introduced a new duty for local authorities to investigate suspected 
harm to a child. The child was now to be brought into the light, by the full resources 
of the law and the State, the reality of his condition represented as a political 
priority. ChildLine, offering a free and confidential service to those who recognised 
themselves or others as children being abused, was founded in 1986. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Jacqueline Rose claims that the ‘discovery’ of child sexual abuse “can 
fairly be called one of the traumas of the 1980s” (The Case of Peter Pan, xi). 
Margaret Thatcher’s government endorsed this work to bring the child into 
the light. The idea of the child as in darkness, unrecognised, was considered 
profoundly troubling. As observed earlier, in the anti-gay discourse adopted by some 
Thatcherite politicians and their supporters and codified in Clause 28, children 
appeared as both the explicit victims and implicit embodiment of a threatening 
future; and their need to be offered an acceptable reading of the world as it should 
be was asserted as the proper aim of their representation in politics. When the 
Thatcher government turned to gays, the drive to bring what was ‘really happening’ 
to the child into the light was curiously inverted, so that recognition had to be 
denied in order to, supposedly, change reality. Recognition was the basis of political 
representation (in both cases, to be withdrawn from queers).  
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In a now-notorious assertion to the 1987 Conservative Party Conference, 
Thatcher stated: “Children who need to be taught to respect traditional moral values 
are being taught that they have an inalienable right to be gay.” The very next line of 
the speech went on, suggestively: “And children who need encouragement [...] are 
being taught that our society offers them no future”, as though the risk of 
destroying the future carried over from the thought on gays. (Clearly, one hardly 
needs a queer theorist to find the association between queerness and death here). 
Even whilst Thatcher professed her concern about the possibility of “no 
future”, she thus sought to ensure that there would be no future that differed from 
the past in certain essential respects. The possibility that some aspects of reality 
might evade or resist recognition, and that these might affect the future and 
therefore deserve some form of representation, was effectively prohibited. The 
speech’s simultaneous evocation and dismissal of the existence of gay children 
reinforces that the suspicion that the child being disappeared here, the ‘real’ child, 
is the one who is always at risk of becoming other than the child – precisely the risk 
presented to the Thatcherite imagination by the gay child, or child of gay parents, if 
the paranoia towards reading materials is anything to go by.  
The Thatcher government’s public attitude to gays (which was 
simultaneously its attitude towards children) thus complicates the picture of a drive 
to bring the child into the light, hinting that recognition might be withheld as much 
as extended in the functioning of a power acting to control the future. It is in fact 
precisely this withholding of recognition that Alan Hollinghurst, Ian McEwan, and 
Peter Ackroyd – the authors discussed in detail in this chapter - present as causing 
the child disappearances in their novels. I will argue that if we take their 
representations of Thatcherism seriously, the child must be understood as 
constituted within the gap between recognition and representation, the gap which 
– according to these texts – Thatcherism sought to eliminate. 
Adam Phillips argues that the most shocking revelation delivered by 
psychoanalysis is that sexuality is not, in reality, reproductive, and that children 
know this (The Beast in the Nursery, 26). The child’s sexuality is dangerous, 
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according to this, because it disrupts an order based on the reproduction of certain 
values and the repudiation of others (the child’s education). This is Edelman’s 
“reproductive futurism” again, and the possibility of its absence, as Phillips hints, 
opens up a potential equality of pleasure that evades the selection of values, the 
abjection of harm and the projection of virtue, that lies behind the demand (made, 
for example, by Clause 28) to positively identify the child as child. Yet I do not 
follow Edelman in concluding that this resistance means that sexuality, and life, 
untied from reproductive futurism should lead to a radical affirmation of the 
present that denies the political function of the future. Instead, it is precisely 
through the contradictory attitude expressed by Thatcherism towards pleasure, 
and the child’s capacity for pleasure specifically, that leads to a realisation that the 
future – with all that implies for creativity in time, and for ambition – should indeed 
be the proper object of politics, but not as Thatcherism imagines it.  
Thatcherism has a contradictory attitude not only towards the child but 
towards time too, as we shall find here. Whereas childhood is ordinarily both 
defined and destroyed by the temporal (it’s by definition a period that cannot last), 
Thatcherism’s desire for authoritarian stability takes the form of an impossible 
need for an atemporal child, one never passing out of the state of childhood. The 
killing of the child we observed in the last chapter is replaced here by the 
disappearance of the child in favour of recognition of a permanent ‘child within’.  
Hence in these novels, the ideal of the child in representation is (as Edelman 
claimed) indeed a predicate for the removal of the real child’s rights – notably the 
right to create a potentially disruptive difference to the past. This removal takes the 
form of a withdrawal of representation from the child whose ambitions frustrate 
recognition.  
With this in mind, I want to look at Thatcherism and the child in literature.  
2. A fantasy so outrageously improbable: Thatcher and the child in fiction 
Several literary texts include both Margaret Thatcher herself and children 
amongst their characters.  The same works often depict recognition, or its denial, as 
fundamental to the Thatcherite project – something which becomes evident, inter 
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alia, through the prevalence there of fantasy, presented as the willed recognition of 
things that may not exist, and the wilful disappearance of things that do - including 
the child.  
Thatcher’s dancing with the high-on-cocaine narrator of The Line of Beauty, 
and (in the most recent obvious example as of this writing), her appearance through 
the gaze a woman comes to willingly share with an IRA assassin in Hilary Mantel’s 
The Assassination of Margaret Thatcher (2014), are variants on the theme: one a 
fantasy of seduction, the other of violence. In Mantel’s story, the opportunity for 
assassination arrives when Thatcher is in hospital for eye surgery; this, combined 
with the repeated focus on the gaze between her, the assassin, and woman who 
becomes an unanticipated collaborator in the crime, draws attention to Thatcher as 
central to a way of seeing. On film, the biopic The Iron Lady (2012) depicts 
Thatcher’s life largely through a series of her (fictionalised) fantasies and memories; 
the real Baroness Thatcher’s eventual dementia seemingly gives the filmmakers 
licence to imply that there was always a strong element of fantasy in both her 
character and her career.  
 This notion appears not just in retrospective portrayals like those noted 
above, but also in contemporaneous representations of Thatcherism. The popular 
1980s Bildungsroman, The Secret Diary of Adrian Mole, Aged 13 and ¾ (1982), neatly 
captures the period as characterised by a borderline absurd tendency to view the 
world through the image of Margaret Thatcher, and implies that this had particular 
effects on children. This is literalised when a message about “three million 
unemployed” is discovered written on the Prime Minister’s cleavage in her picture 
hanging on the walls of Adrian’s school, after which the Thatcher-idolising 
headmaster tests Adrian’s handwriting (241). Mrs Thatcher’s icons inspire fevered 
devotion from male followers, and tolerate no sacrilege; the headmaster goes mad 
soon after the violation.  
Thatcherism as a form of vision and of fantasy, centred above all on Mrs 
Thatcher’s own image, are the common themes here. Interestingly, they are 
reflected in language used by some firsthand witnesses to the Thatcher project; John 
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Biffen suggested that to the Prime Minister and her staff, ‘the rest of us were all 
partially sighted’ (Qtd. in Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 448). Ian Gilmour’s title for 
his critical memoir of the Thatcher government, Dancing With Dogma (1992) even 
uses curiously similar imagery to The Line of Beauty to associate Thatcher as desired 
fantasy figure (the object of the dance) with her political project’s attempt to 
redefine reality (the dogma). All this supports a sense that the extension and 
withdrawal of recognition operated as a fundamental mechanism of Thatcherism as 
a political project. 
Salman Rushdie remarked: ‘The election of 1983 is beginning to look more 
and more like a dark fantasy […] so outrageously improbable that any novelist would 
be ridiculed if he dreamed it up’ (qtd. in Su 159). At the other end of Thatcher’s 
premiership, Howard Brenton described her departure as feeling “as if the curse had 
been lifted” (173). To others, though, the fantasy was seductive: The Line of Beauty 
depicts a sexualised obsession with the Prime Minister, the same one acknowledged 
in reality by François Mitterand (‘the eyes of Caligula and the mouth of Marilyn 
Monroe’ (attributed)); Christopher Hitchens (in his essay on “The Iron Lady’s Sex 
Appeal”); and Alan Clark (qtd. in Moore 436).  
Of course, Thatcher is neither the first nor the last politician to be accused of 
selling a fantasy. Yet the theme is unusually persistent in representations of her 
project from both opponents and admirers, and consistent in how Thatcher’s own 
image is shown to function as the object of fantasy – a function presented as central 
to the success of her project by the popular TV political satire Spitting Image (1984 -
1996), which ruthlessly exposed the excessive investment in Thatcher’s image.  
In The Line of Beauty, Thatcher appears to have altered her country’s 
ability to recognise reality; Monique Ouradi describes the effect on her 
husband and other men as a hypnotism (221). These men are being 
simultaneously compelled and seduced towards acceptance of a single way of 
reading the world (Gilmour’s ‘dogma’), one that Hollinghurst slyly juxtaposes 
with the practice of reading in literary criticism (the events of the novel 
substitute for the doctoral thesis Nick Guest is supposed to be writing (384)).  
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The government’s own rhetorical emphasis, however, was often on 
recognition of an imminent future, where the ‘pain’ of monetarism, industrial 
conflict, and unemployment would be paid off with the pleasurable potential 
to fulfil individual ambition:  
[…] For us, it is not who you are, who your family is or where you 
come from that matters. It is what you are and what you can do for 
our country that counts. That is our vision.  
But if things are improving, why—you will ask—does unemployment 
not fall? […] people know there is always a time lag between getting 
the other things right and having a fall in unemployment. […] The 
other day, at a Youth Training Centre, I was delighted to see a poster 
saying "It is the customer that makes pay days possible." So those 
young people are not only learning new technology; they were 
learning […] the spirit of enterprise. (Speech of 12/10/1984 to the 
Conservative Party Conference)  
Particularly before the greater prosperity of the second half of the 
1980s, Thatcherism based itself on deferred pleasures (the “lag”); it required 
the recognition of a potential behind present reality, a substitution of the 
vision for the visible. Rhetorically, this easily slid, as above, into a focus on the 
specific potential of children and youth.  
This is powerfully suggestive of how the political representation of the child 
under Thatcherism was not only about the child’s embodiment of the future or his 
vulnerability to abuse. It was also about the child’s ambition, his entrepreneurial 
potential. Again, the compulsion is to only recognise this potential, and all will be 
well. This “spirit of enterprise”, though it conjures a vision of the future, is 
essentially atemporal; it need only be properly recognised by the child (through the 
visual suggestion of the poster) to be fulfilled.  
As we saw earlier, one of the most popular ‘family’ television programmes of 
the time, Jim’ll Fix It, paid tribute to this focus on childhood ‘spirit’ by allowing 
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children to act out their ambitions for the camera. Savile, as we noted, hinted at the 
authoritarian imperative co-existing awkwardly with Thatcherism’s vision of 
pleasurable ambition; in his own multiple service to the state, he affirmed that 
social mobility, wealth accumulation and personal exhibitionism need never conflict 
with the national interest or authorised morality. He offered, in fact, the 
opportunity to not recognise the former imperatives as potentially contradicting the 
latter. As with Clause 28, this non-recognition also applied to his sexual ambiguity; 
Mrs Thatcher was adamant that it would not trouble his own political 
representation, overruling her officials when they cited Savile’s lifestyle as a reason 
to prevent his award of state honours (Davies 315).  
Thatcherism’s fantasies were, then, often understood specifically as 
fantasies of the future, albeit a future often identified with an idealised past or a 
set of essential qualities. Spitting Image audaciously captured this in its special 
episode for the 1987 General Election, Mrs Thatcher’s third win and second 
landslide (also dramatised in The Line of Beauty). This episode included a parody of 
a scene from the 1972 musical movie Cabaret where a handsome young boy sings 
“Tomorrow Belongs to Me”, which begins resembling a paen to Nature but turns 
into a Nazi anthem. In the Spitting Image version, Mrs Thatcher’s cabinet are 
listening to the boy. This child’s face fades disturbingly into that of the grotesque 
Thatcher-puppet before a series of cuts follows to images of negative 
consequences attributed to Thatcherism: Environmental degradation; a property 
price bubble; closing hospitals – all implying that the vision of the child is just a 
fantasy. Finally, ending the song, the puppet-Thatcher reappears against a dark 
background and repeats, in an echoing voice, the line “tomorrow belongs to me”.  
This performance of Thatcherism’s investment in the child hints at why it is 
both so outrageous and yet so appropriate that literary depictions of Thatcherism 
repeatedly use child disappearance as a central trope.  
3. The Child in Time  
Ian McEwan’s 1987 novel The Child in Time has Thatcher appear in person as 
a character (though playfully unnamed other than as a Prime Minister with the 
123 
 
female pronoun). McEwan presents child disappearance as a necessary consequence 
of her political project when the three-year old daughter of Stephen, himself a 
children’s author, disappears in a supermarket and despite frantic searching remains 
forever missing (perhaps hinting at the leftist suspicion of Thatcher’s ‘super market’ 
as a moral threat). The novel narrates not only the failed search for the daughter, 
but also Stephen’s gradual descent into attempted retrieval of his own childhood, 
and his co-option on to the ‘Prime Minister’s Official Commission on Child Care’. 
 Quotations from the fictional ‘Authorised Childcare Handbook’ begin each 
chapter, consistently asserting a fundamental and natural relationship between 
childhood and free market economics, together producing a counter-reformation to 
the ‘pallid relativism’ (7) of social democracy. The handbook, as education policy, 
attempts to align representation with recognition; its premise is that we’ve always 
known what is true, but briefly erred in the post-war period, an error we must now 
correct: 
Childcare writers of the post-war era sentimentally ignored the fact 
that children are at heart selfish, and reasonably so, for they are 
programmed for survival. 
Introduction to The Authorised Childcare Handbook, HMSO. (The 
Child in Time, 155) 
 This proposition makes it impossible, McEwan’s novel hints, to take the 
future seriously as the object of politics. As Walsh argues, “what made Thatcherism 
such an impossible-Real object for the British culture of opposition was that it 
succeeded in revoking the gradualist guarantee of social progress, exposing this as 
premised on conditions obtaining in Britain between the 1940s and the 1970s” 
(169). In other words, time was up: abandoning post-war aberration, Thatcherism 
presented itself as a return to a natural and timeless order, thus tending, as 
O’Shaughnessy observes, to “freeze history into essence” (301; tellingly, after 
proclaiming a return to “Victorian Values”, Thatcher added, “they are also perennial 
values” (O’Shaughnessy 390). McEwan proposes that the child herself, as being in 
time, is excluded in this assertion of an essential and timeless reality. 
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 The handbook attempts, as education policy, to align representation with 
recognition; its premise is that we’ve always known what is true, but briefly erred in 
the post-war period, an error we must now correct (sentiments familiar from The 
Line of Beauty). The Handbook’s representation of an attempt to align political and 
legislative policy with a supposed Nature places this novel within a theme McEwan 
has returned to at several points during his career, most recently in The Children Act 
(2014). Here, McEwan demonstrates the arbitrary element in judicial decisions on 
the child, by portraying the case of a boy who wishes to refuse treatment for a fatal 
illness due to his religious convictions, and who is just a few months short of the 
legal age of majority at his eighteenth birthday. As the barrister for the parents 
(who, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, support their son’s views) points out, the age of 
majority is essentially artificial, a legal construction wholly inadequate to the ethics 
of the situation. Yet, ironically, the convictions of those he is defending themselves 
derive from a fundamentalist and absolutist version of the Law (in this case, that of 
the Old Testament) that permits no such discretion or acknowledgement of the 
openness of human judgement, its contingency on history and culture.  
These fundamentalists echo the drive towards dogma that McEwan 
identified in Thatcherism years earlier, in The Child in Time. In this situation, the Law 
(in the broadest sense) becomes paradoxical – it is an assertion of authority over a 
recalcitrant reality, yet it presents itself as aligned to fundamental underlying rules 
of reality itself. The recalcitrant element now has to be dismissed as superficial, 
sentimental or illusory (as Thatcherism saw post-war socialism) or as an artificial and 
unnatural contamination (as it viewed queers and social deviants); the child at times 
occupies both or either position, but is never easily reconciled to the Natural Law 
(hence why, in extremis, he is disappeared). 
Ironically, time itself has become unreal in this society; it has to be projected 
as a vision: 
Kate’s growing up had become the essence of time itself. Her 
phantom growth, the product of an excessive sorrow, was not only 
inevitable […] but necessary. Without the fantasy of her continued 
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existence he was lost, time would stop. He was the father of an 
invisible child. (The Child in Time, 2) 
This suggests that Thatcherism has attempted to eliminate time through the 
disappearance of the child, who can now only exist as a phantom ‘within’ the child, a 
Doppelganger to the ‘child within’ Thatcherism viewed as the source of ambition 
and enterprise. At one point, the Handbook grimly casts this ambition itself as only 
the just repayment of a debt for the interruption childhood makes to the essentially 
atemporal nature of social and economic life:  
Above all, childhood is a privilege. No child as it grows older should be 
allowed to forget that its parents, as embodiments of society, are the 
ones who grant this privilege, and do so at their own expense. (The 
Child in Time, 90) 
This supports a hint McEwan offers throughout his novel: that the 
authoritarian and indulgent tendencies in Thatcherism play out their inherent (but 
unrecognised) contradiction through the child. This is summed up in terms Charles 
Darke, who publishes Stephen’s books, uses. An ambitious entrepreneur himself, 
Darke substitutes the ‘child within’ for the real child: ‘This book is not for children, 
it’s for a child, and that child is you’ (28). Once this substitution takes place, the 
child’s ambitions and the needs of authority need not be in conflict.  
However, Darke’s story turns out to become an uncanny parallel of Kate’s 
disappearance and a breakdown of the Thatcherite vision for the child. Darke goes 
from being a publisher to becoming a government minister, and an indulged political 
and personal favourite of the Prime Minister herself. This glittering career is 
destroyed, though, when he suffers an apparent mental collapse that takes the form 
of regression to a childlike state. Thatcherism’s ideological identification of free 
market economics with an essential idea of childhood breaks apart in the 
appropriately named Darke, whose retreat from public life into a private narcissism 
parodies both Thatcherism’s rhetorical use of the child, as per the Handbook, and its 
affirmation of private interests, both of which he exposes as hypocritical and 
contradictory. Darke is the archetypal ambitious Thatcherite, a metaphorical son to 
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the maternal Prime Minister, who nevertheless ends up demonstrating a potential 
gulf between the pleasures of ambition, self-fulfilment and self-indulgence and the 
interests of the authorities.  
Thatcherism invests in the child as the reproduction of the social order; yet 
its presentation of itself as a revelation or (to use a psychoanalytically charged term) 
a release of previously repressed natural forces required an investment more 
specifically in the young adult male. Whilst this male was over the threshold of 
adulthood, his characteristics, which constituted a certain directness in simplicity in 
approach to life, would often be viewed as ‘childish’ under alternative paradigms of 
value. This male could be the City Boy, from a working class background, free to 
make (in the phrase of the time) ‘loadsamoney’ in the now-freer markets; he could 
be one of the privileged, parasitical graduates who populate the new political and 
social economy of the 1980s (the economy of ‘big banging’, as it were) in The Line of 
Beauty, or here, as we find him in Charles, the personal and political favourite of the 
Prime Minister herself. 
 This, again, exposes a paradox of Thatcherism. One might say that 
Thatcherism preserves the fantasy of absolute and unrestrained indulgence, but 
requires it to remain within the bounds of fantasy precisely in order so that it can 
continue to safely operate as the organising principle of the world. Like Mrs 
Thatcher herself, it requires desire to have its effect but that desire must remain in 
crucial respects within well-disciplined boundaries in order for the system to remain 
stable and to successfully reproduce itself.  This is a more extreme reflection of the 
obvious tension between Thatcherism’s traditional and nationalist rhetoric and its 
economic liberalism (as discussed in Brooker, Literature of the 1980s, 16-17).  
These contradictions were reflected in the Thatcher government’s somewhat 
conflicted attitude towards ‘youth culture’. Whilst Thatcherism favoured a certain 
type of ambitious young man (both symbolically, and to a degree, in practice) it was 
deeply antagonistic towards others (such as miners, New Age groups, and politically 
active gays) – divisions that reflected its highly ambivalent attitude towards the 
individual, the individual’s capacity and desire for pleasure, and the relation of that 
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capacity to actual or symbolic infancy. The persona of Mrs Thatcher herself was 
crucial to that control, as both McEwan and Hollinghurst intuit – this wouldn’t have 
worked in the same way without her role as the oedipal mother only too pleased to 
have her sons take the place of the “wet” Establishment paternalists.  
The indulgence offered by Thatcherism is successful to the extent that it 
aligns with her instrumentalist assumption that the essence of the self and of the 
world are known, not a matter for serious dispute; but this instrumentalism has to 
re-assert itself when the desire provoked and unleashed by the offer of indulgence 
finds itself, as Freud suspected, ultimately immune to satisfaction and so 
permanently resistant to social restraints.  
Of course, in opposition to Thatcherism’s release of the young male comes 
an antagonism, embodied in both the image of Thatcher herself and in the young 
men released by her, towards the older male – or specifically towards a certain 
version of older male authority, a certain ‘establishment’. In real political history, 
such older men were the Tory ‘wets’ like Lord Carrington, Ian Gilmore, Peter Walker 
and others, as well as more symbolic opponents like former Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan (whose line on Thatcher “selling off the family silver” pithily captured the 
antagonism). In literature, this older male establishment appears in such figures as 
Lord Kestler in The Line of Beauty, and in a more middle-class incarnation as 
Stephen’s father in The Child in Time. This older patriarchate is identified with the 
post-war, post-Attlee British order, characterised (in a historical simplification, of 
course) by a predisposition towards the economically active state as a significant 
counterbalance to, and in some key sectors even a replacement for, private 
enterprise; and as a project (albeit limited and gradualist) towards social justice and 
greater equality; these men are also identified with broader notions of fair play and 
restraint (as when Lord Kestler mops up the damage caused by his son-in-law’s naïve 
involvement in speculation and asset striping), establishment opponents of the 
‘greed is good’ formula through which Thatcherism’s oedipal economics were 
perceived to indulge the younger male’s ambition, aggression, and ego (and, 
unacknowledged but exploited by the Prime Minister herself, his sexual desire).  
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McEwan and Hollinghurst are particularly aligned in discerning, and then 
developing, the idea of Thatcher as this perverse new variable in oedipal fantasy – 
the mother who, rather than disciplining or restricting the child, offers the (primarily 
male) child the prospect of unlimited indulgence and unlimited consumption, 
provided he adheres to certain conditions  – and not only this, but she even goes on 
to castrate the patriarchal father, the post-war establishment man, whose authority 
threatens to thwart the indulgence of the boy. This formula operates (often through 
metaphors of sexual fantasy, dreams, and hallucinations) throughout The Line of 
Beauty: 
The men did something naughty, and got away with it, and not only 
did they get away with it but they’ve been asked to do it again, with a 
huge majority. (Hollinghurst, The Line of Beauty, 62) 
This indulgence of the male child or childish male disintegrates, of course, in 
McEwan’s Charles Darke character, whose disintegration suggests the dangerous 
potential for the political investment in the child within to emerge as a return of the 
repressed, an eruption of the unserious yet ambitious ‘youth’ who so revolted the 
real Mrs Thatcher in the 1970s.  
The regression of personal time for Darke is an uncanny parody of the 
collapse of political time proclaimed by Thatcherism’s conceit that no future (and 
therefore no politics) are required beyond return to essential and unchanging values 
- the cancellation of the future’s difference, explicitly identified here as a matter of 
childhood. The space of the awkward child that Darke’s regression opens up also 
establishes an equally awkward non-synchrony that the Thatcherite project, with its 
elimination of the difference between past and future, seeks to deny.  
The desire to know the child is itself turned by Darke back on the Prime 
Minister; he enacts an excessive child-ness that frustrates her terms: it’s totally 
recognisable, and yet (because of being recognisable to excess; he’s too much of a 
child) absolutely and ironically unacceptable to Thatcherism. ‘The child’ goes, then, 
from being a term for the recognisable origins of the self (as formulated in the 
Handbook) to representing that which must be disappeared, that which cannot be 
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recognised even – ironically - when it is most recognisable. There is something about 
the child here that is fundamentally disruptive, different, and ‘private’ in a way 
totally unacceptable to Thatcherism; and the only way to prevent this difference 
affecting the public realm is to ‘disappear’ it. Such is Darke’s fate when he becomes 
a child again. Darke exposes how pleasure always risks becoming political, 
paradoxically when it is most concerned with pleasure itself – a theme that also 
appears in The Line of Beauty. This leads to Darke becoming the second disappeared 
child in McEwan’s novel.  
Darke’s enforced ‘disappearance’ from the public realm is also a play on 
Thatcherite ‘privatisation’. Here, the private, as what is known to exist but 
nevertheless not recognised, disappears from representation; hence the 
disappearance of both Darke and of Stephen’s daughter. Despite its proclaimed 
‘privatisation’ agenda, Thatcherism cannot admit a distinction between the private 
and the public - the distinction that Hannah Arendt saw as the necessary predicate 
of politics in The Human Condition. The private as the difference that might be 
represented but cannot be recognised – the difference suspected in the child – is the 
target of this.  
 It’s useful to frame this reading of Thatcherism (as presented by McEwan) 
with the role of the private in Hannah Arendt’s work. For Arendt, the necessity of 
the private space for the citizen’s participation in politics was a need simply for the 
difference between the private and the public (Arendt, The Human Condition, 22-
79), a difference that however was not abstract or theoretical but physically 
embodied in the private space of the home:  
[…] The four walls of one’s private property offer the only reliable 
hiding place from the common public world, not only from everything 
that goes on in it but also from its very publicity, from being seen and 
being heard. A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, 
becomes, as we would say, shallow. […] The only efficient way to 
guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of 
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publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in. (The 
Human Condition, 71) 
The private here was not the fetishised and flattened (or in Arendt’s term, 
the visible but shallow) images of desire used to imagine the ‘private’ under 
Thatcherism, but the basic conditions of life, the principal characteristics of which 
was simply their unknowability, their removal from the public realm and from the 
regulatory authority of the state (although Thatcherism professed to despise 
regulation in some contexts, it was not shy to attempt to regulate the social lives of 
citizens and the education of children, as Clause 28 showed). Arendt’s terminology 
here would read oddly against conventional critiques of Thatcherism; she demands 
due regard for private property, and explains this demand in apparently negative 
terms: the substantial – or, in her language, deep – element of the self, the self 
deserving and capable of political participation, needs a “hiding place”; there is no 
utopian sense of the withering away of the distinction between individual and social 
needs, but rather the sharp reinforcement of that distinction, as indeed The Human 
Condition emphasises throughout. Arendt is also uncompromising in demanding that 
this privacy is not a metaphor, but rather a very “real, non-subjective” space.   
Significantly, Arendt also saw such political participation as the source of 
potential immortality for the subject, in the sense of the survival of his works 
beyond his own death; in fact, the kind of immortality she identified (itself a form of 
representation) actually requires the existence of death, and of time. Arendt 
provides a frame, therefore, for us to conceptualise Thatcherism’s desire for the 
atemporal and its peculiarly anti-political politics, as summarised in Thatcher’s 
famous declaration of the worthlessness of discussion: There Is No Alternative. 
Death – as the ultimate marker both of the movement of time and of the privacy of 
the subject – is as unacceptable to this politics as is the child, as we shall find in the 
next chapter.  
Despite the official ‘privatisation’ agenda, the possibility of the private as the 
basis for politics (politics understood, following Arendt, as a temporal disturbance 
ultimately dependent on the adult’s death) was effectively banished from 
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Thatcherism’s essentialist vision, which depended on the absolute alignment of 
political representation with the recognition of what, supposedly, had been reality 
all along, Thatcher’s ‘perennial values’. For McEwan, the child is the victim of this; 
and so his title, The Child in Time, makes an even more politically significant 
assertion than is at first apparent. The child does not die, but merely disappears, 
written out of representation, wilfully erased from recognition.  
McEwan shows us that the child is excessive; the Darke narrative in particular 
shows that Thatcherism’s presentation of a vision of pleasure as key to its political 
success could be undone by pleasure becoming political. Pleasure’s tendency to 
excess – what Lacan called jouissance, an excessive pleasure with both destructive 
and creative consequences - creates a dangerous possibility of the unrecognisable, of 
excess not necessarily reducible to the symbolic order fundamentally located in an 
atemporal vision of the past.  
In its attitude to the future, as to the child and to all things, Thatcherism 
simultaneously claimed economic rationalism and moral clarity, a combination it 
viewed as having disappeared in the post-war years. Its attitude to pleasure and to 
creativity was accordingly compromised by its authoritarian embrace of rationalism 
and morality, as is evident in Margaret Thatcher’s own account of how her vision of 
the future replaced one on offer in the 1960s and 1970s:  
Indeed, this was a period of obsessive and naive interest in ‘youth’. 
Parents worried so much about the ‘generation gap’ that even 
teenagers began to take it seriously. A whole ‘youth culture’ […] 
emerged. […] There was vibrancy and talent, but this was also in large 
degree a world of make-believe. […] Carnaby Street in Soho, the 
Beatles, the mini-skirt and the maxiskirt were the new symbols of 
‘Swinging Britain’. […] They concealed the real economic weaknesses 
which even a talented fashion industry and entrepreneurial recording 
companies could not counter-balance. (The Path to Power 148) 
This argument is clearly as much moral as economic. Indeed, Thatcher drew 
little distinction between economic rationalism and Methodist morality; elsewhere in 
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her memoir, she alleges that the Bloomsbury Group’s “rejection of the Victorian 
virtues in their own behaviour” (110, meaning their relationships outside of 
heterosexual marriage, contributed to the allegedly negative consequences of 
Keynes’ post-war economic legacy. Most noticeable here is the revulsion at the 
possibility that ‘youth’ might be seriously different from their predecessors, and at 
the potential of their imagination to produce objects and ways of living with the 
possibility of seriously disrupting the culture itself. The “generation gap” must be 
wilfully unrecognised.  
The great unspoken fear here, though, is that entrepreneurial ambition might 
arise from the same set of desires in youth (and ultimately in childhood) that 
produce political and cultural dissidence. Curiously for a political project that sold 
itself on a vision of pleasure to come in return for adherents’ willingness to recognise 
their own entrepreneurial spirit, Thatcher indicates a profound fear of 
entrepreneurship, and of pleasure becoming political. McEwan captures this 
contradiction between the indulgence of ambition and political authoritarianism well 
in The Child in Time. Alan Hollinghurst would dramatise it to the point of excess – 
precisely the frivolous, pleasurable excess towards which Thatcherism was so 
schizophrenic.  
4. The Line of Beauty  
Alan Hollinghurst’s The Line of Beauty (2004) is, perhaps counterintuitively, 
an important text for Thatcherism and the child. This is because it perfectly 
dramatises the abjection of the real child, who is always coming out of childhood, for 
the sake of projecting an ideal future. This, of course, reflects Thatcherism’s attitude 
towards time, its status as a political project based on a curiously atemporal vision. 
Writing in the early 2000s (Clause 28 remained in force until 2003), Hollinghurst was 
well placed to explore this vision of the future as now itself part of the past (a fact 
bleakly emphasised by the novel’s insinuation that more deaths from HIV-AIDS will 
follow between the end of its chronology and the time of its publication) and yet as a 
vision with powerful continuing effects.  
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No other literary representation of the Thatcherite project probes its ironies 
and contradictions towards pleasure so far as Hollinghurst does here.  The title is 
suggestive of this, most obviously in referring to the lines of cocaine that function as 
a motif in the novel. Another such potential meaning suggests the “line” as 
containing beauty, in the double sense of securing it, giving the subject a place 
where he knows he will find aesthetic (and other) pleasure, and yet simultaneously 
restricting it to that place. This reflects how self-indulgence (the novel brims full of 
beautiful bodies, houses, art, cars, parties, alcohol and cocaine) can be infinitely 
enjoyed so long as it is entertainment without effect, desire without disruption. The 
sources of potential disruption in private excess are managed through their non-
recognition in the public realm, until finally an act of publicising (and publication) 
ends the party for Nick and his adopted family.  
In this novel, images, the objects of fascination, control the relation between 
public and private, a function presented as lying at the centre of Thatcherite politics. 
This reflects Cohen’s contention that the spectacle should properly be viewed not as 
opposed to, but rather as “implicated in historical experience […] vision belongs to 
lived private and public experience” (Spectacular Allegories 1). In other words, 
images can make history, even in the act of forestalling it and containing it. This is 
true of the society of The Line of Beauty, which has become overwhelmingly visual, 
above all in the iconography of ‘The Lady’ herself: “And the wives, you see, all look 
like…her – they’ve all got the blue bows, and the hair” (62). That this society is 
governed by the fantasy image is shown by a telling irony; early in the novel there is 
a suggestion that Thatcher will attend Toby’s 21st birthday party, but Nick 
determines that the idea is merely Gerald’s “fantasy” (59); later, when Thatcher 
does actually attend Gerald’s party, the real event is witnessed by Nick as a fantasy 
because he is high at the time.  
Here, Thatcherite fantasy clearly depends on not recognising those things 
that might disrupt it – HIV/AIDs, gay sex, sexual violence, racism, and mental illness; 
Clause 28, with its specific prohibition on recognition of the queer in the family, lurks 
in the novel’s background throughout. This desire to not recognise correlates with 
the fantasy of timelessness at work, together producing the impression of a latter-
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day Gilded Age – apparently timeless, actually doomed – underlined by the 
shadowing presence of Henry James, the subject of Nick’s doctoral thesis. 
Signs of the costs of arresting time appear constantly but similarly (until the 
ending) confined to the background, in casual references to the rollback of 
progressive advances on race, gender and sexuality, collectively suggesting that a 
temporal reversal of the ‘post-war’ future in favour of a return to some essentialist 
pre-existing Britain is well underway: as O’Shaughnessy says, Thatcherism’s 
attraction was in part that it offered “to abolish complexity and uncertainty by 
suggesting that the future could be lived through the past” (“The Lady Turns Back”, 
295). The act of arresting time requires a peculiar sort of ‘child disappearance’, the 
disappearance of Nick as desiring child whose desire is inevitably disruptive. This 
disappearance occurs when the attempt to simply not recognise Nick’s sexuality 
finally proves a failure.  
The narrative is also Nick’s Bildungsroman (the novel begins shortly after his 
graduation from Oxford, and takes place during a period when he is still theoretically 
engaged in study). The eventual downfall of the Feddens’ world (a localised 
embodiment of Thatcherite society) arises directly from the sources of desire in 
Nick’s childhood, from his upbringing as a favoured child, but one growing up in a 
conventional and provincial environment, lacking the possibility of sensual 
encounter with the new and the different which – as is evident in his choices, at 
least initially – Nick desperately desires. This is clear when Nick returns to his 
hometown in his car, a gift from Wani:  
[…] Some lads, or ‘louts’, roamed about under the arches of the 
market hall.  The market hall was the jewel of the town […] It had 
been the pride of Nick’s childhood, he had done a project about it in 
school […] at the age of twelve it had been ranked with the Taj Mahal 
and the Parliament Building in Ottawa in his private architectural 
heaven. The moment of accepting it was not by Wren had been as 
bleak and exciting as puberty. Now he revved round it, the lads 
looked up, and he savoured the triumph of returning home in a 
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throaty little runaround. It was as though the achievements of sex 
and equities and titles and drugs blew out in a long scarf behind him. 
(Line, 285)  
Here Nick’s childhood ambition and desire is firmly aligned with both his 
sexual and his socioeconomic adventures since graduation. This links a Freudian 
notion of polymorphous infantile sexuality (as described by Phillips, above) with the 
compromised indulgence of desire and ambition offered by Thatcherism; the 
passage clarifies the sheer sensuality of the child’s ambition, situated simultaneously 
in the ‘real’ world of politics and money and in the unrecognised world of queer 
sexuality. That this is temporally and politically a disturbance is neatly figured in the 
literal disturbance Nick’s car creates, suggestively drawing the gaze of the lads.  
There is an attention here, again, to the uncertain boundary between fantasy 
and reality. Nick, imagining the minds of the lads, wonders whether they might 
imagine the sensual pleasures to which he now has access, but concludes that they 
cannot; although they see him, they will not (he believes) properly recognise the 
extent of his privilege, a non-recognition that underpins the social order insofar as it 
contains the hint of menace behind the lads’ presumed jealousy towards Nick’s car.  
The menace is contained by the louts’ assumed political and aesthetic 
ignorance; for them, the market hall is just a place to hang out, not an architectural 
wonder. Thus when Gerald’s comically compromised need to not recognise his own 
involvement in Nick’s gay lifestyle is mentioned, we might note that Nick has 
internalised a rather similar psychological tactic. Gerald is aware of Nick’s sexuality, 
enough to worry about the association between the two of them (though 
Hollinghurst slyly implicates Gerald’s own exhibitionism in Nick’s queerness), but of 
course cannot admit to recognising it. This refusal of recognition must be 
maintained in order to secure the political and social status quo.  
Refusal of recognition is therefore, paradoxically, actually a form of claiming 
to know the other here, a form of knowledge that prevents the extension or revision 
of political representation. The desired position for the subject here is the sadistic 
position of power where one can choose to share or withhold that knowledge from 
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others (as Nick mentally denies the possibility of such knowledge to the lads). This is 
ultimately directed towards power over time, refusing the possibility that the boys 
could grow up to be as Nick has become and therefore disallowing the possibility of 
socioeconomic, as well as sexual, disruption. Desire here is desire to be other than 
oneself; when this wish is limited to the self, the resulting paradox means that desire 
can continue only as an image of what it originally was.  
This reflects how the images work in the novel, as both the objects of desire 
and the authorities controlling it. Thatcher’s own image is the principal example of 
the latter, of course. Yet this control works by exploiting how even the same image, 
as the novel persistently hints, itself constitutes an object of desire; Thatcher herself 
is such an object, and the novel repeatedly associates the fascination created by her 
image with queerness. 
This echoes a moment early in the novel when Nick is looking through a 
series of adverts for men seeking sex and relationships, when he comes across Leo, 
leading to the beginning of their relationship. In this moment, Nick – though a 
graduate – is still a child in the sense of being new to serious relationships and to the 
world he is about to enter. The randomness of the images in the adverts, and in his 
selection of whom to contact, shows desire and curiosity – two factors associated, as 
above, with Nick’s childhood and his pre-adolescent fixation on the market hall – as 
aligned with this unpredictability, this peculiar equality of objects of desire, even 
when the result of the encounter may significantly determine his future. There is a 
randomness in the recognition of affective value here, in that behind one of the 
images Nick will find a depth and human substance, a transformation from the two-
dimensional image into a three-dimensional, sensuous and affective and 
pleasurable, encounter. (This also applies to Nick’s childhood love of architecture; 
only some of the two dimensional drawings that fascinate him will be matched by 
reality.)  
Evidently, this fascination with images, their tendency towards randomness 
combined with their potentially profound effect on the future, is potentially 
disturbing to the political order, as indicated by the fact that it leads directly to 
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Nick’s gay life and all the ultimate consequences of that. Given this, it’s telling that 
Nick’s cocaine use, his sex life with Wani, and the images of Margaret Thatcher all 
provide an order where pleasure and the fulfilment of desire can be secured in an 
orderly, predictable, non-random way. They transform the disruptive potential of 
desire, ambition and creativity into something that can be anticipated, and 
contained. Yet the inevitable result of this is that the lifestyle thus produced 
becomes peculiarly two-dimensional, a consequence figured in the glossy magazine 
that Nick and Wani produce, the fact that Wani can only have orgasm to 
pornographic images, and the fact that Nick is left with a photograph of his 
encounter with Margaret Thatcher, his memory of which is clouded by his having 
been high at the time.  
These are images that provide pleasure in fantasy only, or as Nick puts it to 
Lord Kessler, they possess a “style that hides things and reveals things at the same 
time” (54). In Lacanian terms, it’s an attempt to reconcile the excitement and 
pleasure of the self’s investment in the image of the Other with a totalising symbolic 
order – and of course the two are only reconcilable if one has reliable fetishes, tools 
for stimulation (like cocaine, sex and money) that function to both generate and 
control fantasies, to frame them. In these fetishes, then, one can indulge what one 
would not otherwise recognise; as Nick calls it, this is the “heterosexual queenery” 
of the Tory MPs whose queerly excessive desire is invested in the image of Thatcher 
herself. The power of these images lies in that they provide ‘excess’ whilst denying 
the capacity to actually exceed their boundaries (which would create, as does 
eventually happen, a political disruption).  
Nick’s return to the Barwick market hall, however, is an early signal that this 
state of affairs cannot last. The evocation of his childhood ambition and creativity at 
this time hints at the potential for disruption that still lies behind his current 
lifestyle; and indeed his private desires, identified here with his childhood, will 
eventually go on to bring down Gerald, by then a government minister. Hollinghurst 
thus locates the disruptive possibilities of time – of ‘growing up’, of entering into 
desire and even of dying – in Nick himself as a peculiar kind of real child. This desire 
involves the humiliation as well as the satisfaction of the self (the “bleak” and 
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“exciting” puberty of realising that the building is not by Wren), because it exists in 
time; it arises from lack and loss, but also generates a creativity that is not, 
ultimately, ever fully available for the authorities to anticipate. (Curiously, in both 
The Line of Beauty and Hawksmoor, architecture, as a discipline poised between 
imagination and the real, is a metaphorical site through which this is explored.)  
This desiring and ambitious child is, of course, himself one of the fetishes of 
Thatcherite fantasy; his ambition and desire is supposedly indulged but only in a 
fantastic way, divorced from time, from politics and from death. Serge Leclaire, in “A 
Child is Being Killed”, offers a suggestive frame for this:  
Whoever does mourn, over and over, the loss of the wonderful child 
he might have been remains in limbo […] But whoever believes he has 
won the battle against the figure of the tyrant [this child] once and for 
all cuts himself off from the sources of his creative spirit and thinks he 
is strong when he stubbornly resists the reign of jouissance. (Leclaire, 
3) 
In the scenes of Nick’s return to his provincial hometown quoted above, he 
has just come back from a somewhat awkward visit by Gerald to his parents’ house, 
one which brings up the gap between his childhood, when his parents invested in 
him as their intelligent and sensitive only child, and his present reality, which his 
parents do not fully understand. Nick finds that he “felt for both parties, as though 
he were witnessing an argument with himself” (284); he shares his parents’ 
mourning, as Leclaire might say, for his parents’ ideal of himself. However, his 
current life is marked by a willingness to abandon his childhood ambitions, his 
jouissance, in favour of its pale image in his coke-and-sex-filled life with Wani; a 
fetishised performance of jouissance that never quite enters into it because it 
attempts to avoid the knowledge of loss, attempts to be secure and available for 
anticipation. It is telling that in this same scene, Nick finds out from Gerald that Wani 
lost his own little brother years earlier, something he has never told Nick (281).   
Since the fetishised life of High Thatcherism, and of Nick and Wani’s affair, 
has to banish the existence of loss and death, their reintroduction through the AIDS 
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crisis constitutes a return of the repressed, forcing into sight that which this society 
desires not to recognise. Suddenly, death as a disturbing rupture in time reappears, 
seen as a vengeance on homosexuals. The culmination of this is that the desiring 
child himself re-appears as a lurid version of Nick himself, conjured up by Gerald’s 
paranoia, at the moment when time re-erupts to destroy the fantasy life of High 
Thatcherism, the private taking an unexpected revenge on the proponents of 
‘privatisation’.  
At the novel’s ending, time suddenly re-erupts as Nick’s experiences are re-
told in a lurid narrative delivered by Gerald, who imagines Nick as a changeling child, 
taken in by the Feddens only to deliberately destroy them - driven by resentful 
malice over his own homosexual inability to produce children. Following Edelman, 
we can clearly see that there are two children in play here: the recalcitrant real child 
(who, like Nick, is always in fact growing up), and the fantasy child on whom the 
values of family and state are pinned – Thatcher herself acts as the ‘revenant oedipal 
mother figure’ (Duff 182) at the centre of this order, bent on reproduction but 
increasingly, as the 1980s go on, lacking a meaningful reality to reproduce, as shown 
by the failures of the various heirs in the novel – Toby Fedden, whose semi-arranged 
relationship with the daughter of his father’s business partner falls apart; and Wani 
Ouradi, Nick’s lover, dying of AIDS after long sustaining an entirely staged 
heterosexual engagement.  
The fantasy child takes priority (despite the spectacular disintegration of the 
Feddens’ world) over the real child, and hence Nick is finally excluded, disappeared, 
from the Feddens’ lives. Gerald accuses Nick of being (figuratively, but with literal 
implications) a child murderer; but what is actually lost is Gerald’s narcissistic self-
image; the child here is the purely fantasy root of the self, the real child (all the more 
real because he has, at least in a purely temporal sense, grown up) abandoned.  
This society based on the visual hates what cannot be seen, what lies 
outside, exceeding and disrupting the image, which turns out to be primarily Nick’s 
queerness (although this is in part a scapegoat for other things, of course). It hates 
the three-dimensional, which threatens to demand a representation of what cannot 
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be recognised, or seen, because authority here – which is authority over time itself, 
over history (‘No Future’ being the guiding mantra) depends on the visual image.  
The Line of Beauty, then, suggests that the private self originating in the 
desiring child demands a temporal, even a historical politics, a politics that (as the 
AIDS crisis both symbolically and practically shows) cannot escape – even depends 
upon - individual mortality, as the final reminder of time’s passing. Thatcherism’s 
attempt to arrest time and politics cannot survive, as the fates of both Nick and of 
the Feddens shows. The novel shows that this attempt demands both 
acknowledging and containing the desiring child in the fetish of the ambitious child, 
and proposes an analogy between this child’s role in Thatcherism and its 
implications for a politics of reading; Nick derives such authority as he has from his 
supposed ability to read books, people and objects. It is in the practice of reading in 
its broadest sense, Hollinghurst suggests, that we must look to unpick the 
psychological tactics adopted by Thatcherism.  
Such a practice of reading would have to take a very different approach 
towards the relation between recognition and representation. The novel’s interest in 
images as both the objects of creativity and ambition and, consequentially, the tools 
of authoritarian control subtly hints at the unpredictability inherent in the child’s 
curiosity and capacity for pleasure. Such curiosity leads to the future and to 
demands for extended political representation and rights, as demanded by gays. The 
virtue of such demands, though, can never be truly demonstrated through a 
requirement to be available for recognition, to submit to the controlling frame of 
the image, the image imagined to guarantee the future and make it available for 
recognition. The authorities’ desire to nevertheless maintain such recognition as the 
basic for representation sustains their interpretative and political authority, but only 
at the cost of the real child’s disappearance. As The Line of Beauty hints through its 
framing reference to literary studies and literary criticism, this inability to truly read 
the child has implications for the fundamental function of reading as a mode of 
political and interpretative authority.  
5. Thatcherism and Theory: Peter Ackroyd  
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Why, do we not believe the very Infants to be the Heirs of Hell and 
Children of the Devil as soon as they are disclos'd to the World? 
(Hawksmoor 9) 
Peter Ackroyd’s early novels are concerned with both Thatcherism and the 
child. His first, The Great Fire of London (1982) neatly parodies both Thatcher’s 
‘Victorian values’ rhetoric and the leftist accusation of a revived ‘Dickensian’ poverty 
by imagining the return of a ghostly extra-textual Little Dorrit to early-1980s London. 
Great Fire explores the marginalised groups of the early Thatcher years – such as 
student radicals and gays – who were, both occasionally in their own and frequently 
in right-wing discourse, associated with the mantra of rebellious youth expressed in 
the Sex Pistols’ famous rejection of time: ‘No Future’ (a slogan suggestive of just how 
fundamentally the presumption that the future was the proper object of politics had 
been questioned in the years leading to the Thatcher premiership).   
However, Ackroyd was as much influenced by then-recent developments in 
literary theory as by the British culture wars; the influences of Lacan, Derrida, 
Saussure and others on his work is widely recognised (in studies by Gibson and 
Wolfreys, and by Onega, as well as being evident in his own theoretical work and 
early novels - Derrida is even discussed explicitly, though with comical 
inconsequentiality, in Great Fire (91)). Before beginning to write novels, Ackroyd had 
already authored a radical New Critical work, Notes for a New Culture (1976). His 
third novel, Hawksmoor (1985) presents a powerful narrative of a queer and 
uncanny difference arising from the individual’s childhood experience of alienating 
privacy, a difference that Thatcherism must (in this Ackroyd agrees with Hollinghurst 
and McEwan) necessarily refuse to recognise.  
Hawksmoor is also a novel structured around the child’s abduction and 
murder. Through this, Ackroyd traces Thatcherism’s origins in Enlightenment 
rationalism (as he identifies them) and imagines an oppositional project drawn from 
his knowledge of Theory (here particularly, though not exclusively, psychoanalytic 
and Lacanian), and from his interest in the uncanny geography of London, where he 
finds forces recalcitrant to rationalist discourse and Thatcherite capitalism (Link, 
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“The Capitol of Darknesse”, 518).  From this, he produces a compelling account of 
the reality to which Thatcherism refuses recognition, a reality apparently realised at 
the ending in an ambiguously violent moment of indistinction between adult and 
child, a moment that itself eliminates time – and politics.  
The novel is structured as two parallel texts that unify at the ending: one is 
the first-person narrative of Nicholas Dyer, a macabre Doppelgänger of the baroque 
architect Nicholas Hawksmoor (c.1661-1736), who recounts his life as it has led to 
his present (1711) commission to build seven new London churches. The other text 
is a third-person narrative in the mid-1980s, where a detective called Hawksmoor 
investigates a series of murders – almost all of children - perpetrated in Dyer's now-
derelict churches. Dyer discloses to the reader that the architecture and geography 
of these churches represent a coded catechism for the gnostic religion into which he 
was abducted following his parents’ deaths in the 1666 plague and his subsequent 
abandonment on to the London streets, and to which he still adheres. This 
Manichean faith reveals evil and darkness as true and necessary elements of an 
essentially unchanging world, elements which are in Dyer's view ignorantly 
suppressed by the discourse of Enlightenment led by his rival, Sir Christopher Wren. 
For Dyer, Wren’s rationalism will always fail, because it refuses to recognise those 
uncanny and abject, but fundamental, conditions of the world (revealed to Dyer in 
childhood) that would disturb Wren’s arrogant belief in an enlightened present 
where the scientific method can recognise, and thus represent, everything that does 
or could exist.  Against Wren’s public leadership, Dyer is as private an individual as 
it’s possible to be (once again, ironically the individual who truly ‘privatises’ is 
precisely the queer child Thatcherism fears). 
At the opening of the novel, we are immediately faced with the text as the 
ground of the child's entrance into authority; and this text is more monumental, 
more authoritative, than one might normally expect:  
 
Dyer took his scale from the plans he had already drawn up and, as 
always, he used a small knife with a piece of frayed rope wrapped 
around its ivory handle. For three weeks he laboured over this 
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wooden prototype and, as by stages he fitted the spire upon the 
tower, we may imagine the church itself rising in Spitalfields. But 
there were six other churches to be built also, and once again the 
architect took his short brass rule, his pair of compasses, and the 
thick paper which he used for his draughts. (Hawksmoor, 1) 
 
 The adult controls the relationship between the child’s fragile thought, the 
organisation or ordering performed in the text, and the reality on to which this order 
is imposed – between black lead, ink, and finally stone. Yet this control is never 
perfect; in Hawksmoor, the text is both more real, and the real more textual, than 
usual: the narrative itself is especially close to the author, to his living and breathing 
body, as when the preface initiates the reader’s position of bodily closeness to Dyer 
(“yet now, for a moment, there is only his heavy breathing as he bends over his 
papers” (1)), a position maintained throughout by the intimacy of his narrative 
(somewhere between stream of consciousness and the maniacal aides of a 
Marlovian antihero)15 and by his frequent references to body parts and bodily 
function. Breath - life – is bound into the page, which is therefore no longer dead. 
Both the survival of the subject beyond his own mortality and the possibility of 
authority are at stake as the adult bids the child write yet tries to control the pen 
himself. Yet whereas the body is conceived as singular and the text as a mediating 
representation between the subject’s mind and the external reality it promises to 
ultimately re-order, the text now takes the place of the body’s singularity – but 
without the body’s mortality (just as, of course, the churches function as 
monumental tombs, replacing the decaying body with a more perfect body of stone). 
The symbolic order condensed in the text is imagined as wholly subsuming the 
subject, even the subject who has created the text.  
As Dyer admits, there is always the possibility of his being in the ‘wrong suit’, 
of creating a merely fantastic order – yet the paradox (and, perhaps, the reason for 
Dyer’s good cheer) is that if the fantasy holds sufficient power for the subject, it 
doesn’t matter (rather as for Mrs Thatcher, ‘conviction’ – that is, an internal sense of 
the order of things - admitted no mediation with reality). Murder, of course, is a final 
assertion of fantasy over reality – it forcibly aligns reality with the ‘order’ of the 
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subject who commits the murder, and it destroys the other subjects who might 
think, or imagine, differently. Yet here it is also conceived as redemptive for the 
murder victim – for the child.  
By offering an alternative spectral existence, Dyer produces the fantasy of 
penetration without exposure, without risk, for the sake of which the killing of the 
child is in fact redemptive: “They sacrificed Boys since it was their Opinion that 
Humane life […] could not be secured unless a vyrgyn Boy suffered in stead” (21). 
The killing of the virgin prevents the loss of the object (the boy) to the subject 
(Dyer); both are re-constituted as a single subject, in the collapsing movement 
considered by Freud as the primary project of religious feeling (Civilisation and its 
Discontents, 8). Indeed, the objective itself as that which is Other to the subject is 
banished by Dyer, hence the series of real churches in which his murders take places 
finally collapses into a fictional church. 
In 1980s London, detective Hawksmoor investigates the serial murders in 
and around Dyer's churches. Whilst pursuing his investigation, he faces pressures 
from police colleagues to use new algorithm-driven technologies promising greater 
predictability, even pre-emptive knowledge, of crime – an apparatus of modernity 
targeted by the police towards basically superstitious fears: of paedophiles, of the 
loss of control over urban space, and of social outsiders – the homeless, 
homosexuals, and ‘feral’ children. Statistical and automated prediction of crime here 
replaces political attention to human problems, and simultaneously eradicates the 
future as a source of threat (echoing Arendt’s claim that in modernity, politics tends 
to be reduced to mere management of the social, a form of management that 
dissolves private into public (69)). Ackroyd presents these technologies, deployed by 
an authoritarian and homophobic Thatcherite police force (Hawksmoor, 110), as the 
successors to Wren’s Enlightenment. Like Hollinghurst and McEwan, Ackroyd targets 
the Thatcherite insistence on the revelation of a human nature that must necessarily 
be located in the child, and simultaneous demand that this nature must be set free – 
a process enabled by the acceleration of the capitalist economy and removal of 
restrictions upon it – yet even this ‘setting free’ must itself be restricted by the 
requirement to be predictable, reproducible (as the detectives’ new computer 
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systems promise).  Dyer’s refusal to be visible (and therefore predictable), his refusal 
to allow the child to enter into reproducibility, and his insistence on an alternative 
vision of immortality, all indicate modes of authority repressed in the Thatcherite 
paradox.  
For Ackroyd, both Thatcherism and the Enlightenment participate in an 
ahistorical fantasy of controlling, even eliminating, the future: a fantasy that 
ultimately dismisses death itself as any significant rupture in the individual’s mastery 
of the world. Death (which Arendt saw as a predicate for the kind of immortality 
achieved through political action) is the final and most necessary condition for a 
politics of difference; it demands attention to a world from which the subject will be 
absent; it requires the conscious conception of the state of unconsciousness – or in 
other words, the representation of that which cannot be recognised. Hence the 
police computer, attacking temporality as a limitation on recognition, aims to also 
eliminate death itself, alongside ensuring that the child is never exposed to a 
disruptive or dangerous experience.  
It becomes evident to the reader that Dyer, through his diabolical scheme to 
make the churches a kind of permanent text to overcome mortality and time, is 
himself responsible for the 1980s child disappearances, a once-abducted child 
returning to haunt the ideological heirs to Enlightenment rationalism.  Meanwhile, 
Detective Hawksmoor becomes increasingly detached from his professional 
investigation as he gradually suspects the ghostly truth; he becomes ever-closer to 
the figure for whose ‘true’ name his substitutes. This finally results in a union 
between Dyer and Hawksmoor at the novel's close in the Church of Little St Hugh, 
named for the child saint apocryphally murdered by Jews and the only one of 
Hawksmoor’s churches to be wholly fictional, textual, rather than erected by the 
historical Hawksmoor. Here, in a culminating killing, the two men dissolve into one 
another and the text becomes spoken in a single voice, authoritative yet, curiously, 
finally identifying with the child in the closing words: ‘And I am a child again, begging 
on the threshold of eternity’ (217).  (It’s suggestive that Arendt contrasted “eternity” 
to “immortality”, seeing the latter as political and the former as apolitical and 
atemporal; the key difference is the acknowledgement of death (Arendt 17-21)). A 
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new version of the child has been produced, again, by the child’s own 
disappearance.  
Ever since his childhood experience of his mother's death, Dyer’s life work is 
simultaneously a reaction to the trauma of witnessing death and an attempt to gain 
authority over language, and this is where the novel’s parodic representation of 
Theory, as well as Thatcherism, becomes most apparent.  For Dyer, ‘common’ 
language displays the subject's lack of mastery; when the subject speaks publicly, he 
forfeits both the form and the substance of his words to time: a forfeiture to the 
past (from where the words originate) and to the future (where, as the distorted 
phrases recurring between the 1711 and 1980s narratives indicate, the words will be 
misused). For Dyer, ‘common’ language displays the subject's non-identity with itself 
- the splitting, in fact, of subject and object, the maternal loss at the root of the 
child’s entrance into sexuality. Ackroyd makes this splitting explicitly and especially 
violent in Dyer's personal history, where it appears as the death of his parents. 
In Hawksmoor, the common people’s discourse is saturated with cliché, 
proverb, and rhyme, with speakers ignorant to the point of unconsciousness about 
the origins of their own words; yet it is only by attending to these distortions, 
making them visible, that one can seek to recover the original, the source of 
authority (hence our knowledge that detective Hawksmoor's name refers to the 
distortion in which the architect Hawksmoor has been twisted into Dyer cues us 
immediately in this authoritative position). For Dyer, truth is obscure, difficult, and 
available only in code, the ability to interpret which is the basis of his aggressively 
isolated authority. (Suggestively, Ackroyd’s own fictional and ‘non-fictional’ writing 
often foregrounds his knowledge of the hidden origins of places and of the 
etymologies of words).  
Dyer seeks mastery of past and future through access to a hidden language 
at the centre of the universe, one not disorderly and alienating (as the existence of 
death and desire demands) but rather fundamentally ordered, and one he can speak 
through giving it architectural expression. Doing so gives him an advantage over the 
common masses, a means of reading the world, which is in fact the most precious 
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thing he can pass on to the child (at the opening, Dyer is doing precisely this for his 
young apprentice). It is this orderly language that is identified at the novel’s ending 
with the total mastery of time; to achieve this, death itself (which Arendt suggests is 
the basis of politics), is being eliminated here, as too is desire (Dyer’s murders 
substitute for the gay encounters through which they are understood in the minds 
of the police force (110)).  
At the novel’s ending, language, as the medium for authority, is still present 
but only as a kind of paradoxically silent language: “And when they spoke they spoke 
with one voice […] their words were my own but not my own […] they were 
watching one another silently” (217). The traumatic splitting between the subject 
and the crowd in childhood is healed by the discovery of a unitary, knowable 
authority at the origins of language and of the world. 
There is a suggestive parallel here with Don't Look Now, where John Baxter 
also turns detective in the final part of the story, similarly located around a set of 
derelict churches. Baxter is killed (in a murder similarly characterised by silence and 
by the collapse of time) both because he has refused to relinquish his rationalist 
distinction between the living and the dead (and so ignores the warnings that come 
from his dead daughter via a seer) and paradoxically because he relinquishes this at 
the wrong moment, following a being that has the appearance of his daughter. 
Hawksmoor becomes Dyer's final victim because, in acknowledging and following 
Dyer's presence, he too relinquishes the distinction between the living and the dead, 
prompting their euphoric union – a union of two adult males that oddly (but now 
not so oddly) results in their becoming, in the singular, a “child again”.  
The patterned order of silent witnesses at the end of Hawksmoor echoes 
Kermode’s assertion, in The Genesis of Secrecy, of privileged and secret knowledge 
as lying at the root of a western literary and critical tradition, planted there by 
Christianity. Dyer – like Ackroyd – has, in fact, applied this tradition to his own 
traumatised experience of a certain moment in modernity, from which he has 
derived truths of which the masses – the outsiders – are ignorant. As Kermode 
suggests, this has always been – as the explicitly religious origins of the phenomenon 
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indicate – about overcoming mortality. It is his “dying generations of [insider] 
readers” (2) who are brought together, in the religious “oceanic” spirit identified by 
Freud, at the close of Hawksmoor, united by their shared access to the truth. 
Kermode argued that the “operations [of hermeneutics] may require the 
professional exercise of stealth or violence” (1). Reading Dyer, we might find this 
prescient.  
Dyer’s specifically visual operation of power – he sees those who cannot see 
him - recalls Virilio’s identification of the individual who sees others whilst 
concealing himself as a key figure in the development of modernity (in warfare, but 
also in the expansion and centralisation of political and social power). This has some 
application to Dyer’s mission; the churches are in fact built to enable him to 
(continue to) see even where and when he lacks bodily presence, and to use sight as 
a means for both violent control and controlled violence. 
 The collapse of architectural and technological power into visual desire that 
Ackroyd produces here links important strands of late twentieth-century literary 
Theory, from Virilio to Lacan; and the power to be present when absent is not only 
permitted by the computer technology in which detective Hawksmoor finds his 
colleagues placing such faith in the 1980s – it is also enabled by the much older idea 
of the spectre. Edelman, building on Žižek describes the powerful attraction of the 
fantasy of the subject who is present even during his absence: “To be there always, 
though unperceived, to inhabit the space of perception as such and thus to become 
the witness to one’s absence, one’s disembodiment” (No Future, 34) is, he suggests, 
a fantasy at the heart of religious promises of immortality; it is also central to Dyer’s 
own version of this promise.  
Here Dyer’s murders of the children of Thatcher-era London become visible 
as the rescue of the child not from privatisation but from the publicising of the 
‘private’ individual. Dyer rescues the children from this ‘public humiliation’ (of the 
sort Thomas Hill, and the tramp, experience) and simultaneously from the 
requirement to enter into adulthood and ultimately to reproduce; they are rescued 
for privacy and the privilege of intimate desire - the privilege and intimacy 
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conferred, as we have noted, by and through the text itself.  Dyer retrieves the 
notion of the private as that which can be represented (in code) but which remains 
not available for general recognition.  
Yet the greatest irony in Hawksmoor, as we may be beginning to suspect, is 
that Ackroyd has nevertheless made Dyer’s project a direct, if perverted, parallel to 
its Enlightenment and Thatcherite opponents. Whilst the Enlightenment seeks a 
totally predictable future, Dyer’s satanic vision, for all its ostensible difference and 
its claim to recognise those things politically favoured fools like Wren cannot, aims 
for exactly the same thing: mastery over time, and the collapse of past and future 
into a single present. Dyer’s is yet another project for No Future, designed to end 
the mundane world of the crowd and of the temporary political order in favour of 
correct recognition of an absolute and atemporal authority. Here Hawksmoor’s 
sustained appropriation of psychoanalytic imagery, to serve its interest in childhood 
trauma and language (as already observed by several critical readers, like Link, Hock-
soon, and Taube) is significant.   
Link, who explores Hawksmoor’s engagement with psychoanalysis, argues 
that whilst the novel does indeed provide a resistance towards Thatcherite 
rationalism, this is complicated and rendered ambiguous precisely by the parallels 
between its rationalist and anti-rational elements.  We should add to this how 
Ackroyd audaciously draws attention to the Lacanian and Thatcherite forces in the 
novel as projects of reading with shared characteristics. This should be read, I 
believe, as a parody of critical reading after Lacan. Dyer not only lives a Lacanian life, 
he reads that life in a Lacanian fashion: 
Why do we not believe the very Infants to be the Heirs of Hell and 
Children of the Devil as soon as they are disclos’d to the World? I 
declare that I build my Churches firmly on this Dunghil Earth and with 
a full Conception of Degenerated Nature […] there is a mad-drunken 
Catch, Hey ho! The Devil is dead! If that be true, I have been in the 
wrong Suit all my life. (Hawksmoor, 9)  
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This bizarre declaration utilises Lacanian concepts including the alienation of 
the child (in the image of ‘disclosure’ to the world); the abject (“Dungil”; 
“Degenerated” – Link also notes (520) the importance of the abject in Hawksmoor); 
language (the “Catch”); lack and the phallus (the building of the churches). Above all, 
though, the ironic self-awareness of the final words, the mischievous suggestion that 
Dyer’s ‘Suit’ works as a symbolic order where the coherence of the order takes 
primacy over reality, confirms the Lacanian parody at work. Ackroyd had directly 
quoted, and discussed at length, Lacan’s statement that “it is only the signifier that is 
important, not the signified” in Notes for a New Culture (111), and in Hawksmoor he 
translates this interest from theory to queer parody.  
Dyer’s project, based as it is on knowledge of supposedly originary symbols, 
symbols he in turn repeats in the form of his churches, further parodies Lacan’s 
suggestion that language and the Symbolic exist before the subject’s birth (and 
therefore will also survive his death). Ackroyd implies that in asserting the totalising 
nature of the Symbolic, Lacan unintentionally opens the possibility of an 
authoritarian reading of the world, one that removes the subject undertaking the 
reading from his own subjugation to death (and therefore to the child). Although 
Lacan conceived his work as “Copernican”, undermining the human subject’s 
mastery and stability, and sought to avoid making the symbolic into “only a re-
apparition, under a mask, of God” (Lacan 35), Ackroyd equates his thought with 
religion with almost comical directness, and equates it with the mastery sought (and 
achieved) by Dyer.  
The irony of this is confirmed in how the child in Hawksmoor acts a version of 
the Lacanian Real, for there is something within the child (as Dyer’s own childhood, 
indeed, suggests) that resists the masterful knowledge of the adult and thereby 
resists incorporation into the Symbolic; the child visibly embodies the adult’s own 
death, reminding him of the Real that alienates his consciousness from his own 
body. Yet Ackroyd makes a sick joke of this by demonstrating that incorporation of 
the Real into the Symbolic can, in fact, take place if one turns to the ‘corpse’ latent 
in ‘incorporation’, and kills the child. The murdered child, deprived of the disruptive 
difference that risks emerging from his subjectivity, becomes a mere object, one 
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wholly available to the symbolic order rehearsed by the murderer; they do not read, 
but are available for reading. Hence at Hawksmoor’s ending, the narrator finally 
recognises himself as a “child again” only when there is nothing left to recognise but 
the representation itself – a perfect reading, at the cost of the real (or Real) child. 
Such a perfect reading emerges as a collapse of author, character, and 
potentially (it is implied) reader too. It is thus only at the novel’s close that an 
assertive and unequivocal “I” appears in the narration (despite the self-assertion of 
Dyer) and this is no longer in Dyer’s first-person voice nor in the third-person 
account of detective Hawksmoor. It seems instead to be Ackroyd’s ‘own’ voice, 
saying “I am a child again”. Dyer is, as this implies, at least partially a projection of 
his author, who sees true authority in all-encompassing but secret knowledge that is 
above and indifferent to the daily business of the world.  
Ackroyd’s increasing solidification of this project can be observed through 
the changes in focus of his novels; whilst his use of a kind of magical historicism is 
fairly constant, there are nevertheless significant changes of theme and scope in his 
writing career. In his first novel, The Great Fire of London (1982), his imagining of a 
return of Little Dorrit to early 1980s London implicitly critiques Thatcher’s rhetorical 
return to ‘Victorian values’, and dwells upon the marginalised groups of the time, 
especially radical leftists, gays and non-whites. Yet even here there was already a 
highly ambiguous attitude towards the value of any kind of political engagement – 
or even with engagement with the contemporary as anything other than that which 
can be resolved through mystical resolution with the past. After meeting a group of 
radical young people living with an academic who delivers an extended diatribe on 
how early-Thatcherite London has resurrected the social conditions of the 
Dickensian city in only slightly subtler form, the main character, a film director, 
muses –  
He felt oddly threatened by this group of young people, and yet at the 
same time vaguely sympathetic towards them. Despite their 
foolishness, they had a point. Perhaps he would give the film more of 
a documentary look. (Great Fire, 84)  
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The same ‘vagueness’ can be discerned, perhaps, in Hawksmoor – Ackroyd 
presents Thatcherism (and the Enlightenment) as ignorant and cruel, but he is highly 
ambivalent about whether anything outside the intellectual and literary sphere, 
anything political, should be done about this.  In Ackroyd’s later career, the 
sophistication of the 1980s novels gradually descends into the cultural nationalism 
of First Light (1989) and English Music (1992), before Ackroyd abandons the novel 
entirely as a vehicle for this thinking, which reaches its apogee in the deeply 
conservative Albion: The Origins of the English Imagination (2002). Remarkably, 
Ackroyd himself claims not to view the change from New Criticism to historicism as 
particularly significant; in interview he remarked that, “the contrast between 
humanism and modernism doesn't strike me as probably being very important now. 
I think there are other forces, other contexts […] the London sensibility, the visionary 
sensibility, the English Catholic sensibility” (218-219). This hesitant dismissal can be 
explained, I suggest, by the fact that Ackroyd’s 'historicism' here is in fact just as 
ahistorical as the former theoretical stance; it is about 'history' as access to a 
timeless utopia known through 'timeless' traditions or “sensibilities”, much like the 
vision of Hawksmoor’s ending.   
More generously, we can acknowledge that despite Ackroyd’s failings, he 
establishes a powerful counter-narrative to Thatcherite ‘rationalism’, where the 
revenants of what rationalist economics have attempted to dispose of re-emerge, in 
uncanny sites of intersection between embodiments of ideology and the real 
geography of 1980s London. Ackroyd queers Thatcherism’s equally simplistic claim 
to a retrieval and restoration of a pre-existing, constant reality in its own moment, 
exposing its own ahistoricity, its profane dismissal of the significance of death itself 
as marking any significant rupture in the world. Yet Ackroyd’s conclusion is, 
ultimately – and like his antihero’s churches – an authoritarian construction that 
uses the child’s death to assert the primacy of the disembodied intellect over the 
chaotic world of death, desire, and growing up. One thing being lost here, of course, 
is the possibility of a sexuality – and, behind that, of a private life – being 
represented politically even in the public sphere where it goes unrecognised.   
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Hawksmoor locates the child’s drive and capacity for creativity, troped in the 
theme of building, in that private zone.  The power of Thatcherism’s political offer 
similarly depends, I suggested, on its appeal to the desire of the male to release his 
creativity, to ‘make’ money, with the quasi-maternal Thatcher symbolically 
castrating the literally paternalistic post-war order that is assumed to deny that 
creativity. Yet creativity, if we accept the accounts given here, inevitably arises in 
response to conflict and chaos, to the trauma of an uncertain world, to the 
disruption between past and future. To echo Dyer’s declaration once again: “I cou'd 
not weep then but I can build now”; creativity initially emerges as an act of desire, 
desire to project the self beyond the body. This is, of course, exactly why Dyer 
builds; yet his buildings are also sites of theory and mastery, and authored texts that 
extend authority through violence. In his case, then, creativity has been perverted 
by an attempt to eradicate the conditions that gave rise to it, and the creative object 
(the building or text) is no longer a medium for the creative transgression between 
public and private realms, but a site for the reduction of the Other subject – here, 
the child - to an object, a dead body to be absorbed into the subject.  
In becoming spectral, achieving a mobility of consciousness independent of 
the physical and mortal body (a powerful fantasy in various formulations, of course) 
Dyer has achieved the ability, like Faustus whose name he takes for a period, the 
ability to ‘fly’ anywhere in the world, to see and experience at will. Yet (indeed 
rather like Marlowe’s Faustus) he is drawn back to the same place, and his influence 
is ultimately highly localised (and Ackroyd insists throughout his career, of course, 
on the absolute importance of the local, of the specific place). Ultimately, then, the 
subject’s desire for infinite, unconstrained, creative mobility has turned into a 
certain narrowness – the spectre roots himself exclusively in particular places, and 
ultimately a textual place, as though the ultimate locality is within the pages of the 
book itself. 
It is not too fanciful to suggest that this has a parallel in how Thatcherism, 
which in one sense should be a manifestation of an entirely universal theory, the 
neoliberal theory of the destiny of mankind towards the free market, was in practice 
a highly narrow project, one deeply suspicious and exclusive of foreigners literal and 
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figurative. This is to say that when these projects offer an indulgence of the subject’s 
individual creativity but then turn aggressively against the chaotic world from which 
that creativity arose, and develop an authoritarian formulation that (actually or 
symbolically) adopts a paranoid and murderous stance towards those who 
undermine or oppose its logic, they inevitably turn antagonistic towards the 
creativity on which their original attraction was predicated.  
For both Ackroyd and for his narrator, their ambition makes the child a 
problem to be resolved, to be ‘fixed’ in the way James’ Governess sought to fix 
Miles. For in indulging the ideal of a spectral, endlessly penetrative yet disembodied 
self with a masterful relation to reality as a whole, the child is a physical reminder of 
the incomplete and uncertain course (as Dyer himself admits) of reality, Bersani’s 
trauma of “uncompleted endings”. Yet as the Thatcherite capitalist might put it, a 
problem is also an opportunity: mastery of the child, as paradoxical and elusive as 
we might expect that to be, will affirm the permanence of the ‘I’, of the 
authoritative vision. This can be achieved, as Ackroyd achieves it, by ‘disappearing’ 
the child from the real into the textual, into the book that bears two names; one 
Ackroyd’s own and the other (the title, Hawksmoor) a joke whose meaning only he 
can reveal.    
Even in the most (literally) violent attempt to reach outside Thatcherism’s 
narrow and philistine approach to representation, we have found ourselves, Ackroyd 
ambiguously but inevitably indicates, trapped within the desire for stability and 
coherence from which it first arose. The effect of this is to draw attention to reading 
as potentially such an operation of power, and the demand posed is not to offer a 
historicist conviction of Thatcherism for its arrogance and authoritarianism (as 
justified as such charges might be), but to examine the conditions that turn the 
disruptive potential of childhood desire into a desire for mastery of time and the 
absence of politics. In doing this, we might usefully follow Arendt’s belief that the 
private is simultaneously psychological (the need to go unseen and unheard, 
unrecognised) and material (to be based in the physical space ultimately controlled 
by the political processes of representation).  
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6. The child in time  
Thatcherism, we’ve found, seeks to ‘disappear’ the child as the embodiment 
of time, and of the private which (antagonistic towards Thatcherite ‘privatisation’) 
demands acknowledgement of the difference between the public and private 
realms, the latter impenetrable and disorderly, a space of desire and of death – but 
also of ambition and creativity. This is the space of the child, in whom Hollinghurst, 
McEwan and Ackroyd have each found the persistence of a disruptive desire, a 
capacity for difference that is (following Arendt), both private at source and political 
in effect. The difference between source and effect is the difference constitutive of 
time itself as the object of politics; it is the space between a reading of the world 
and a change to its representation, either political or literary. We can locate the 
child, therefore, precisely in this gap, and conclude that this accounts for the 
persistence and centrality of her disappearance in literary representations of 
Thatcherism.  
Hollinghurst, McEwan and Ackroyd place this scenario in a historically 
specific set of circumstances prevailing from c.1979 to the present, when 
Thatcherism proclaimed an end to the post-war future and identified the future 
instead with an essentialist past. Ackroyd both reiterated and exceeded this account 
not only by locating Thatcherism’s origins in earlier discourses of rationalism, but 
also in suggesting that Thatcherism as a reading of the world has parallels in other 
forms of reading, even perhaps (as his theoretical references imply) our own as 
critical readers. Even here, Ackroyd implies, the desire for mastery, for the 
elimination of time and politics, is always at risk of erupting. As Rose said, we need 
to consider what we seek in our own readings.  
This provokes the question of whether it is possible – either for politics or for 
literary criticism – to read in a way that represents more than we can recognise; that 
represents, in fact, the never wholly perceptible interests of the child who will 
survive us. If it is possible, it would probably demand that we too are ‘in time’ in a 
dual sense: in reading within the terms of temporal political history, but 
simultaneously attending to the disturbances within that history when the failure of 
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representation and recognition to coincide produces the disappearance of the child 
– who, unlike at the end of Hawksmoor, is both fictional and all too real, both object 
and subject of reading.  
If, then, the implicit critique of Theory, found both in Hawksmoor itself and in 
my reading of Ackroyd’s own ambiguous position in his novel, sounds like the 
conventional accusation that the Left turned to Theory and representation when it 
lost the material capacity to engage in political change, this needs important 
qualification. We do, indeed, need to turn to history and to real politics, as these 
representations of Thatcherism suggest. However, we need to do so not because the 
matters to which Theory, particularly psychoanalytic Theory seeks to attend – 
desire, ambition, death and the child herself – are unserious or unimportant, or 
because the real political needs for the future are obvious, but rather the opposite: 
because we cannot see and read the future through the child, other than through 
violence towards the real child. This is not, therefore, the typical criticism of the 
effect of Theory, made by Terry Eagleton amongst others, as a deviation from the 
real politics towards the politics of identity. On the contrary, this rather suggests 
(and here both Arendt’s theory and Ackroyd’s historical awareness are helpful) that 
modern politics has been based around identity since well before the 1980s, even 
though the markers of twentieth-century time in the ‘post-war’ and the supposed 
‘end of the post-war’ for various reasons intensified the demand for identity, for a 
figure available for recognition. Such demands persist not because of Theory or even 
of Thatcherism in themselves, but rather because the anxieties and attractions to 
which they respond are psychologically real and thus historically persistent.  
There is, nevertheless, an imperative to change politics, including the politics 
of reading, here: this is the imperative to no longer base political representation on 
recognition, on identity. Rather, as Arendt argued, we need to accept the necessity 
of the private space and private life for political representation – something which is 
known to exist but yet cannot, by definition, be presented and made available 
visually. This particularly applies, as the ironies of Thatcherism show, to the child in 
growing up and exercising her creativity and ambition.  
157 
 
The texts considered here suggest that we should not extend access to 
representation to the child on the basis, and prerequisite, of the child demonstrating 
some set of essential values, qualities or truths. Such a mode of predictability is in 
conflict with the child’s ambition, with her stake in the future, even when (as in 
Thatcherism) it tries to align with it. The equality of pleasure indicated by the role of 
images in The Line of Beauty hints that such attempts at prediction are false, and 
cannot last. Which aesthetic objects, then, and which texts, should be made 
available for the child’s education – since Clause 28 attempted to control exactly 
this? The readings offered here suggest that precisely those texts and objects Clause 
28 attempted to remove from schools should be those provided to the child: those 
which allow her to imagine herself as other than the child. Only through extending 
access to such things (and as the case of the market hall, the car and the lads in The 
Line of Beauty showed, controlling of access to pleasure is fundamental to authority 
in practice) will political representation itself ultimately, though not in any 
selectively predictable way, also be expanded.  
Although Thatcherism may have aimed for atemporality, it was in fact itself a 
historical phenomenon; although it may have had great cultural longevity, other 
phenomena within political culture will increasingly supplant its real, and perhaps 
even even its perceived, importance. Yet analysing its literary representations, and 
their odd common interest in child disappearance, exposes some broader 
implications for the relation between the child, time, history and politics. It is on 
these that we shall build in the next chapter, turning to the works of Kazuo Ishiguro.  
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Chapter 4: Death, Politics, Aesthetics: Kazuo Ishiguro  
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have observed a number of 
persistent attempts in recent cultural and political history to eradicate the 
movement of time in favour of an essential present - attempts represented, 
sometimes advanced, through the disappearance of the child and the eradication of 
private life.  
This kind of private life is consistently both associated with the future and 
located in the child – not the fetishised image of The Child (as described by Edelman) 
but the real child who is always growing up, always becoming different to herself 
and therefore always, as McEwan proposed, “in time”. The child’s private life 
involves a contamination of the present and the future, one produced through the 
child’s ambition, imagination, and knowledge of the adult’s forthcoming death. Real 
politics, we’ve come to contend, itself depends on this private life. This is the 
argument crucially made by Hannah Arendt, and it is one that has been urgently re-
engaged with in recent years by theorists such as Wolfgang Sofsky (in Privacy: A 
Manifesto, 2008), Raymond Wacks (Privacy: A Very Short Introduction, 2010) and 
Josh Cohen (The Private Life, 2013). In this thesis, the dependency of politics upon 
privacy has become evident even, or especially, where political projects laying 
particular claim to both reality and the private (like Thatcherism) have in fact 
attempted to abolish private life and thus, paradoxically, abolish meaningful politics 
– politics as the possibility of change.  
The novels of Kazuo Ishiguro dramatise this association of the private with 
the child and, through her, with the future. They use this to implicitly demand, as we 
shall find, representation without the precondition of recognition. 
Ishiguro’s characters also repeatedly approach death as the ultimate form of 
privacy (and thus, paradoxically, the ultimate guarantee of politics). For these 
characters, the child’s embodiment of a future beyond the adult’s death typically 
does not immediately produce consolation, but rather trauma. Various authoritarian 
regimes respond to this trauma by attempting to eliminate death, precisely in order 
to abolish the future and disappear the child. As we’ll now readily anticipate, 
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following the previous chapters, this fantastic political project becomes apparent 
through an attempt to eradicate the future and disappear (or kill) the child. This is a 
politics, carried out within institutions, paradoxically based on a fantasy of the 
abolition of institutions and the ending of politics. I will go on to argue that the 
ethical implications of the child and authority in Ishiguro demand a renewed 
attention to institutions as sites where the relation between private life and political 
representation is managed.  
Whereas in the last chapter we considered representations of the child in 
Thatcher-era Britain as a historically specific location in which a contest over the 
child and authority played out, for Ishiguro the issue of history remains central but is 
not limited by correspondence to specific times and places (indeed, Ishiguro 
frequently presents such correspondences only to undermine them in the most 
disturbing fashion). The authoritarian regimes depicted by Ishiguro seek to produce 
a child out of time in a dual sense – a child both located in a fantasy of natural order 
(echoing the deep cultural tradition, described by Kuhn, of locating the child in an 
Edenic and atemporal place (66)), and a child gruesomely ‘out of time’ as she faces 
the threat of imminent death. Ishiguro’s work is replete with such ironic and 
uncanny responses to conventional expectations for the revelation of meaning.  
Ishiguro identifies this scenario at work both in a specific set of psychological 
tactics - used by individuals to defend themselves against their own mortality and 
their loss of authority – and simultaneously as at the heart of his uncanny version of 
post-war politics. For Ishiguro (to echo my earlier reading of Marlowe), politics – 
including authoritarian politics - is always in the mind, but the mind is inside a body 
that the authorities can, in the final instance, destroy. Whether they do so or not is 
conditional on whether the individual can present some interior essence or value for 
recognition by the authorities.  
The desired receptiveness, and feared recalcitrance, of the child’s mind for 
education is, of course, once again at issue here. This all ultimately produces a 
symbolic and practical question of reading: Both the adult’s need to teach the child 
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to read the world, and his desire to read the child and so secure the world (and the 
future).  
Ishiguro’s novels in crucial respects respond to, anticipate, and parody their 
own reading - and the politics behind those readings. The “ethical imperative is 
Ishiguro’s signature” (Groes and Lewis 2), and his awareness of, and willingness to 
play with, the ethical complexity involved in the reading of his own work is central to 
my arguments here. For Ishiguro, ’real’ politics and the politics of reading are 
ambiguously but closely related; he suggests that in the private time and space in 
which we read, something of value and potential practical importance can be 
produced, and this is the time and space we institutionalise as ‘education’, or the 
school, for the child. This productivity or creativity is not necessarily predictable, 
though; it is not available for anticipation, or on demand for the adult’s gaze. For this 
reason, because the child’s private and creative life is as likely to frustrate the 
authorities as to satisfy them, neither the time nor space for this private life – nor, it 
turns out, for life at all - can be taken for granted. The question of the child’s 
political representation is necessarily an issue of institutions, of the organisation of 
time and space for her education.  
 It is, therefore, through reading Ishiguro that I shall complete my own 
reading of the child and authority in contemporary literature. In doing so, I will 
consider Ishiguro’s texts in thematic rather than chronological order, whilst 
nevertheless paying attention to their development of the author’s political thought, 
and to the responsiveness of later works to the readings of earlier texts. In doing so, 
I will both draw upon and critique the substantial, and still expanding, field of 
scholarship on Ishiguro, notably work by Walkowitz, Bain, Black, and Sim.  
1. Death and Authority: Ishiguro’s Children  
Freud, explaining “why it is so hard for mankind to be happy”, cites “the 
three sources of human sufferings, namely, the superior force of nature, the 
disposition to decay of our bodies, and the inadequacy of our methods of regulating 
human relations in the family, the community, and the state” (Civilisation and its 
Discontents, 43).  The matter of “regulating human relations”, the realm of 
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authority, is, according to Freud (so often behind or in the margins of the critical 
readings of the child and authority referenced here so far), conditioned by the 
existence of death – a death perpetually risked by the “superior force of nature” and 
eventually guaranteed by our biological “disposition”.  Freud makes two important 
propositions here: that the authorities regulating life are inadequate; and that this 
inadequacy concerns the fact of death in some way. If this is correct, it suggests that 
an ethical authority – for Freud, implicitly an authority that expands human 
happiness and reduces suffering – could only be one that somehow becomes more 
adequate to its task through recognising its own inadequacy; I shall argue, from 
reading Ishiguro and following the preceding chapters, that this should include 
recognising its own inability to recognise.  
More immediately, though, we can recognise that Freud’s formulation 
concerns the child. It implies the dependency of authority on an anticipatory faith in 
the child, conveying the desire to recognise what we, as mortal adults, ultimately 
cannot: the adult whom the child will become. In the child, we want to recognise our 
own reproduction. Ishiguro, rather like Freud, exposes a crisis in this faith in the 
child that results only in more frantic attempts to restore it – ultimately leading to 
the attempted erasure of death itself, which makes the child in one sense curiously 
unnecessary. Yet in Ishiguro, the same imperative also demands the permanent 
accessibility of the ‘child within’ the adult, as a paradoxical means for the adult to 
eliminate all traces of the actual childhood condition of incompleteness, of always 
passing from the past into the future prematurely and without achieving a unified 
present. Thus when death is abolished, the child becomes (just as we saw with 
Thatcherism) an unlikely (and often uncanny) marker of permanence.  
As a historically important tool for projecting authority beyond the death of 
the individual author, the text plays a crucial role in the authorities’ treatment of the 
child.  If the text is normally part of the education that, in teaching the child to read, 
also makes the child available to be read by the adult, what are we to make of texts 
that frustrate or disrupt precisely this operation?  
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As we saw earlier, in the final paragraphs of the 'Nagasaki' narrative in A Pale 
View of Hills, the act of child murder is a non-event. It takes place, as it were, 
'between the lines', a vagueness that itself structurally echoes the implication of 
violence, in that the child can be written in or out of existence with worrying ease. 
Like the bad dreams that haunt Etsuko, the child has become a subjective, or textual, 
problem – even, Ishiguro dangerously hints, when she’s still a ‘real’ child, albeit an 
unknowable one, recalled from the past by an unreliable narrator.  
In (perhaps) killing Mariko, Etsuko is attempting to destroy some excessive 
demand that the future places upon her, a demand felt in the body. (This is exposed, 
as we noted, in her finally adopting the voice of Sachiko, collapsing the 'real' child 
Mariko, external to Etsuko’s body, with the baby gestating inside her, the foetus 
constantly overburdened with representation of an essential Japan or, alternately, 
of the new globalised world). Here it is the unseen and unrecognisable factor in the 
child, the child who appears to both demand and frustrate recognition, that must be 
eliminated from representation. In this elimination time itself is stopped, because 
death is – in the attempt to exile it – incorporated into the regulation of life: As 
Etsuko puts it when contemplating the image of her daughter’s death, it is “possible 
to develop an intimacy with the most disturbing of things” (54). When mortality as 
fundamental rupture between past and present is erased, an eternal present is 
created, one where the difference between recognition and representation – the 
fundamental basis for politics in the true sense, we might say following Arendt – is 
eradicated. This is literally the case in Pale View, where past and present are 
recounted (and thus experienced by the reader) simultaneously, and where the 
dead girls of different periods merge into one another. 
In seeking to transcend death, Ishiguro indicates, one becomes governed by 
it in life. Everything in the world is brought ‘within’ the subject in this situation, but 
the life that remains to that subject is an empty one. This is precisely the situation in 
which the elderly Etsuko finds herself; and yet it is the child, despite her best efforts, 
that continues to disrupt this state of affairs. The child is a kind of persistent object 
that frustrates attempts at perfect incorporation into the symbolic order, something 
163 
 
that might usefully be read alongside Arendt’s arguments on the object’s 
importance for politics:  
Under the conditions of a common world, reality is not guaranteed 
primarily by the 'common nature' of all men who constitute it, but 
rather by the fact that, differences of position […] notwithstanding, 
everybody is always concerned with the same object. If the sameness 
of this object can no longer be discerned, no common nature of men 
[…] can prevent the destruction of the common world […] men have 
become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing 
and hearing others [...] They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of 
their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if 
the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. (The Human 
Condition, 57-58)  
The child is poised between the ‘common nature’ of, in Edelman’s phrase, 
“reproductive futurism”, and its role as the persistent object demanding a common 
world, reminding the adults that they will die and that the child herself will inherit, 
thus disturbing the singularity of experience by, paradoxically, reminding the adult 
of the final guarantee of singularity: his mortality. Framing this chapter with both 
Freud and Arendt, then, a common concern with the difficulty of sustaining a public 
realm adequate to cope with the disruptions provoked by the child, and by the 
unknown future she signifies, will inform our reading here. To have an authority 
adequate to the child, in fact, and thus in a peculiar sense (as Freud hinted) 
adequate to its own inadequacy, is the imperative Ishiguro presents for us.  
2. Authority and Death (in Venice) 
Ishiguro's short stories in Nocturnes (2009) meditate on the implication of art 
in the inevitable death of the artist (or author), the anticipation of which is 
expressed through the tropes of the evening, the dying part of the day (revived from 
his earlier novel, The Remains of the Day (1986)). “Nocturne” refers to both a 
musical composition and to a night scene, naming this symbolic connection between 
death and the text.   
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In Nocturnes’ first story, “Crooner”, an itinerant musician working in the café 
orchestras of Venice encounters a childhood hero, an ageing American singer in the 
Tony Bennett/Dean Martin mould called Tony Gardner, visiting Venice with his wife. 
Janeck, the narrator, enthusiastically recounts how Gardner's records consoled his 
mother during his grim childhood in an unnamed eastern-block country, leading 
Gardner to unexpectedly enlist him for a favour: together, they will surprise Mrs 
Gardner with a serenade from a gondola below the Gardners' hotel balcony. Soon, 
though, Janeck is shocked to learn that the purpose of the performance is actually to 
mark the long-married couple’s separation: 
 “Mr Gardner, are you saying you and Mrs Gardner have to 
separate because of your comeback?” 
“Look at the other guys, the guys who came back successfully 
[…] Every single one of them, they've remarried.” […]  
“I still don't get it, Mr Gardner. This place you and Mrs 
Gardner come from can't be so different from everywhere else. That's 
why, Mr Gardner, that's why these songs you've been singing all 
these years, they make sense for people everywhere. Even where I 
used to live.” (Nocturnes 30-31) 
This peculiar separation is prompted by anticipation of death: “She needs to 
get out now, while she has time. Time to find love again” (31) says Gardner of his 
wife. Suddenly, though, the notion of “getting out” - of autonomy – is transferred to 
another death framing the story:  
“Your mother. I guess she never got out.” 
I thought about it, then said quietly: “No, Mr Gardner. She 
never got out. She didn't live long enough to see the changes in our 
country.” 
“That's too bad […] Too bad she didn't get out. I don't want 
that to happen to my Lindy.” (31-32) 
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This asserts a startling equivalence between the promise of political 
autonomy in which one woman did not survive to participate and the other woman's 
freedom to leave her apparently happy marriage to further her career (and Tony 
Gardner’s freedom to do the same). Janeck’s enthusiasm for the songs as supposed 
instances of universal language “make[ing] sense for people everywhere” underpins 
his sense of political utopianism;16 there is an equivalence drawn, too, between 
aesthetic and political representation, with a strong implication that both concern 
death in some way.  
For Janeck, the music enables an absolute connection between singer and 
listeners; it is a window on the soul, giving access to an intersubjective authenticity, 
and a personal authority: “Your music helped my mother through those times, it 
must have helped millions of others” (24). The connection between author and 
reader (or singer and listener) literally enables the afterlife of the parent in the child, 
through the aesthetic representation it provides. Tony Gardner, however, is the 
sceptic, dissatisfied by this 'authenticity'; he wants instead to make a 'comeback' 
predicated on an anticipation of the death he intends to ward off by re-marrying to a 
younger woman - which itself, in ironic juxtaposition with Janeck and his mother, re-
opens the possibility of a child, of Gardner insuring himself against death through 
procreation as representation. This story ironically parodies the trope of the child as 
text.  
When Gardner himself meets the child that his texts have in part created, he 
sees him as “sweet” (25), but continually stresses their mutual difference from each 
other: “My friend, you come from a communist country. That's why you don't realise 
how these things work” (16). Nocturnes is a series of variations on this theme: The 
sometimes uncanny, but more often farcical, denial of common meaning – a denial 
that itself becomes a form of evidence for the existence of death in the face of a 
disbelief in or disregard for the world beyond the self, the “common world” 
described by Arendt. Reading Ishiguro’s work, there is often a sense that such a 
“common world” seems to exist but remains hardly penetrable; it can be 
represented, but not always recognised; it is not transparent to the gaze of others, 
as Janeck finds. For Ishiguro, the common world is more of a floating world. This 
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does not, however, clothe the individual’s intentions in elevated mystery: they might 
be quite banal.  
Ishiguro develops this theme in part by proposing a curious equivalence 
between the subject facing death with the individual alienated by distance. Distance 
and death are compounded in all the relationships in “Crooner”: Janeck's 
geographical distance from his home country emphasises the death of the mother 
who “never got out”; the geographical distance between Janeck and Tony Gardner, 
restored at the ending and meaning, Janeck suggests, that he will not see Gardner 
again before his death; and the planned separation of the married couple, the 
Gardners themselves, is of course made in response to awareness of their 
approaching deaths. In this, there is an implication that mortality is both an ultimate 
guarantor of privacy in its own right and as an analogue for a recalcitrance, an 
unknowability in the Other, even during life. This also links those who lack political 
representation because of time and mortality with those who lack it because of 
distance; Janeck’s mother is in both categories. The child, who uniquely provides a 
sight of the future in which the adult subject will not live to participate – but who 
persistently complicates and frustrates the adult’s recognition of that future – is at 
the centre of the issue.  
 “Crooner” is essentially the story of an encounter, in Venice, between a 
young and a much older man, who is also a celebrated artist – an encounter that 
ends with a vision of death. Reduced to this structural core, Ishiguro’s story looks 
much like an ironic reflection, even a parody, of Thomas Mann's Death in Venice 
(1912); a number of incidents in “Crooner” ironically re-work episodes in Mann’s 
novella. Whereas in the latter, the older man is suspended in an obsessive gaze upon 
the younger, and never actually speaks to him, in “Crooner”, the approach is made 
by the younger man, almost at once. For Mann, Venice’s commercial life 
(particularly embodied the figure of the gondolier, who re-appears in ironically banal 
form in “Crooner”) is ominous, swollen with foreboding symbolism (incidentally 
laying ground for the Venice of Don't Look Now); for Ishiguro, though, the gondoliers 
and hoteliers are humans who create Venice’s atmosphere for commercial 
consumption by cheap and obvious tactics (4-5). For Aschenbach, the youth is the 
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source of inspiration, of artistic truth; for Gardner, Janeck is a naïve and 
embarrassing, even morbid, devotee of his most dated material. 
In Mann’s story, the world – or at least Venice – exists wholly from the 
perspective of a central, privileged subject. For Aschenbach, every transaction is 
portentous, full of sinister meaning, as though the banality of commercial life must 
be concealing its true implications for the educated masculine subject. It is part of 
Ishiguro’s bathos that his story is, by contrast, narrated by the seller rather than the 
consumer; the re-telling of a story about death in Venice thus brings authority into 
question, compromising it in a different way than is Aschenbach’s, and divorcing 
representation, both political and artistic, from recognition.  
This is confirmed by Ishiguro’s most significant revision of Mann, the reversal 
of the power of the gaze. Mann's novella is famously preoccupied with the erotic 
relationship between distance, death, and the gaze, until at the end it finally appears 
that this distance might be transcended:  
He rested his head against the chair-back and followed the 
movements of the figure out there, then lifted it, as it were in answer 
to Tadzio's gaze […] And before nightfall a shocked and respectful 
world received the news of his decease. (Death in Venice, 79) 
The moment when distance is overcome is itself the moment of death; in this 
world, one cannot know death – as Aschenbach does, in the figure of Tadzio – 
without dying oneself. In Mann's classical landscape, the earthly is merely an inferior 
shadow of the perfect form that resides in eternity; here death is unreal, or rather a 
passage to a more real state. 
For Ishiguro’s Tony Gardner, however, the knowledge of death conditions 
but also allows for life.  The consequences of this remain ambiguous, as the 
separation of the Gardners may be less genuinely about freedom than the idea that, 
facing the end of life but unable to imagine the world continuing outside the self, a 
unitary and permanent fulfilment of the self must be achieved while there is 
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(supposedly) still time – in other words, one must use the time that remains to 
eliminate time altogether.  
For Mann, the gaze on the child gives access to fundamental truths, to 
atemporal values that are actually preferable to the temporal and living world. To 
see is overcome distance, in order to achieve an ecstatic union with the desired 
Other (a union, through death, not unlike that with which Hawksmoor concludes). 
This produces the perfect aesthetic representation (Mann’s text collapses into the 
desire with which it is concerned, symbolically losing its own status as an object), 
which removes the subject from the debased, commercial real world. Death, for 
Mann, is thus imagined to actually produce a more affectively satisfying form of 
existence than ordinary life offers, a condition affirmed through the spectacle of the 
drowning city. Ishiguro reverses all this, suggesting that to see the Other is not to 
know him, and that artistic representations are not perfected through an ecstatic 
overcoming of death. Rather, in fact, they have to be understood as produced in the 
knowledge of death, and often ‘read’ after it. Ishiguro’s ambiguous association 
between aesthetic and political representation here is indicative of how his work 
repeatedly parodies the presumptions that confer the right and possibility of 
representation.  
3. Language and Politics  
Ishiguro is, then, evidently engaged with the relation between reading and 
seeing – with the right to interpret, as a penetration of that which would otherwise 
be private, as a form of power. I want to briefly investigate further the politics of 
language, of articulation, and particularly of the right to speak as constituting a 
potential for representation, in Ishiguro. Often, in the societies portrayed by 
Ishiguro, such a right to speak is predicated on recognition.  
Ishiguro’s best-known novel, The Remains of the Day (1989) is concerned 
with the subject's attempt to manage a radical disintegration of his own version of 
political representation in the knowledge of his approaching death. This emerges 
here, inter alia, in Stevens' repeated disquisitions on butling. Stevens' vocation 
generates the novel’s central tension, between his need to celebrate his service to 
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Lord Darlington as an achievement of consequence, whilst simultaneously strictly 
limiting that consequence to exclude Darlington's support for appeasement and thus 
ultimately excluding implication in British inaction and ill-preparedness towards 
Nazism – an implication signified here by children killed or abused: Darlington's 
substitute-child Mr Cardinal, the son of Stevens' hosts on his travels, and the Jewish 
servant girls dismissed from their position. 
 Stevens repeatedly asserts his belief that a great butler is essential to the 
moral achievements of a Great Man; the butler is the private man(servant) behind 
the public Man. Yet by the end, with Lord Darlington dead and Stevens’ own death 
approaching, he finally admits a fear that he has wasted his life; and it comes to 
seem that a different relation of public to private, requiring new ways of speaking 
about and ‘reading’ other people, is needed to replace the one he has espoused 
throughout his life.  
A principal theme of Remains is the scale of moral consequences latent in 
trivial incidences (Walkowitz identifies this as a key theme throughout Ishiguro’s 
work), hinting at the individual’s lack of mastery over the full implications of his life, 
a lack Stevens dedicates his career to eliminating. Stevens holds that his every small 
act is vital to the operation of a Great Man's household (supported by the 
declaration that “the fate of Europe could actually hang on our ability to bring 
Dupont around on this point” (84) whilst Dupont is in fact entirely preoccupied by 
his painful feet). “A 'great' butler can only be one, surely, who can […] say that he 
has applied his talents to serving a great gentleman – and through the latter, to 
serving humanity” (123). Stevens draws a sharp distinction between public and 
private as essential to this operation:  
The great butlers [...] wear their professionalism as a decent 
gentleman will wear his suit […] he will discard it when, and only 
when, he wills to do so, and this will invariably be when he is entirely 
alone. (Remains, 43-44)  
This echoes Arendt’s sense of the dependency of political participation on a 
private life. However, Stevens’ professionalism replicates gentlemanly values 
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(identified by both him and Lord Darlington as the proper ground for political 
participation) in the space where the gentleman is both alone and not alone, his 
private (but servant-supported) home. In a sense, then, even whilst Stevens 
proclaims the importance of the distinction between public and private, his own role 
is to fill in any possible gap or lack that might arise between the two. It is to ensure 
that Lord Darlington’s visible mode of living matches his supposed inner nature.  
The American senator, Mr Lewis, articulates a distinction between “real” 
politics and Lord Darlington’s projects, unwittingly making a distinction that disrupts 
Stevens’ identification with his employer: “his lordship here is an amateur […] and 
international affairs today are no longer for gentleman amateurs […] You here in 
Europe need professionals to run your affairs” (106-107). Stevens is the epitome of 
“professionalism”, the virtue to which Lewis makes his unwelcome appeal, but his 
professionalism is avowedly apolitical - even amoral in his deference to Lord 
Darlington's dismissal of two Jewish servants.  
In the wider historical world that (as Stevens notes) used to come to the 
interior spaces of Darlington Hall (thus negating any need for him to ever much visit 
the external world), the individual’s ambitions are opposed by the anti-democratic 
aristocrats who taunt Stevens in order to demonstrate the supposed fallacy of 
universal suffrage. Years later, though, the advocate of post-war Socialism, Harry 
Smith embarrasses Stevens by advocating for “dignity” not in service to a master but 
as the right to one’s own voice:  
“If Hitler had had things his way, we'd just be slaves now […] 
there's no dignity to being a slave. That's what we fought for and 
that's what we won [...] That's what dignity's really about.” (Remains, 
196)  
 
 This dignity in democracy has itself arisen from death: “Some fine young lads 
from this village gave their lives to give us that privilege” (196-198). Stevens begins 
to find that the wilful refusal of his own capacity for political representation actually 
exacerbates his responsibility for the dead. Death is in the fabric of the novel, from 
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Lord Darlington and Stevens' father to Mr Cardinal and the many young men killed in 
the war. Ironically, Darlington and Stevens believe Cardinal to have no knowledge of 
sex, and awkwardly teach him about it, only for their circumspection towards 
biological facts to be overtaken by death as the ultimate biological fact: the death of 
Cardinal himself.  
Stevens’ own reading is undertaken for self-education, but of a curiously 
constrained form; the novel tellingly opens with him in the house’s library - not 
reading, dusting the portraits. Later, Miss Kenton intrudes into the butler's pantry:  
“Now I wonder what it could be you are reading there, Mr 
Stevens.” 
“Simply a book, Miss Kenton.”  
“I can see that, Mr Stevens. But what sort of book – that is 
what interests me.” […] 
“Really, Miss Kenton,” I said, “I must ask you to respect my 
privacy.” (Remains, 174) 
Stevens describes the room, like his book, as a space that is private yet 
nevertheless essential to the success of his professional, 'public', identity (174). By 
extension, then, in seeking to expose the book – which she finally does by actually 
prising it from Stevens' fingers – Miss Kenton is seeking to expose the properly 
private and recognise some interior, affective or desiring, self inside Stevens, 
something available for her to identify with. She is bewildered to discover that “it 
isn't anything so scandalous at all. Simply a sentimental love story” (176). Stevens 
has an explanation:  
There was a simple reason for my having taken to perusing such 
works; it was an extremely efficient way to maintain and develop 
one's command of the English language. (Remains, 177) 
Stevens claims to practice reading as a purely technical linguistic exercise, 
unconcerned with values – because he already has a secure sense of value that this 
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reading is to serve in a purely mechanistic function. He is afraid of the 
incompleteness, the openness to education and to the potential disruption of 
imaginative pleasure, that the act of reading threatens to expose inside himself. This 
reflects how Stevens (himself childless) seeks to exile any compromise to his 
“dignity” that might associate him, even symbolically, with the child: hence his 
highly stilted relationship with his own father and his tragicomical introduction of his 
father not by reference to their relationship but simply as another “Stevens”.  
Earlier in the novel, Stevens' musings on the English landscape, interspersed 
with his philosophy of butling, show that he holds that essentialist conception of 
language we have encountered elsewhere both within and outside Ishiguro, a 
conception wherein the best language, paradoxically, is silent:  
We call this land of ours Great Britain […] and yet what precisely is 
this 'greatness'? […] What is pertinent is the calmness of that beauty, 
its sense of restraint. It is as though the land knows of its own beauty, 
of its own greatness, and feels no need to shout it. […] (Remains, 29) 
This 'silence' – literally the lack of a “shout” - is once again the ideal language 
because it is mere transparent representation of an essential, indeed 
transcendental, value, one possessed of total authority: it need only be properly 
recognised.  
Yet Stevens finds himself - ironically in order to retain his professional ideal 
of perfect service to his employer – anxiously needing learning a new language, 
“banter.” This imperative has come about, of course, because Lord Darlington is 
dead, and because an American has been able to buy his estate, whilst the ideal 
silence in language (or “restraint”) advocated by Stevens has been exposed in its 
most ironically literal application, his silence in the face of Darlington's support for 
Nazism.  Stevens ultimately gains no obvious consolation from his attempt to 
redeem his relationship with Miss Kenton and finally say what he never said to her 
before; her final reason for refusing a renewed relationship is the arrival of her 
granddaughter: the child has thwarted the adult's attempt to forestall death.   
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Ishiguro uses Remains to historicise the relationship between political 
representation and recognition of essential qualities, and thus associates that 
dependency with some of the worst ethical and political failures of the twentieth 
century. For Ishiguro, though, history is never at a safe distance from either the self 
or contemporary political culture.  
4. Never Let Me Go 
The condition Arendt described in terms of the disappearance of a common 
object leading to a destruction of the public realm appears with remarkable 
directness in Never Let Me Go. As we shall see, here the individual’s rights – the 
protections agreed for the private individual within the public realm – depend on an 
act of recognition that has now failed to take place; there is no longer any common 
object. This fundamentally arises from an unwillingness to accept death as 
demanding that we represent what we cannot recognise: the child.  
Ishiguro’s narrators are particularly close to the reader: an abnormally 
intense proximity achieved via Ishiguro's deliberate technique, which first sets up a 
persistent sense of ‘reserve’, of a gap between the narrative and the experience that 
must, we assume, lie behind it, only then to give us a series of clues by which we can 
tentatively reconstruct that experience – we are never on the surface with Ishiguro, 
but rather inside and between the lines. This paradox of the distance inherent in the 
text and the almost bodily intimacy with the narrator into which we are drawn is 
foregrounded in Never Let Me Go’s title, though to some extent it characterises all 
Ishiguro's novels. Paradoxically, though, the phenomenological closeness established 
between narrator and reader does not finally collapse one subject into another in a 
utopian and ecstatic moment, but rather brings the reader nearer to the reality of 
death. Just as in Ishiguro’s first novel, Pale View, the initial impression of 
unmediated access to the narrator’s thoughts is highly misleading.  
Never Let Me Go’s title page, setting the scene in “England, late 1990s” is a 
premature cue, to be followed only in retrospect, to the realisation that the reader is 
trapped in the future as much as the narrator (who on the novel’s timescale has 
presumably already “donated” and “completed” (died) by 2005) is trapped in the 
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past. The title page’s disorientating claim to periodicity immediately frustrates its 
potential reading as 'science fiction'; the novel’s banal settings and realistic human 
relationships equally frustrate its reading as ‘dystopia’. Richard Robinson observes 
that in Ishiguro, “the hyper-realist reader – who did not care to linger over the 
ontological jolt of the final pages of A Pale View, or who enjoyed picking [Ishiguro] 
up for getting the butler to pass the port in Remains – is set traps” (108), and this 
opening in the late 1990s is another such trap, targeting expectations of dystopia or 
sci-fi.  
The indication of Kathy's birth date as c. 1965, and her time at Hailsham as 
therefore the early 1970s, makes her childhood coincide with the real decade of ‘no 
future’ in Britain, of punk, the Winter of Discontent, the film version of A Clockwork 
Orange (1971), the Sex Pistols' “God save the Queen” (1977), and Jarman's Jubilee 
(1978). The decline of Hailsham and other 'progressive' institutions for clones is also 
roughly concurrent with the discourse (as discussed in the previous chapter) of a 
failure of post-war optimism from the mid-1970s onwards.  
Like the Britain of which it is a refraction, Never Let Me Go presents a society 
of 'haves' and 'have nots', where what the former 'have', in this society’s own 
terminology, is the status of the “normal” or “original”. This dogma gives rise to a 
cruel paradox; the closeness of the clone to their Original is taken as an absolute 
determinant of the clone's ethical status, but actual closeness – bodily closeness – is 
denied to them; ultimately, even the reassurance of proximity to one's own organs – 
the blood, heart and stomach – where emotions were traditionally and are still 
figuratively said to reside – is denied. The ultimate result of this system is the 
perpetual maintenance of biological, bodily life that is assumed to be essentially 
meaningful – indeed, to be the source and origin of all meaning – but which Ishiguro 
exposes as increasingly meaningless.  
Hence Never Let Me Go narrates a reversal of the conventional (Freudian) 
narrative of the child's entrance into authority, both because meaningful authority, 
even of the most normal kind, is denied to the children with whom it is concerned 
and because these children are perversely compelled to reverse their own 
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development, first in order to seek their “Originals” and later to prove their own 
“Originality.” In order to enjoy virtual access to the agency and future – the 
authority – denied to them, they conversely have to look, in a cruel parody of pop-
psychology, ever more deeply into and on to themselves, and back towards their 
childhood. In this endeavour, their own relationships and activities, meagre as they 
are, must be ignored as meaningless variables that obstruct the search for the 
inherent, a search itself meaningless because the inherent, the Original, is already 
present in its absence in the clones themselves.  
 The Originals the clones seek are in fact a kind of absent parent; ideologically 
always present in their total identification with those from whom they were cloned, 
but always absent in the sense of missing physical and emotional closeness that 
preoccupies the novel.  The child abuse that results is so profoundly disturbing 
because it is not committed directly against the child – only when the clones grow 
up does the harvest of their organs begin – but it nevertheless governs these 
children from their earliest education, oddly making real, with bleak irony, the myth 
of the childhood idyll constructed through opposition to the ‘real’ (that is, adult) 
world. This is a perverse distortion of the conventional sense that the adult world’s 
destructive tendencies require moral protection of the childhood environment; here 
that environment is rather being protected precisely in order that the children can 
be destroyed upon entering adulthood. The worst child abuse turns out to be not 
the cliché of being “denied a childhood” but rather the denial of an adulthood, a 
denial permitted by technology and maintained through the calculated 
administration of violence. 
Mirroring its collapse in time, this society is also (like that in The Line of 
Beauty), based around a curious flatness in space, a faith in the two-dimensional 
image only. The clones are, of course, denied the moral ‘depth’ that constitutes the 
imagined location of subjecthood and of human worth. In a sense, the clones are 
themselves imagined as two-dimensional; they have to be, in order to act as perfect 
copies of their Originals, and this demand is made physical when their bodies are 
deconstructed. This adoration of the flat image is a way of both figuratively and, in 
this case, literally excluding “the disposition to decay of our bodies” that Freud 
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identified as fundamentally conditioning the regulatory authority of the state. This 
resonates with the iconography of twentieth-century dictatorships, their reliance on 
images (both of the projected Leader and the abjected Jew) becoming 
indistinguishable from reality. Something of the latter sense is preserved in the 
representations of Thatcher considered in the previous chapter, most obviously in 
Hollinghurst. Yet in Never Let Me Go, there is no Leader; her sovereignty has been 
transferred to the Original Human. The idea that a two-dimensional image can 
contain humanity in the dual sense – that is, both incorporating it (but only from the 
external source of the author) and limiting it, framing it – is conveyed through the 
novel’s persistent interest in paintings and drawings.  
 Both this theme and the reversal of the child's ordinary entrance into 
authority are spectacularly condensed in the image of Kathy H, as an adolescent, 
quietly searching porn magazines in the hope of seeing her Original. This image – 
indirectly reported, as is typical in Ishiguro – derives its tragedy from the reversal of 
the normal use of porn as a mundane function of entrance into sexual activity: 
“Are you looking for something, Kath?” 
“What do you mean? I'm just looking at dirty pictures.” […] 
“Kath, you don't...Well, if it's for kicks, you don't do it like that. 
You've got to look at the pictures much more carefully. It doesn't 
really work if you go that fast.” 
“How do you know what works for girls?” […] 
“You weren't doing it for kicks […] you had a strange face. Like 
you were sad, maybe. And a bit scared.” (Never Let Me Go, 134) 
 
As Freud showed, the entrance into sexuality is irrecoverably bound with the 
child's entrance into authority - or as Kathy puts it in describing the 'sex education' 
at Hailsham, “We'd be focusing on sex, and then the other stuff would creep in” 
(82). Hence Tommy's awkward but astute perception that the proper use of porn is 
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predicated on a particular practice (and speed) of reading, one he tries awkwardly to 
teach Kathy. 
This is suggestive of how the valorisation of Originality generates violence 
towards the clones as adolescents - that is, as children in the process of becoming 
children no longer. Adolescence, the period of the ‘coming of age’ where age 
doesn’t quite come, is the part of a life within which ‘normal’ adult society has to fix 
the assignment of those rights it grants to the adult: When can a person marry? 
When can they legally have sex? When can they vote? When are they old enough to 
take the risks involved in joining the military, or just in leaving education to get a 
job? When can they drive, and drink?  It’s suggestive that during their adolescence 
the clones go through a period of being obsessed with the notion of being “gay”, 
even without properly understanding what it means; they have gathered, though, 
that it’s something to do with the relation between sex, reproduction, recognition 
and rights in which they themselves are caught up. This is less a dystopia than recent 
history, seen through an only slightly distorted mirror.  
A bitterly comical travesty of the process of assigning rights to the adolescent 
famously appears at the beginning of Nabokov’s Lolita (1958), when the narrator 
discusses the wide variety of ages at which a girl has supposedly been considered 
‘legal’ for sex within the history of various societies, evidence he marshals to 
demonstrate the relativism of such judgements and so justify his own sex with Lolita. 
Lolita not only effectively erodes the moral barrier between the moralising 
paternalistic gaze, legally privileged through parenthood and guardianship, and 
Humbert’s sexually possessive gaze; it also audaciously suggests that the assignment 
of rights is itself also a matter of the gaze, of the scrutiny of the child and the 
meaning found within her.  In our terms, it suggests that representation depends on 
recognition, but it also exposes, through black comedy, just how arbitrary 
recognition can be. 
 Ishiguro takes the same slippage between the protective and the violent 
gaze and relentlessly, uncomfortably locates it within his uncanny re-working of 
post-war British politics. Yet it loses both the seduction theme found in Lolita, and 
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indeed any quality of sexual fascination. The gaze on the child in Never Let Me Go 
has become aimed at anticipation for its own sake, devoid even of pleasure, 
producing a guarantee of the future but oddly one lacking content or even interest.  
Never Let Me Go is profoundly concerned with the right to recognition of 
personhood, and about the rights – particularly to reproduce, to be recognised as 
being in a marriage or equivalent relationship, and ultimately simply to be allowed 
to live – that accrue from that recognition of personhood, of humanity. By making 
his novel into both the Bildungsroman and the memoir of Kathy H, Ishiguro 
emphasises that those questions of personhood that usually centre on the child 
(when they might appear to us in relation to the rights of the foetus or the disabled 
child, or the child at risk of sexual abuse, for example), can only in fact be genuinely 
addressed when one considers the child’s entanglement within the adult, and the 
mutual contamination that takes place between childhood and adulthood, a 
contamination that psychoanalysis essentially identifies as the basis of the private 
life.  
In both acknowledging the centrality of the child to culture and making that 
centrality uncanny by giving us the child inside the adult woman (a woman complicit 
in the deaths of her own childhood friends), Ishiguro’s novel emphasises the 
dependence of political representation, on a biopolitical and also curiously aesthetic 
investment in reproduction.  
This appears with particular clarity at one moment when Kathy listens to a 
favourite song from a cassette tape, the song that shares a title with the novel itself, 
“Never Let Me Go.” This seems to signal that here we’ll find an episode with 
application to the purpose of the novel as a whole; and indeed here is an uncanny 
trope for adolescent entanglement of the adult and child in the confusion between 
the singer’s repeated address of the word “baby” to an adult lover, in the 
conventional pop usage of the word, and Kathy’s own mental direction of the lines 
towards an imagined actual baby. This is a fantasy she knows she will never be able 
to actually make real – paradoxically, precisely because of her own status as a 
reproduction, as a clone who will in a sense always be a child and no more than a 
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child. Yet even though the culture in which Kathy is living takes the status of the 
child as the defining factor for the recognition of personhood, Kathy’s status does 
not permit this recognition of her own personhood – quite the opposite.  
Similarly, when Kathy searches porn magazines for a face that matches hers, 
for her ‘original’, another myth is made ironically real though in distorted form: the 
trope of the child as mirror-image. Kathy knows that she is someone's mirror, but 
being the image herself, she has neither the prerogative nor the ability to see the 
Original she reflects, a darkly ironic reversal of the Lacanian scenario.  This produces 
a major paradox: total identification with the image of the self is to be alone and 
unloved. The absence of sexual interest in Kathy’s searching through the porn 
magazines reflects the conditions of her infancy; the clones did not experience the 
sense of loss in the separation from the mother that plays a crucial part in sexual 
development; they never had the affective, mirroring relation to the mother in the 
first place, and it is this relation, which precedes the trauma of oedipal sexuality, 
which they primarily try to establish.  
Even though Never Let Me Go occasionally seems to draw the child into the 
heart of adult sexuality, rather than this resulting in vulnerable children being 
exploited by manipulative adults (as in Lolita), here the children are made vulnerable 
again precisely at the moment when they are nearly most ‘adult’ in every sense, the 
moment when they symbolically become lovers and sexually aware, sexually active 
individuals. Paradoxically, it is at this moment that Kathy becomes a child again – not 
in any sentimental offer of a moral resolution, but in the sense of the child being the 
incomplete, contaminated reproduction of someone else. The society of Never Let 
Me Go is based on a fantasy of original completeness, which exists precisely to 
enable its opposite, the enforced deconstruction, of the clones, whose imagined 
moral incompleteness is thus made real in their bodies. The great irony of Kathy’s 
song, and what perhaps makes Madame so uncomfortable in gazing upon her, is 
that it hints at reproduction not as providing completeness, but rather its opposite.  
There is an absolute value placed upon the child in the world of Never Let Me 
Go, where what matters is to be an original, and what is original inside a human is 
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imagined to be the child, as the essential self before its contamination by society 
(and by sexuality). There is a sign, though, of how much human rights depend on this 
essential image of the child in the fact that the clones’ childhoods are still to a 
degree protected in the Edenic space of Hailsham, and by the fact that their 
childhood art, the fantasy of innocent expression of the soul within, is collected by 
Madame and imagined to be a source of salvation. At least, this is the case in the 
earlier period of the novel; by the end it is reported that the new generations of 
clones are being raised in farms, their condition changed so that they visually match 
their imagined essential nature; representation is forcibly aligned with recognition. 
The “original” bodies that are sustained at the expense of the clones’ lives 
are imagined here as two-dimensional, as images. They carry meaning without 
content, their “original’ status existing purely in the abstract, a vision that confounds 
the visual. The scrutinising gaze the adults direct towards the clones is an attempt to 
get inside these children, making real the wilful non-recognition of their human 
voices (the final irony here is that the children’s visual resemblance of the originals is 
itself taken as the proof that they do not fulfil the vision of value that governs this 
society.  
Even in the attempt, represented by Hailsham, to reach a humane 
compromise in this grotesque situation, the assertion that the clones’ appearance 
really does match their humanity is still achieved through the gaze, through a 
reading that ultimately turns out to be contiguous with the violent reading of the 
clones in the broader society. Prefiguring how the surgeon’s tools will eventually cut 
into the living bodies of Kathy, and Tommy, and Ruth, and extract their organs, 
Madame’s collection of their childhood art is, of course, a liberal-idealist form of the 
same extractive process. As Shameem Black says of Madame and Miss Emily – 
[…] Concealed within their Romantic logic lies a far more dystopian 
goal that colludes with the exploitation of the students they claim to 
protect. When Miss Emily says that “your art will reveal your inner 
selves” (254), her choice of phrase suggests that making such art 
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actually prefigures the process of organ donation. (Black, “Ishiguro’s 
Inhuman Aesthetics”, 794) 
In Never Let Me Go, the belief in art as redemptive (explored by Black in 
“Ishiguro’s Inhuman Aesthetics” as a key target of the novel’s parody) has been 
perverted, the promise of immortality through Arendt’s “common objects” confused 
with a mere cure for mortality. The belief in a “common nature”, though, has never 
been stronger. In practice, this “common nature” has become the justification for 
the indefinite maintenance of life for the permanently ageing. Theirs is apparently 
life for its own sake, not for any particular purpose; just on-going life, biological and 
banal (located, incidentally, in the British seaside towns that have traditionally acted 
as places for the retired to live out their final years). It is a life without jouissance, 
because no pleasure can ever be excessive in this environment, and it is a society 
without privacy insofar as everything is imagined as identical to its own image.  
When Kathy and Tommy ask for a political representation on the basis of 
Tommy’s aesthetic representations, his drawings, this creates disturbing evidence of 
the existence of privacy, implying the possibility of change, of difference: of the 
passage of time meaning something more than the passing of time that it has 
become.  
Like the classic adolescent, the clones want not to be looked at, but to be 
listened to; yet for any society, listening to those to whom the dominant logic denies 
rights is a traumatic thing; as Kathy and Tommy find, there is finally no proof they 
can offer of the interior value, no document that will be accepted for dispensation. 
They are unable to prove their originality, and such proof is in any case no longer 
wanted. In this society, the empty image of the original rules all, but even images 
can be refused recognition, and no identity documents are provided to Kathy and 
Tommy.  
5. Authority and Originality 
Paradoxically, the clones’ search for their Originals is actually the search for 
the differentiation of the self, for gaining the status of a unique individual. Kathy's 
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desire to see her Original amongst the porn images – and Ruth's searching gaze for 
her Original through an office window – are attempts at this; because once one can 
see the Original, one can no longer be (just) her; neither the pages of the porn 
magazines nor the office window constitute a mirror. Instead, they promise to frame 
the Original in circumstances different to those of the clone – thereby confirming 
the difference of the clone from the Original, a difference ultimately constituted as 
their different futures, confounding their biological identification and giving access 
to agency.   
Such agency, as the children themselves recognise in planning their careers 
before the full truth is revealed to them by Miss Lucy, is authority over the future. 
Their subsequent awareness that they lack such authority induces a shared 
obsession with the phantasmagoric, imagined futures of their Originals, which 
remain unreachable, as they find when they engage in a futile search for Ruth's 
Original.  Yet differentiation and agency are treated by the society of 
Normals/Originals as trivial, ultimately meaningless – finally, as Miss Emily and 
Madame’s behaviour shows, they just want to keep on living (and they have given 
up on the project that was Hailsham.) That differentiation is conceived by the clones, 
however, in terms of small but deeply desired differences – such as the quotidian 
office furniture they imagine the Originals to enjoy in their jobs – gives an anti-
utopian emphasis to the unrealised desire of these children for agency, whilst they 
are surrounded by a utopian state founded on the banishment of death.   
It is worth referring again here to Arendt - 
A complete victory of society will always produce some sort of 
“communistic fiction”, whose outstanding political characteristic is 
that it is indeed ruled by an “invisible hand,” namely, by nobody. 
What we traditionally call state and government gives place here to 
pure administration – a state of affairs which Marx rightly predicted 
as the “withering away of the state,” though he was wrong in 
assuming that only a revolution could bring it about, and even more 
wrong when he believed that this complete victory of society would 
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mean the eventual emergence of the “realm of freedom.” (The 
Human Condition, 44-45) 
 Rule by nobody in particular, where everyone is so invested in the system, as 
Miss Emily informs Kathy, that “they’ll simply say no” to any prospect of a change 
that might risk their own privilege (however cannibalistic), is exactly what appears to 
have been created by the end (which is also the beginning) of Never Let Me Go.  
Of course, though, Never Let Me Go is structured in large part around Kathy's 
learning to love, a learning derived from witnessing the adolescent and adult 
Tommy's simultaneous identity and non-identity with his childhood self over the 
passage of time.  The delayed articulation of Kathy's love for Tommy is not the result 
of repression so much as of its actual gradual emergence during the course of their 
shared lives; love does not exist in a single originary moment that can be reified as 
art and temporally located in a childhood that, through the art, is never past but 
always literally present - but rather in the passage of time and the growth of 
experience alongside the development of linguistic capacity to articulate that 
experience. Tellingly, Tommy’s drawings are in fact examples of the latter, rather 
than the former, and so he and Kathy worry over whether they will be eligible as 
evidence for a dispensation, a worry that turns out to be misplaced. This, Ishiguro 
suggests, is the cruelty of a system that demands an aesthetic image for recognition 
as the condition for access to political representation – a demand that the 
authorities can always amend on their own terms.  
 
6. When We Were Orphans: The Abandoned Child and the Politics of 
Representation 
If Never Let Me Go is concerned with children who constitute 
representations to be ultimately discarded, this theme already emerges in Ishiguro’s 
preceding novel, When We Were Orphans (2000). The image of an abandoned child 
is peculiarly effective in compelling international action. In Never Let Me Go, 
Ishiguro dramatises how the authorities restrict representation temporally; Orphans 
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reflects this theme, but also introduces a spatial dynamic to the issue. In fact, the 
refusal or extension of recognition as the basis for access to political representation 
turns out to apply both to the child and to the foreign Other. The abandoned child 
embodies both categories simultaneously.  
In an international crisis, the image of an abandoned child makes things 
happen; it even transgresses, or transcends, the most powerful modern boundaries 
of affective concern and acknowledged responsibility, the limits of ethnicity and 
nationality. An aesthetic representation of a crisis, this child nevertheless has 
political effects.  
A recent example, at the time of writing, comes from the circulation of 
images of a deceased three-year-old, Alan Kurdi, which generated affect towards 
exactly such political effects. Kurdi died in September 2015 during his family’s 
escape from the Syrian civil war, when the craft in which he was travelling 
foundered at sea. A photograph of his body lying apparently abandoned on a beach, 
reproduced widely in the media, provoked a significant acceleration in attempts to 
provide safe channels for refugees, with British Prime Minister David Cameron 
directly citing Kurdi’s image: “Anyone who saw those pictures […] could not help but 
be moved and, as a father, I felt deeply moved by the sight of that young boy […] 
Britain is a moral nation and we will fulfil our moral responsibilities” (Dathan 1). The 
abandoned child makes international action possible – though curiously here in the 
name of a national identity he does not himself share.  He visually represents a 
global responsibility, based on his recognition as a deserving object for affective 
identification.17 
Such images of the abandoned child have a long genealogy. As early as the 
Second Boer War (1899-1902), images of dying children were used by anti-war 
campaigners to elicit outrage (Hasian 68-89). Much later, images of 12-year-old Ali 
Ismail Abbas, who lost both limbs and most of his family in a botched US bombing 
during the 2003 Iraq invasion, intensified public concern over civilian casualties and 
led to Abbas’ treatment in Britain, where he later gained citizenship; for him at least, 
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the affective identification produced by his own image really could enable the 
crossing of otherwise rigid national borders.  
Similar deployment of the child’s image appears in all kinds of global crisis. 
Birhan Woldu’s near-death during the 1984 Ethiopian famine was recorded on film, 
the footage shown at ‘Live Aid’ in 1985 and again at ‘Live 8’ in 2005, where Bob 
Geldof declared, “Don’t let them tell you that this doesn’t work” (Sebsibe 1). The 
abandoned child does indeed work –  summoning affect, generating effect. An image 
of global crisis, an aesthetic representation implicitly redressing the inequity in 
political representation that caused (or at least exacerbated) that crisis, she 
transcends ethnic and national affinities. 
This visual trope also works through historic failures of the international 
order. Anne Frank’s Diary is almost always published with a cover image of the 
author, as though the face of a child were necessary to render the horror of Nazi 
persecution. W.G. Sebald’s novel of the Holocaust and memory, Austerlitz (2001) is 
structured around a child’s photograph (reproduced inside the book, often also on 
the cover), as though only the unbearable image of an abandoned child provides an 
aesthetic representation for political failures of a scale that otherwise threaten to 
frustrate all representation. 
Yet he has a Doppelgänger on the ‘wrong side’ of historical memory. The 
abandoned child served the Nazis well, for example: their film Hitlerjunge Quex 
(1933), depicted the murder of 16-year-old Hitler Youth member Herbert Norkus by 
a Communist gang, after neglect by his own pro-Communist father; here the ‘voice 
of a murdered child’ readily became a “ventriloquised address to Germany” (Lebeau 
175). We might console ourselves by thinking that whereas Norkus produced affect 
through identification with an imagined German nation (mobilised precisely against 
a supposedly international Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy), today’s abandoned 
children replace the racial nation with the ‘international community’ as the site of 
affective identification. Yet matters are both more complicated and more 
compromised than this. In fact, I argue, in allowing a transgression of ethno-national 
boundaries, the use of the abandoned child’s image also limits that transgression, 
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turning it from an act of political significance to an aesthetic recognition, the 
recognition of an ethic that is imagined as actually belonging to the viewer’s own 
identity.  
Edelman’s identification of the dominant use of the child’s image in 
contemporary culture as imposing “an ideological limit on political discourse as 
such” (2) certainly appears again here: Cameron “as a father” finds that the child 
demands an international action which, paradoxically, re-asserts the inner character 
of a nation. It’s worth exploring this apparently paradoxical move from the universal 
(or global) ethnical imperative to national identity.  
Perhaps the explanation lies in how it’s only the child, precisely as child, who 
is automatically recognised as deserving survival (literally, in the prioritisation of 
children for assistance in the refugee support opened up by Kurdi’s image (see 
Wintour in The Guardian of 7th September 2015). The assumption is that (unlike an 
adult migrant) there is nothing private about the child, and so nothing to fear; a 
universal child to whom any father could relate, his status as a global responsibility 
actually works to enable his retrieval by a particular nation. Through ‘saving’ him, 
those nations simultaneously re-assert their own essential identities and apparently 
restore a rupture in the international order. 
This child generates some extension of political responsibility, but as its 
object only; to become a subject would be to lose his innocence, implying the 
privacy he cannot be admitted to possess. This child thus does not truly extend 
political representation, for there is in a sense nothing to represent other than the 
(presumed) western viewer’s capacity for affect.  
For Arendt, ‘politics’ implicitly acknowledges the need to negotiate and thus 
potentially revise the arrangements for the future; politics is therefore 
fundamentally historical, implying the permanent need for and possibility of change. 
As we saw, for Arendt under modernity politics in this sense is actually a rare thing, 
replaced by the desire for Marx’s “withering away of the state” and its equivalents in 
other dominant ideologies, which use an aesthetic vision to imagine the end of a 
need for politics (The Human Condition, 44-45).  
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‘Aesthetic representation’ refers not to the speech but to the image of the 
individual, which is typically (as with the abandoned child) spoken for by others. The 
histories of the abandoned child’s image record the replacement of a potential claim 
for expanded political representation with just such an aesthetic representation. The 
circulation of the abandoned child’s image has effects, of course, as noted – 
sometimes critically important effects for those who live rather than die as a result - 
but crucially not the extension of political representation, nor the revision of the 
basis on which political representation might be extended.  
The viewer of Kurdi’s image is, implicitly, invited to become the child’s 
rescuer, who thereby contributes to the restoration of an international order 
reassuringly asserting national identities and eliminating the ‘global’ as disruption to 
that order. This is how I use the term ‘global’ here: to indicate a disturbance to the 
territorial arrangements of nations, often exposing an extension of responsibility 
beyond ethno-national limits. This is precisely the terminology demanded by 
Ishiguro, who, as Black observes, responds to a sense of ‘the failure of 
representation to encourage action on others’ behalf’ (“Ishiguro’s Inhuman 
Aesthetics”, 790).  For Ishiguro, this failure reflects a fear of the seemingly infinitely 
expanding extent of ethical responsibility through the global reach of political and 
economic networks and systems (Walkowitz, “Unimaginable Largeness”).  
The image of the abandoned child seems to embody this fear; but it also 
contains its own resolution. This resolution is provided by recognition itself, the 
recognition of the child as deserving affective identification; any actions to follow 
depend on this recognition, indeed are sometimes subsumed by it: when Anne 
Frank’s image moves the viewer to think ‘never again’, nothing more than the 
thought is immediately required. The key imperative is for recognition itself. None of 
this, of course, disputes that images of children suffering rightly compel attention; 
however, there are reasons to wonder why the reaction is limited by the very image 
that provokes it.  
The child at the centre of Ishiguro’s fifth novel, When We Were Orphans 
(2000), is not only abandoned, but made to play a peculiar part in the representation 
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of a global crisis – where he ultimately acts as the abandoned child and as that 
child’s European saviour. Following Bain, I read Orphans as concerned not only with 
the period in which is ostensibly set, but as responding to ethical and political 
arguments over the extension of global responsibilities (and apparently of global 
power) in the late 1990s, the period of its composition. Beyond this, though, 
Ishiguro’s persistent contamination of one period and place by another, and his 
location of the causes of political failure in the repetition of fundamentally aesthetic 
modes of representation, demands that we also consider the novel’s implications for 
current and continuing international crises. 
Ishiguro’s novel works as a parody to both dramatise and undermine the 
collapse of political and aesthetic representation into one another, particularly as 
evident in the figure of the abandoned child. It queries the provision of such an 
image as the prerequisite for international action, (a requirement with, as observed, 
both an extensive history and an acute contemporary relevance). Orphans does not 
dramatise a particular piece of history (indeed, Ishiguro consistently eschews 
historical realism (Walkowitz, “Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds”, 1052), but rather exposes 
how structures that base political representation on aesthetic recognition work 
against history as implying the potential for political change). Ishiguro audaciously 
insists that we read this resistance to history and politics as grounded in the 
psychological condition of his characters.  
The novel’s principal orphan and protagonist, Christopher Banks, is the son of 
two British residents of the Shanghai International Settlement, a businessman father 
and a politically active mother. After his parents’ mysterious disappearance, Banks is 
moved to England, where, after education, he eventually becomes a private 
detective. Years later, he is prompted to return to Shanghai to attempt the recovery 
of his parents, but finds that this search is both obstructed by, and yet curiously 
merges into, a developing conflict, where the international ‘settlement’ (in every 
sense) is coming undone.  
Banks is uniquely required to be both abandoned child and European 
rescuer. As critical readers have to varying degrees acknowledged (Luo; Sim; Bain), 
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Ishiguro uses this paradox to parody and critique the idea of the global as a problem 
to be resolved through representational figures, above all Banks himself. Banks’ 
function in returning to Shanghai (appropriately for the detective he has grown up 
to be) is to bring the potential otherness of the global, which threatens to evade 
identification by national authorities, into the light, and thereby eliminate its 
capacity to disrupt the international order. In this way, he also addresses the 
traumatically exposed extent of ethical responsibility for the ‘western’ observer of 
Shanghai’s ‘global’ crisis.  
Rather than endorsing his protagonist’s representational function, Ishiguro 
exponentially intensifies the evidence for its perversity - daring to suggest that the 
abandoned child does not make things happen, or at least not well. In an ironic 
reversal of the structural purpose of the classic Bildungsroman as described by 
Moretti in The Way of the World, Ishiguro uses the Bildungsroman form and hero 
figure to dramatise the failure of aesthetic representation as a basis for political 
representation.  
Christopher’s mother Diana, upper-middle-class British wife and campaigner 
against the normally (and hypocritically) ignored source of the Settlement’s wealth, 
the opium trade, creates a kind of international community within her house. Her 
angry rebuke to a representative of her husband’s employer, as he attempts to 
prevent her retaining servants from an opium-ruined region, is overheard by the 
infant Christopher: “You wish me to drive out these friends of ours!” (58-60). In their 
argument, Diana and the company official each compete to claim greater 
recognition of the nature of the ‘globalised’ situation in which both they and the 
servants are caught up.  
In the Settlement, an individual’s political status remains dangerously 
unresolved until some process of identification has taken place, which in turn 
determines (as with the servants) the extension or withdrawal of affect. This process 
of representation depends on the aesthetic imagination, or actual creation, of some 
essential ‘interior’.  
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Arendt’s claim that political participation depends on a private zone located 
not only in the body but also spatially, in the home, initially bears some resemblance 
to the importance of ‘home’ spaces in the Settlement; yet there is a curious paradox 
here, because the Settlement’s political order simultaneously identifies the private 
or interior space with something always to be strategically read: the ethno-national 
essence, the British-ness or Japanese-ness, of the occupants. The exclusion of others 
from the private space of the home (as the company man demands), does not keep 
that space unknown, but rather more perfectly known; a vision of identity provided 
by its removal from visibility.  
Hence the parents of Christopher’s friend Akira maintain a hidden core within 
their house, where behind “the outer, ‘western’ side” with oak-panelling, lies an 
inner, “Japanese” room of “delicate paper with lacquer inlays” (72). In the 
Settlement, then, private spaces are not truly ‘private’ at all; they are always 
imagined as visible, and it is this that determines the inhabitants’ political 
representation (the opposite of Arendt’s formulation of the dependency of political 
participation on access to private spaces).  
Yet although these ‘private’ spaces actually work to eliminate genuine 
privacy, elements of an unpoliced interior life nevertheless still manage to occur 
within and around them – notably the relationship between Christopher and Akira, 
who play in the gap between the physical institutions in which they live (their 
ethnicised homes, and the Settlement itself) and the identities those institutions are 
made to embody. It’s a gap always under threat of elimination, first temporarily 
when Akira goes to Japan, and then permanently when Christopher is taken to 
England. It does however imply that forms of living can (even unintentionally) 
produce ‘global’ encounters that evade representation (indeed the pressure to 
represent an ethno-national essence is the only thing that seriously disrupts the 
friendship).  
This friendship, with its traces of a pre-representational interior life that 
Banks finds hard to replicate in adult and heterosexual relationships (such as that 
with Sarah Hemmings), actually causes a miniature global crisis, decades later, when 
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Banks diverts his own attention and the military resources of others to the recovery 
of someone he calls (but who probably isn’t) Akira.  
The friendship between Christopher and Akira, the remembrance of which is 
deeply felt by Banks years later, slips between the Settlement’s normal political 
logic, where the maintenance of the home constitutes a process of aesthetic 
representation that operates to control the expansion of affect. The interior does 
not even necessarily need to be seen in order for this to work; it simply needs to be 
recognised as existing, and its content can be imagined. This use of the image to 
manage affective identification can be usefully explained with reference to Lacan, 
whose pertinence for Ishiguro is already critically recognised (see Lewis, Kazuo 
Ishiguro, 136-7). 
[For Lacan] the ego that apprehends itself in the world does so only 
through a strictly theoretical knowledge, since all ‘feeling of Self’ is 
immediately captured, captivated, by the ‘image of the other’ (1961, 
181). Out, then, with the feeling of ‘self,’ since now it is seen in the 
other, instead of being felt in him, as him; and theorised or reflected 
affect, as everyone knows, is no longer lived affect. (Borch-Jacobsen, 
Lacan: The Absolute Master, 59) 
As with the abandoned child, the location of affect in an aesthetic image 
contains that affect in a dual sense: embodying it, but also immediately limiting it. 
This limits, in fact, the potential expansion of ethical responsibility that constitutes, 
as observed earlier, the key trauma of the ‘global’. When affect is ‘theorised’ in this 
way, not only is responsibility contained, but its acknowledgement is made 
dependent on the availability of the image. The burden therefore subtly shifts to the 
other, who is expected to provide the image deserving of affective identification. 
The image is expected to immediately produce meaning, to be available for reading 
within the order or ‘theory’ by which the world functions. 
Ishiguro’s audacious move is to take this demand and place it squarely as 
constituting the requirement for political representation too. Hence for the official, 
the Chinese have to be both seen and read as dangerous, as the objects of abjection, 
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in order to exclude them from the domestic (ethnic) space. Christopher, by contrast, 
is permitted to act as the respository for affect, but only as a contained or 
‘theorised’ affect that demands he himself acts as an aesthetic representation.  
This makes the question of who has the right to be here, inside ‘our’ 
territory, and the question of who has an ‘interiority’ of her own, a subjecthood 
deserving of recognition - and by extension, political representation – one and the 
same issue. Such interrogation of ‘interiority’ reappears throughout Ishiguro’s work 
(see Black, “Ishiguro’s Inhuman Aesthetics”). The delusion and paranoia behind the 
function of interiority in this double sense is exposed in Orphans by one episode in 
particular.  
When Christopher and Akira dare each other to enter the room of Akira’s 
Chinese family servant Ling Tien, whom they imagine practises dark magic, they 
finally enter only to find the room clearly empty of anything untoward; the boys 
nevertheless subsequently maintain that they braved some great danger in entering. 
Their play mirrors the Settlement’s structural logic: the potential political question 
raised by the presence of the Chinese and their simultaneous absence from political 
representation is resolved by their aesthetic representation as dark and dangerous. 
A political question posed by the ‘global’ space, with its disturbing exposure to other 
‘races’ normally denied representation, is aesthetically re-imagined as a darkness at 
that space’s heart. 
This movement between the political and the aesthetic appears with a clarity 
and directness in Orphans that makes its absurdity unusually obvious. Yet, as a 
parody, the novel exposes this absurdity only by excessive pursuit of a logic that is 
actually all too real, grounded in the real history of racial paranoia.  
In this context, it’s fruitful to read Orphans alongside recent historical work 
that has argued for the centrality of such aesthetic notions, and of the paranoia lying 
behind them, to real international crises. In Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and 
Warning (2015), Timothy Snyder notes that because most Germans “were not 
particularly good at distinguishing Jews from non-Jews”, a “new racial optic” had to 
be created (42). Here politics began in the aesthetic imagination, turned into 
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aesthetic ‘reality’, which in turn radically constrained political representation, before 
producing its ultimate genocidal effects. This emerged alongside a conception of the 
global as the problem disrupting the proper identity between the political status of 
individuals and their imagined interior nature.  
As Snyder argues, for the Nazis the Jews embodied a globalisation perceived 
as threatening because it was not aligned with what Nazism considered to be 
essential ethnic realities. The Jews only thrived, they considered, because state 
institutions, and the access to political representation they conferred, had wrongly 
been separated from the recognition of racial truth. In this paranoid vision, the 
‘global’ arises precisely as this gap between representation and recognition. Hence, 
in the Settlement, where the racist trope of the ‘wandering Jew’ is replaced by the 
Chinese migrating from Shantung, even when the ethnic interior is found to be 
essentially empty, it is still compulsively imagined as meaningful. Identity is based on 
paranoia. However, if this is true of such abject identities as the Jews and the 
‘Chinamen’, is it also true of the apparently positive identity recognised in the 
abandoned child? I will go on to argue that it is.   
Freud defined paranoia as purposed to “ward off an idea that is incompatible 
with the ego, by projecting its substance into the external world” (The Complete 
Letters, 106), “projection” here therefore encompassing a potential abjection. This is 
suggestive of how when the global emerges as something recalcitrant to the ethno-
national order, the abandoned child, as the consequence of this global disruption, 
shares in the same ambivalence. That this applies to Banks himself is clear when he is 
‘rescued’ by Colonel Chamberlain, following the disappearance of his parents: 
Shanghai’s not a bad place. But […] you’ve had about as much as you 
need. Much more, you’ll be turning into a Chinaman. […] You really 
ought to cheer up. After all, you’re going to England. You’re going 
home. (Orphans, 28) 
Evidently, Banks as the abandoned child presents both a risk of otherness and 
the possibility of redemption. This ambiguity behind Banks’ representational status 
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persists much later on, after he has become an adult and developed a successful 
career as a private detective:  
 Mr Banks. Of course, you know the truth. You know that the real 
heart of our present crisis lies further afield […] you do have, shall we 
say, a special relationship to what is, in truth, the source of all our 
current anxieties. […] You know better than anyone the eye of the 
storm is to be found not in Europe at all, but in the Far East. In 
Shanghai, to be exact. (Orphans, 137-138)  
Under this speaker, Canon Moorly’s, gaze, seeing turns into reading (ironically 
reflecting Banks’ own role as detective, tasked to see that which is recalcitrant to the 
gaze). Moorly refuses to let Banks speak, even when expressing his frustration over 
Banks’ supposed failure to speak; rather, he uses him as an image, almost as another 
metaphor, like the ‘eye of the storm’. Tellingly, this is entirely dependent on Banks as 
child; whatever ‘special relationship’ Banks gained from being in Shanghai must have 
been achieved before the age of ten.  
Following Freud, we could observe that Moorly’s reading of Banks is poised 
between projection and abjection. Moorly’s comment follows a rancorous debate 
over the recent German invasion of the Rhineland (136), where arguments about the 
cause of the crisis use a discourse of conspiracy evoking the racial scapegoating of 
both the Jews in Europe and the Chinese in Shanghai. Banks is the projected figure of 
the European rescuer who will resolve the global crisis; yet, as the abandoned child 
from the dangerously unresolved global space himself, he is also uncomfortably close 
to being imagined as the abject, foreign, and dangerously migratory cause of the 
crisis.  
In order to avoid this, Banks is expected to demonstrate his fulfilment of the 
former identity by undertaking a particular task: a return to Shanghai. (That Banks 
internalises the implicit threat behind this demand is obvious later on, when he 
shouts: “You believe this is all my fault, all this, all of it, all this terrible suffering, this 
destruction here” (262)). He delivers this line in the war-torn Warren, when his 
delusions become increasingly extreme as he helps the Japanese soldier he identifies 
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(almost certainly wrongly) as Akira and makes his way through the warzone in search 
of his parents (almost certainly not there). This later echo of Moorly indicates how 
Banks’ delusions have arisen precisely from the representational status accorded to 
him; he is irrationally expected to resolve an international political crisis because he 
is first taken to aesthetically resolve the problem of the global, to bring its disruptive 
otherness under control and thus prevent the further spread of ‘anxieties’. 
Fundamentally, this resolution, Moorly imagines, is merely a matter of correct 
recognition – of Banks recognising his own status and then applying to the political 
and military crisis his own skill, as a detective, in recognising and exposing the truth. 
This will prevent Moorly doubting his own recognition, and from turning to the 
alternative identification of Banks not with the solution, but with the cause, of the 
crisis.  
The context of this in the Rhineland debate introduces particular historical 
echoes. As Snyder notes, a similar prioritisation of aesthetic forms of representation 
has historically been the basis of very real totalitarian projects: ‘Hitler’s worldview 
did not bring about the Holocaust by itself, but its hidden coherence generated new 
sorts of destructive politics’ (Snyder, Black Earth, xiii). Moorly, likewise, is a believer 
in hidden coherence; in narrative, allegory, and affective images.  
Importantly, though, Ishiguro suggests that this collapse of aesthetic and 
political representation does not exclusively appear in obvious totalitarian thought. 
On the contrary, it makes appearances even in utopian visions of the global – 
something that suggests that reading the novel as a simple indictment of racism and 
imperialism would itself miss the full extent of its political implications. Thus even 
when the ‘global’ appears not as a problem but apparently as a celebratory, even 
euphoric, vision of the future, the collapse of political and aesthetic representation 
still persists, as with the vision of Banks’ ‘Uncle’ Philip:   
I think it would be no bad thing if boys like you all grew up with a little 
bit of everything […] one day, all these conflicts will end, and it won’t 
be because of great statesmen or churches or organisations […] It’ll 
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be because people have changed. They’ll be like you, Puffin. 
(Orphans, 76) 
At first glance, this apparently benevolent ideal sounds entirely different to 
Moorly’s paranoid demands; yet, of course, they share a dependence on Christopher 
Banks having a special relationship to the global. As with the “theorised affect” of 
Lacan, this begins with the supposed felt experiences of Christopher (though as they 
are imagined, yet again, by someone else) but makes no distinction between those 
experiences and the political order. The imagined ‘interior’ is once again to be the 
basis of political representation.  
This is reflected, too, in how Philip imagines institutions will fade away before 
the messianic child. In return for the status this vision confers on Banks, though, he 
will be expected to perform the representation he is considered to embody. 
Similarly, whilst space will be opened up to everyone in principle, there is a 
condition: everyone must, in turn, be like Banks. Ishiguro hints, then, that the 
collapse of political and aesthetic representation is dangerous across both racist and 
totalitarian political projects and in utopian versions of the ‘global’. This initially 
startling implication takes on greater resonance when read alongside Ishiguro’s own 
reception.   
As Walkowitz (“Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds”, 1055) notes, Ishiguro’s earlier 
critical readers tended to attribute an essential Japanese quality to him, even ‘while 
they remain otherwise self-conscious about the use of ethnographic language’; 
although some later criticism has challenged this, the tendency persists. As the child 
of parents who migrated to Britain from post-war Japan, Ishiguro has himself been 
read as the abandoned child, signifying a disruption to the international order that 
must be resolved through the recognition of some essential identity. That this 
identity is repeatedly imagined as Japanese does not, however, preclude the 
recognition of Ishiguro as himself a figure for the ‘global’; rather the two repeatedly 
merge, often around an assumption that his childhood experiences were traumatic 
(a suggestion he denies (Ishiguro and Moore 1)) and even through symbolic reversal 
of his childhood migration: 
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In several reviews [of An Artist of the Floating World], the artist Ono 
and the artist Ishiguro are metaphorically interchangeable. Critics 
associate the novelist’s technique with an authentic Japaneseness, 
and they propose this affiliation as a natural rather than a cultivated 
element of Ishiguro’s craft. […] Ishiguro has lived in England since the 
age of six, was educated in England, writes in English, but he is 
regularly compared with ‘modern Japanese novelists’ all the same. 
(Walkowitz, “Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds”, 1053-1054)  
Even though this trend has been increasingly challenged over time (for 
example, by Beedham, The Novels of Kazuo Ishiguro), it persisted well after the 
publication of Orphans; for example, even when acknowledging that ‘it is an open 
question where Ishiguro’s style came from,’ Ben Howard nevertheless resorts 
immediately to the child supposedly inside the man:  
Evocative, by turns, of British reserve and Buddhist equanimity, [the 
novel] reflects the experience of a writer who, at the age of six, was 
brought from Nagasaki to England by his parents and reared in their 
Japanese home. (Howard, “A Civil Tongue”, 400) 
Significantly, Howard refers to a subjectivity not entirely knowable ‘from the 
outside’, but then immediately implies his own knowledge of it, in part through the 
imagined interior space of a home, ironically echoing Orphans. In thus symbolically 
reversing Ishiguro’s migration (and recovering an image of him as child), the critics 
are also symbolically resolving the international crisis they presume caused that 
migration (the Second World War, and specifically the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, 
which injured Ishiguro’s mother (Wroe, “Living Memories”, 1)).  Moorly’s irritated 
assertion that Banks has “a special relationship to what is, in truth, the source” of 
global problems echoes the attitude of Ishiguro’s critics.  
We should, therefore, read Orphans in part as Ishiguro writing back to his 
critics, as his diagnosing their compulsion for recognition and imagined affective 
images as the basis for representation. This follows Sim’s arguments about how 
Ishiguro, notably in Remains, tends to write back to undermine the latent (or 
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explicit) essentialism in the reception of his novels. Orphans, in this trend, both 
figures and disfigures the narratives behind Ishiguro’s own reception.  
For two days after our arrival in Hong Kong […] I suppose I did 
appreciate here and there […] some vague echo of Shanghai. [...] It 
was as though I had come upon […] a distant cousin of a woman I 
once loved; whose gestures, facial expressions, little shrugs nudge the 
memory, but who remains, overall, an awkward, even grotesque 
parody of a much-cherished image. (Orphans, 299) 
Ishiguro’s desire to frustrate expectations for recognition is played out above 
all in Christopher Banks’ final ‘reunion’ with his ‘mother’, which takes place in 1958 
in the globalised and ‘post-war’ city of Hong Kong. This reunion scene can be usefully 
read alongside Ishiguro’s own comment on globalisation, in interview. Countering 
some of the critical attitudes directed towards him, he replaced a desire to read the 
Other’s ‘internal’ life with a rather externalised form of dialogue: 
I should talk to people in a way that they understand. If you’re talking 
to someone who just flew in from China or Rome you will talk to them 
in a slightly different way than to someone who has grown up 
alongside you […] It’s just good manners, really. (Qtd. in Groes and 
Lewis, “Kazuo Ishiguro and the Ethics of Empathy, 2)  
Ishiguro indicates a higher ethical imperative towards the Other than 
affective identification; and the imperative is, in fact, for a certain kind of dialogue, 
for an attention to form as ‘good manners’, gesturing towards the formality in 
Ishiguro’s style (itself firmly attributed by his early critics to his Japanese origins 
(Walkowitz, “Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds”, 1053). This ‘formality’, unlike both 
Ishiguro’s critics and his characters, allows representation – the right and 
opportunity for speech – to the Other without attempting to read her.  
A similar formality is required from Banks when he finds a woman he claims 
to recognise as his mother, but who certainly fails to recognise him as her son. Banks 
lives a parody of Oedipal narrative: Loving his mother and resenting his father during 
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infancy, he is ‘orphaned’ and exiled. He becomes a detective – like Oedipus, a solver 
of deadly riddles – before eventually returning to his parents’ city. Yet when 
apparently he finally rediscovers his mother, in an uncanny and ironic reversal of the 
Oedipus story, Banks cannot know that it is her. Banks ironically gains what Freud’s 
Oedipal subject is usually denied – the return of the mother – but nevertheless 
retains what that subject struggles to escape: the traumatic failure of recognition.  
The centrality of the ‘reunion’ scene has already been critically recognised. 
Bain discusses it in the context of situating Orphans as an ironic exploration of the 
demands for intervention in a global crisis from the liberal western actor (242-5), 
exposing the grotesque inequality of representation evident in such demands. This is 
conclusively demonstrated, Bain argues, by the novel’s ultimate revelation of Banks’ 
true situation (his economic support from an unholy self-sacrifice by his mother to 
the combined forces of the corrupt warlord Wang-Ku and the amoral corporation 
employing Banks’ father, with the deal brokered by “Uncle” Philip). 
 Whilst this accurately identifies Orphans’ concerns, Bain replicates a 
representational mode the novel actually parodies rather than, as he suggests, finally 
affirms:  
The introduction of Diana Banks and Wang Ku as the joint financial 
spectre of Christopher’s life is more than an eruptive moment […] 
Diana’s past comes to us and to Christopher, rather, as a story about 
accumulation through invisible labour. What’s in the darkness behind 
Banks is a process – an ongoing, unending history – that has made a 
product. The product is, of course, him. (Bain, “International 
Settlements”, 256) 
Here, Bain concludes, Banks has discovered “the never-ending and 
unpalatable condition that will always underwrite his intentions and his resources” 
(258): According to this, Banks was indeed what he was repeatedly said to be, a 
special representation of the global – but as the heart of a global darkness rather 
than its saviour. When Banks finds his mother unable to recognise him, this scene 
confirms, Bain argues, his representational function; this Diana, herself the 
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representative victim of the system that has benefitted him, may not recognise him, 
but we now do so.  
This crucially fails to acknowledge that Ishiguro parodies the idea of revealing 
the causal heart of global crises through Banks as representational figure. The way 
Banks’ status is apparently revealed in the novel itself parodies both Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness and Dickens’ Great Expectations - in addition to Oedipus, and Golden 
Age detective fiction. The effect of these references is to increase the sense that he 
is living a pre-existing narrative derived from elsewhere, one that is fundamentally 
aesthetic and which repeatedly conflicts with reality. (This indicates that those who 
criticised Orphans for its rather unconvincing presentation of Banks’ detective career 
(see Hensher, “It’s the Way He Tells It”) missed the point; the narrative, rooted in the 
Bildungsroman and detective genres, is the delusion, and vice-versa). Rather than 
confirming Banks’ role as representation, these references draw attention to the 
gaps and failures in how he enacts that role.  
Bain claims that Banks’ representational condition wholly encompasses not 
only his resources, but his intentions too. This is partially true; the representational 
relationship to the global ascribed to Banks has overwhelming effects on his sense of 
self and ultimately his actions, as we’ve seen. Yet even whilst acting out his 
representational status, Banks repeatedly disrupts it – making ‘slips’ akin to the 
Freudian sense. Why, after all, does he get distracted with searching for the adult 
Akira – presumably now an enemy citizen, possibly a combatant - rather than for his 
parents? Why does he take so long to return to Shanghai in the first place? Why was 
Banks’ detective career apparently determined as much by the gift of a dead 
childhood friend (9) as by the imperative to resolve the case of his parents’ 
disappearance? Why does his relationship with Sarah Hemmings fluctuate wildly? 
These elements imply a private life – a set of desires or, in Bain’s term, “intentions” – 
that don’t fit Banks’ role as representation of a global system.  
This is not, of course, to deny that such systems operate to terrible effect, or 
that the novel is interested in dramatising such effects. However, the novel parodies 
and undermines any expectation of revelation of a coherent and total system where 
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the only imperative left is to recognise this previously hidden, now revealed, 
coherence through a representational aesthetic figure. This is because the emphasis 
on recognition (and denial of the incoherent elements of the representational 
system) itself leads to endless deferral of extension to political representation in 
favour of an attempt for perfect aesthetic representation, matched by a perfect 
reading.  
Ishiguro’s interest in thoroughly disrupting such an attempt emerges most 
sharply, in fact, in the ‘reunion’ scene. The true identity of the woman Banks calls his 
mother, which Bain does not question,18 is in fact subject to a terrible (and yet, for 
Ishiguro, typical) ambiguity. Banks has made several irrational identifications already 
by this point; he sees ‘Akira’ first as a businessman and then a wounded soldier, 
ignoring the sightings’ mutual incompatibility; he thinks he remembers seeing Wang-
Ku, but this is probably the power of suggestion (117); he expects to find his 
(presumably long deceased) childhood amah still living (195). Though Banks never 
acknowledges it, logically his parents may well have died too between their 
disappearance (given that he studied at Cambridge in 1923 (3), this occurred c.1908-
1912) and his 1937 return to Shanghai. 
This renders his identification of Diana (whom he last saw 48 years ago, at 
age ten)19 deeply suspect. This woman does not recognise the man before her as her 
son; she appears to recognise “Puffin” as Banks’ childhood nickname, but this is 
hardly unambiguous from an author best known for his concern with unreliable 
memory. Banks’ own repressed doubt about the woman’s identity is betrayed in his 
metaphor about “the distant cousin of a woman I once loved” in describing Hong 
Kong. 
Following these hints that the woman Banks meets in Hong Kong may not be 
his mother at all, the whole episode turns the revelation it initially appears to 
provide on its head.  This denies the consoling effect found in the scene’s claimed 
revelation of Banks’ true representational status, as a “‘liberal and humanitarian 
actor’ who, standing amid the wreckage of a particular political crisis, is orphaned 
and paralysed by revelations about a system operating in the name of his welfare” 
(Bain, “International Settlements”, 245). This revelation, whilst exposing a horrifying 
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sequence of exploitation, and refusing the possibility of action, is consoling insofar 
as it appears to establish a secure identity for Banks as the aesthetic representation 
of that exploitation, available to us as a figure through which we can recognise and 
describe it.  
For Bain, this recognition of the system, provided through its aesthetic 
representation in Banks himself, is the key imperative offered by Orphans. Here, 
Banks – and through him, the reader – has become the modern hero described by 
Moretti, tasked less “to put an end to the ‘futility and anarchy that is contemporary 
history”, but to give them “a shape and a significance. To create a perceptual order, 
not a real order” (Moretti, The Modern Epic, 112). However, if we accept my claim 
that Bain has misread the implications of the scene, the consolation offered by this 
perceptual order is no longer available.  
In fact, the ethical imperative of the scene is very different to what Bain 
suggests. It is not to undertake the affective identification he proposes, (What if this 
woman were “your own [parent]?”), but instead, to represent someone precisely 
outside the terms of affective identification. Whilst we began with the abandoned 
child providing a blank surface for the aesthetic resolution of a global political crisis, 
this woman is a wholly opposite figure for the global, a figure of irreducible private 
history who cannot be securely identified. This privacy is ultimately guaranteed by 
the inability to know whether Diana Banks is living or dead.  
The scene peculiarly collapses the still-possible death of Diana Banks with the 
distance between Banks’ life in England and the ‘Diana’ he finds in Hong Kong. 
Curiously, here the possible (even likely) death of Diana Banks makes her loss all the 
more real because it cannot be known: We cannot be sure that Banks is right in 
identifying his mother; yet we cannot be sure he is wrong; the person before him 
could be his mother, or anyone else in the world.  
This ‘Diana’ brings the politics of representation into crisis at the very 
moment they ‘ought’ to be affirmed, as the abandoned child retrieves his mother, 
and as the Bildungsroman concludes with territory being symbolically brought under 
the identifying vision of the protagonist, the affirmation of his own representational 
status (Moretti, The Way of the World). Ishiguro disrupts all this, re-establishing the 
global as the site of a difference that refuses to fulfil prior identities or limit ethical 
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responsibility, expressed through its refusal to match Banks’ representation of 
himself to a recognition by his ‘mother’. Yet, strangely, Banks is nevertheless actually 
consoled by the encounter.  
Banks describes the scene later to his niece:  
“Do you really suppose,’ Jennifer asked, ‘she had no inkling at 
all who you were?” 
“I’m sure she didn’t. But she meant what she said, and she 
knew what she was saying. […] If you’d seen her face, when I first said 
that name, you’d have no doubt about it either.” (Orphans, 306) 
Although Banks says “Diana” had “no inkling” of who he was, she showed 
what Lacan would call the vouloir-dire, the “intention to signify”, that marks the 
subject as such more than the content signified (Lacan, Écrits, 83). Banks finds he was 
able to speak with this woman without fully ‘reading’ her history, her own ‘content’, 
and certainly without her successfully reading him. If a human ‘interior’ is known to 
exist, but cannot be read, how then does the encounter leave Banks confident that 
she ‘meant what she said?’ It does so, I suggest, because the formal and spatial 
conditions for the dialogue, where words show an intention to signify even if not a 
transparent significance, exist – they consist of the institution where “Diana” is 
housed and which Banks visits, and of the ‘good manners’, or formality, with which 
he pursues their conversation.  
‘Formality’ characterises one’s mode of speech when entering into dialogue 
with someone whose equal right to the space and the conversation is acknowledged, 
but of whom one does not claim personal, affective or ‘interior’ knowledge. In other 
words, ‘formality’ itself constitutes a form of representation, one that tends to take 
place only when the institutional conditions governing access to a given space makes 
it possible, as here. This attention to form and the formal, so pronounced in the 
reunion scene and so resonant with the critical debates over Ishiguro’s style, 
indicates the novel’s overall imperative for political representation to take priority 
over affective identification and over recognition. It implies that access to forms and 
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spaces providing such political representation should not be conditional on the 
provision of an affective image for recognition.  
Snyder, quoted earlier, gives historical reference for the violence caused by 
such conditions in practice, noting that in the Holocaust “the people who had the 
power to rescue others were those who could dispense identity documents” (255). 
Those who get identified (and thus saved from death) are those who can provide 
some affective image – generally of their ethnic or national affiliation, but in other 
circumstances also perhaps of some imagined universal and essential qualities – to 
provide for this recogntion. Ishiguro, through his ironic and uncanny parody of this 
situation, hints both at how it is paradigmatic in modern structures for political 
representation (even when these are called into question by international crises) and 
how its consequences are profoundly inhumane. Ishiguro also suggests, as we’ve 
found, that both this inhumane imperative and its consequences are intensified for 
the child.  
Snyder refers to this in the Europe of the 1940s. We might also recognise it in 
the Europe of today, presented in dominant media narratives as besieged by the 
victims or embodiments of global crises (again, the distinction between these 
categories is ambivalent and viciously contended), and where repeated calls are 
made for those seeking access to demonstrate either their emptiness of political 
capacity (as in the case of children), or their ethnic or quasi-ethnic allegiance, or their 
adherence to supposedly universal values. Any and all of this, the cruder but 
dominant voices in contemporary European political culture suggest, can be 
demonstrated visually; the child who is really suffering will not look like a fit or 
healthy adolescent; the woman who is really capable of political agency will not 
appear with her hair or face covered up. There are, no doubt, many other 
contemporary examples where affective identification, aesthetically mediated, is the 
prerequisite for political representation.  
Ishiguro shows both the absurdity and the hidden violence in all this. It is a 
violence not only to the ‘global’ as the imperative for national and supra-national 
polities to engage in Arendt’s real politics, politics as a negotiation for the future. It is 
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also a violence towards the privacy of the subject, her right not to represent on 
demand, which Arendt rightly saw as the necessary basis for her agency, that is for 
her right to represent in any worthwhile sense. It should be read alongside the 
demands to represent oneself in aesthetic and affective terms that appear again for 
Kathy and Tommy in Never Let Me Go and for Axl and Beatrice in The Buried Giant 
(2015).  
History is produced, Orphans suggests, through forms of engagement, which 
are only possible, in practice, when the institutional conditions exist to allow access 
to space for such engagement, even if the encounters themselves are contrary to 
what the authorities governing those institutions expect (as with Christopher and 
Akira). The asylum housing “Diana” at the novel’s end is a bleakly ironic version of 
the sorts of institutions where such relationships might take place. The ‘global’ space 
thereby opened up is not a utopian realm where institutions have fallen away before 
the messianic child (for this, as Ishiguro suggests, still relies upon a prioritisation of 
aesthetic recognition). Rather, it indicates the point when states and other 
institutions become conscious of themselves as institutions, subject to politics as a 
negotiation for the future, rather than as rehearsing pre-existing identities and 
essential qualities or ‘European values’. Ishiguro’s cross-contamination between 
different histories of paranoia, racism, and utopianism itself provides a model for 
this, in its resistance to the reduction of history to essential identity.  
Such institutions might be concerned with revising the current political 
arrangements to avoid repetition of the past (as institutions referenced in Orphans, 
like the League of Nations, once tried and failed to do); Ishiguro powerfully suggests 
that as long as we remain attached to images of identity as the basis for our political 
order, past crises will indeed repeat themselves.  
There is, then, both an urgency and a pragmatism in the imperative 
remaining at the end of Orphans. In this respect, it echoes an episode in Remains 
where Stevens is complicit in the dismissal of two Jewish servants from Darlington 
Hall. Stevens defends his complicity on the basis that he cannot counter the insight 
into world systems possessed by Lord Darlington, with his supposed knowledge of 
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the “nature of Jewry” (158). Miss Kenton argues back (rather like Diana for the 
servants from Shantung), pointing out that the Jewish women have undertaken their 
work perfectly well and that there is no justification for their dismissal. Her 
pragmatism, with its basis in an assumption of respect for the women, a ‘formality’ 
of sorts, would have saved their places in the institutional space and possibly their 
lives too, had she been successful. Lord Darlington’s demand for recognition of the 
supposed essential nature of the women, which Stevens accepts as part of his 
general adherence to the political order as it stands, is responsible for the violence 
here.  
This has implications, too, for literary criticism as an institutionalised practice 
of reading, where political and aesthetic forms of representation are mediated. My 
reading of Orphans could be assumed to align with the recent movement (as 
advanced by Best and Marcus (“Surface Reading”), whose argument’s significance for 
Ishiguro is recognised by Walkowitz (“Unimaginable Largeness”, 234)) challenging 
the dominance of textual interpretation seeking revelation of the ‘interior’ of a text 
or figure.  Ishiguro, however, continues to insist on the importance of interiority – 
whilst denying his reader the possibility of its revelation. He insists on representation 
before recognition.  
 In a reversal, therefore, of the basic demand on literary scholars to read 
what we cannot immediately see, and to locate those images that make themselves 
available for such reading, we are compelled rather to disturb the relationship 
between political forms and aesthetic figures. It is only through this willingness to 
allow for what we cannot recognise that we can pursue a better politics and practice 
of representation. 
Even those who cannot be read or seen by the ‘west’ urgently demand and 
deserve representation (as continuing global crises themselves show); and the global 
as the site of a gap between institutions and identities, the site of private lives and 
unlicensed encounters, provides the basis for a potential, but still hardly realised, 
practice of real politics (in something approaching Arendt’s terms). Orphans, too, 
demands re-reading for its supremely humane parody of an inhumane politics of 
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representation, one still relevant to contemporary global crises and to our 
inadequate responses. Reading Ishiguro’s use of the abandoned child, whom we find 
still at work in those on-going crises, helps us to realise the full, tragic significance of 
his parody. 
As discussed earlier, in The Private Life (2013), Cohen argues that both 
totalitarian regimes and authoritarian cultures tend to seek the violent erasure of 
any distinction between public and private. As a frame for reading Ishiguro, this 
suggests that a specific relation of the child to the adult is at threat in such cultures – 
the relation of ambiguous proximity that Never Let Me Go shows both as 
contamination and as loving. The essentialist conception of the child is highly 
accommodating towards, perhaps even necessary for, authoritarianism (as Edelman 
has argued), but the real, often recalcitrant child, and the relation of that child to the 
adult, are its enemies. The attempted abolition of this relation constitutes an attack 
on the content of real life (which, as Cohen has claimed, depends on a private life 
that is in a sense insignificant, existing before representation), as we have seen 
throughout this chapter and the last. This is a serious issue for the practice of critical 
reading; for example, although Edelman’s critique of the function of the essentialist 
child is highly effective, its elevation of the death drive, jouissance and the queer 
itself becomes dismissive of real politics, as I shall argue further shortly.   
We have seen that the authoritarian violence in Ishiguro’s work aligns with 
the paranoid search for a secure and permanent present that evades death, time 
and change. The cost of such a present, though, is of meaningful difference between 
the public and private selves; the disappearance of the real child is an attempt to 
eliminate this difference. Ishiguro powerfully suggests that an attention to the 
institutional and to the formal is required to counter this. As noted, by the end of 
Never Let Me Go, institutions – not only Hailsham but others of its type – are 
reported to have failed and have been abandoned. The perfectly unitary, perfectly 
‘present’ society established has no need of them, nor of their educative mediation 
between the private and the public, the child and the adult.  
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It is here that Ishiguro's pronounced concern with institutions becomes 
particularly important, then – a concern including Darlington Hall and Hailsham, but 
also institutions more broadly defined: the pre-war Japanese education system led 
by Ono; the Shanghai International Settlement where Christopher Banks grows up; 
the ideal England sought by Stevens; even the café orchestras in which Janeck plays. 
Institutions, even in such cases, are of course designed to reproduce themselves, 
and therefore to educate the child, even when they lie outside or beyond the actual 
education system. They also manage the relation between public and private, as 
Stevens perceives in his initial celebration of precisely this function at Darlington 
Hall, which gives the Lord whose name it bears both a public face (or, literally, 
façade)20 and a private realm.  
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Chapter 5: The Child, Authority, and Institutions  
 
In this thesis I have read certain literary scenarios involving the child and 
authority in order to explore the political implications they raise. I’ve also suggested 
that these implications are significant for the practice of reading (and that the 
practice of literary interpretation is itself, amongst other things, an attempt to 
exercise authority over the future and thus over the future’s embodiment, the 
child). In reading Ishiguro, I have further proposed that institutions are key to all 
this; that not only are institutions the site of the authorities enacting violence upon 
the future through the child, but that institutions might nevertheless be necessary 
for an alternative to that violence. This includes, of course, the institutions of literary 
interpretation themselves, which, as Ishiguro’s case suggests, (re)produce critical 
cultures that also deserve scrutiny and critique.  
These conclusions have emerged from observing the tendency of education 
and violence to coincide as means of responding to the challenge that the child 
poses for authority. In these scenarios, which we’ve repeatedly seen played out in 
novels, films and other forms, two particular characteristics emerge: The first is the 
gaze, the violent reading that replaces the visual with the vision, or to put it another 
way, that we read what we see, and then believe that reading, often on pain of 
death. This gaze demands something for us to recognise – above all, the positive 
identification of the child as embodiment of a recognisable future – as the 
prerequisite for the political representation of the Other, and of the child 
specifically. The second characteristic is the private life of the child, which I have 
associated with the child’s capacities for creativity, ambition and desire, and which – 
following Arendt and other theorists, and indeed the prompting of the literary 
authors discussed here – we have identified as the necessary basis for political 
participation. 
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These two characteristics of the problem of the child and authority are 
closely linked. The gaze demands that the child produce or perform some value for 
recognition; this must be done on demand in a temporal sense, it must be available 
for anticipation. The private life suggests that this demand cannot be met, at least 
not in the terms the adult intends, and not on demand – and if it appears to be met 
on demand, the precocious and therefore dangerous child, like Miles or Edward III 
(who are both ‘ahead of time’ in their own ways), may actually be manipulating 
adult authority. This has significant consequences, though, because meeting this 
demand for recognition is the basis for access to political, educational and other 
institutions – not only in these fictional scenarios but in history, and in the 
contemporary world.  This is ironic, because it is within institutions that, in historical 
rather than utopian terms, the private life that is the necessary basis of political 
difference – even, according to Arendt, of politics at all – is given the space it needs 
to exist.  
Given that all this is played out, as I have argued, around a violent reading of 
the child, what this also implies for our practices of reading as literary critics, often 
with some role in controlling access to institutions of various kinds. In doing so, I 
shall begin by briefly returning to two images from the preceding chapters. They 
emerge from very different, and ostensibly quite unrelated places, yet visually and 
thematically, they echo one another. These are Edward III at the end of Marlowe’s 
Edward II, and Miles performing a poem in The Innocents: two boys, each wearing a 
crown, apparently contemplating the image of a dead man, two children who have 
ambiguously come into authority before their time.  
As literary critics or cultural historians working today, we might identify these 
boys as embodying the queer child. It’s worth considering whether the queer child, 
as the most consistent term we currently have for the child who represents the 
possibility of political difference, who demands representation but frustrates 
recognition, is adequate to the children we’ve considered in this thesis. I’ll do so by 
returning to what is perhaps the most influential formulation to date of the queer as 
the answer to the problem of the child and authority, Edelman’s No Future.  
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At the end of Edward II, the young Edward III has gained power through a 
collapse of institutional authority over time, a collapse that has arisen from very 
suggestive conditions for contemporary queer readers. Had Edward’s father not 
been excessively attracted to Gaveston, had his father not been murdered in a 
grotesque parody of anal sex, and had Mortimer and Isabella not been distracted by 
their own equally excessive desire, this child would not have yet had the opportunity 
to come into authority. But is this child himself queer? Perhaps so, if we consider his 
premature seizure of power, relying as it does on his capacity to think secretly and 
therefore constitute a potentially queer, disruptive difference between interior 
thought and external presentation. Yet this child’s first act, as we saw, was to abolish 
that difference in others, starting with Mortimer, through acts of authoritarian 
violence. When Jarman remade the play as a celebration of the queer on film and 
put the child at its centre, he eliminated this element from the ending. There is 
something about the relationship between queerness and power in Marlowe, as we 
found, that didn’t suit Jarman’s ultimately affirmative political purpose.  
When Edward III contemplates Mortimer’s severed head at the end of 
Edward II, he fantasises about abolishing death, or rather making it one and the 
same as life. This, he indicates, is his desired basis for his own authority over his 
subjects. It is also a fantasy about abolishing an institution, insofar as the monarchy 
has been exposed in the play as an institution founded not upon a natural self-
perpetuating legitimate order, but as maintained by the exercise of power through 
violence. In other words, the monarchy (more broadly, the authorities claiming the 
right to rule) has been exposed as an institution precisely insofar as it is unnatural. 
The monarchy has fallen out of joint because it is based, as written by Marlowe, on a 
fantasy of natural union between the public and the private, a fantasy of itself as a 
perfectly natural institution and therefore, in a sense, no institution at all.   
The supreme irony, of course, is that this Edward – who is in different senses 
the product of at least three queer relationships (Edward II/Isabella, Edward 
II/Gaveston, Isabella/Mortimer) immediately announces his intention to erase the 
distinction between public and private and make real again the fantasy of the 
monarchy as an essential and natural authority – and thus hardly an institution at all. 
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The child who imagined his own disruption of adult authority, and then carried out 
that disruption by taking advantage of the queering of monarchical authority 
represented by Mortimer and Isabella, plans the eradication of all future potential 
for further disruption. A fundamentally queer and private imagination located in the 
child creates a fantasy of power, quickly used to deny and destroy the possibility of 
the same capacity in others. The disturbance posed by Edward III is that he answers 
the adult gaze on the child with a gaze of his own – the one he turns upon 
Mortimer’s head.   
Similarly, in The Innocents, in his recital from the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, 
Miles is also frustrating the adult gaze just when it expects consolation through the 
child’s embodiment of the future. This particular ‘performance’ is just one occasion 
in Miles’ general tendency to performativity – his presentation of Miss Giddens with 
flowers, his kissing her and his other flirtations, his dressing in a gentleman’s clothes, 
his formality at afternoon tea. These are performances of adulthood; the usual 
consolation of such performances, their charm for the adult gaze, is that they convey 
the necessity of initiation into adult practices and simultaneously the child’s 
innocent incapability to perform those practices as an adult really would. The 
‘problem’ with Miles, of course, is that he is too successful in these performances, 
far too much really like an adult, even whilst he remains physically a child. Miles 
does, in fact, exactly what he is explicitly accused of doing: he contaminates the 
child with desires for adulthood, which is to say simply to be other than he now is. 
Thus his performance of the poem, which is a particular culmination of this 
tendency, frustrates a moment of identification of the child when it is most 
expected, when it is most anticipated by the adult gaze. Miles replaces this with his 
own apparent gaze upon the dead Quint.  
In both Edward II and The Innocents, then, despite their very different 
contexts, a similar moment occurs, one that denies the anticipation of the child from 
adult authority and which instead creates a new act, a deviation from what is 
anticipated. Edward III orders Mortimer’s execution and announces his desire for a 
form of rule that will negate the possibility of anyone seizing power from himself; 
Miles (perhaps) invites Quint in to replace the moral rule of Miss Giddens with 
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something else. This politics places the child in time – and thus in the position of 
simultaneously remaining and becoming other than the child – reminding the 
current authorities of the mortality with which, as Freud pointed out, they struggle.  
 If we can recognise both Edward III and Miles as queer children, but their 
queerness does necessarily resist, nor indicate a better alternative to, authority, is a 
‘queer reading’ of the child and authority sufficient here? Noting how the child is 
consistently used in conservative discourse to limit the possibilities of politics, 
Edelman dares to wonder – 
What […] would it signify not to be “fighting for the children”? How 
could one take the other “side,” when taking any side at all 
necessarily constrains one to take the side of, by virtue of taking a 
side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of 
the future it intends? (No Future, 3) 
Edelman identifies queerness and the death drive as acting to negate this 
order (queerness figures “the place of the social order’s death drive” (3)). However, 
he struggles with, even as he persistently returns to, the issue of how this negation 
functions, as he believes it does, from within the order. His solution is that – 
Queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to 
that place [of abjection and stigma], accepting its figural status as 
resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the 
inextricability of such resistance from every social structure. (No 
Future, 3) 
This suggests that the queer exists as a kind of permanent resistance within 
the institutions through which authority operates. Edelman is keen to emphasise 
this as a negation; any affirmative role would destroy its function. His formulation of 
the queer here draws upon Lacan and, behind him, on Hegel. Queerness as negation 
has, Edelman argues, drastic consequences for the political use of the future:  
[The queer] suggests a refusal – the appropriately perverse 
refusal that characterises queer theory – of every substantialization 
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of identity, which is always oppositionally defined, and, by extension, 
of history as linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which 
meaning succeeds in revealing itself – as itself – through time. Far 
from partaking of this narrative movement towards a viable political 
future, far from perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual 
realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of 
futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure 
or form.  
Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of 
negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider 
accepting and even embracing it. (No Future, 4) 
Edelman emphasises that the queer needs to be understood as negativity, 
not as affirmation of identity; and yet it’s a negativity that needs to be “accepted” 
and “embraced”. His critique of teleological history sets up the queer as the site of 
resistance to this history, and as a negation of futurity. The problem with this is that 
it exclusively considers history as teleology, as the revelation of latent meaning. If 
the queer resists this tendency to “substantialization of identity”, it ironically 
nevertheless ends up here, despite Edelman’s efforts, as a rather substantial, and 
indeed identifiable, thing itself. Whilst this may oppose the future as teleological, it 
also opposes the emergence of any particular or different future in relation to the 
child, who in embracing the queer appears to become just as permanent and 
unchanging as the conservative image of the child.  
This explains why Edelman is incoherent in insisting that the queer is a radical 
“bar” to the social order, yet nevertheless necessarily functions within it; he 
identifies the queer with a kind of atemporal permanence (the permanence of 
submission to the death drive) that is only explicable by making it intrinsic to the 
social order, even as it is claimed to act in resistance to that order. This perhaps 
would not be a problem, except that Edelman’s hostility to the institutions of civil 
society (undoubtedly justified, insofar as those institutions are organised to oppress) 
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is actually a hostility to the difference between the private self and the social order, 
which Edelman describes in terms of “figurality”:  
[…] Politics, construed as oppositional or not, never rests on essential 
identities. It centers, instead, on the figurality that is always essential 
to identity, and thus on the figural relations in which social identities 
are always inscribed. (No Future, 17)  
In Edelman’s thought, “politics” describes the symbolic order to which we are 
compelled to acquiesce, but with which we never can, despite our efforts, wholly 
identify. Queerness indicates the refusal of such efforts, of “figuring” the self, in 
response to their constant demand through the figure of the Child. Yet both Ishiguro 
and Arendt suggest that this process of figuring – the relationship between a private 
self and a political and/or aesthetic representation – need not only take place in 
such authoritarian circumstances, even if they both also imply that such 
authoritarianism currently prevails.  
Edelman’s demand is essentially for recognition of the queer, leading to its 
rhetorical affirmation (despite the queer’s alleged negativity), which will dispel or at 
least disrupt the demand for representation. This recognition is, in a new form, the 
desired encounter with the Other that reduces both self and other to a single 
present, and Edelman explicitly suggests that this must be prioritised over concern 
with the politics of institutions. This does not stand up to the two queer children 
described above, Edward III and Miles, whose queerness is a desire for institutional 
authority.  Edelman’s determination to reject “reproductive futurism” leads him to 
insist on the value of the present, ignoring the fact that (as these children show) the 
present contaminated with the future can be the queerest thing of all.  
Jarman’s desire to affirm – through first recognising - the queer, through the 
queer child, led him to fail to recognise the “dusty” Marlowe’s writing of a much 
more uneasily queer child at the play’s conclusion. The model proposed by Edelman, 
with its emphasis on recognition of the queer as a precise, recognisable and 
permanent force of resistance, is adequate for viewing Jarman’s child but not for 
reading Marlowe’s. Jarman’s vision of an ecstatic, atemporal moment of 
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identification between father and son at the ending of his film, one that does away 
with death, is a version of the death drive that would fit with Edelman’s reading. 
However, we have to be cautious about making such a display of affective 
identification the prerequisite for our interest in a particular text, for our willingness 
to institutionalise the reading of that text through critical authority, given that 
Marlowe frustrates precisely such an interest and refuses an affirmative ending. This 
is why I bring up an early modern text for an exploration of contemporary literature 
and critical culture: because the failure to read that text that Jarman represents (and 
which the Edelman model would likely perpetuate) is indicative of the difficulties we 
still face in constructing an adequate reading of the child.  
This suggests, also, that we need to turn to institutions as determining the 
conditions within which the child grows up and where the difference between public 
and private life is mediated. Marlowe’s Edward III does not only structurally draw 
our attention to the importance of institutions (because of his role in restoring the 
‘legitimate’ institution of monarchy, a legitimacy the play’s events have thoroughly 
undermined) the content of his speech also, in his desire to abolish the institutional 
as distinct from his personal rule based on total recognition and the refusal of 
privacy, does this too.  
It might be objected that we are already living with institutions, and that 
institutions are in fact themselves the problem insofar as they constitute the 
practical mechanisms of the conservative, oppressive social order Edelman sets out 
to critique. After all, too, the educational institutions in Ishiguro’s novels are almost 
all authoritarian in nature and destructive in their consequences, even the initially 
liberal-seeming institution at Hailsham, with its emphasis on the clone-children’s 
welfare. Of course, in practice those in authority virtually always work through 
institutions in some form, even if only for pragmatic reasons. Yet it is possible for 
institutions to be based upon the fantasy of their own destruction; as Arendt points 
out, Marx’s predicted “withering away of the state” encouraged precisely this 
fantasy, which turned out to be inimical to real politics (The Human Condition, 45). 
More immediately under our purview here, we’ve also noted how Thatcherism 
based itself on a fantasy of union between the political, economic and natural 
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orders. Reading Ishiguro through Arendt, then, one senses that institutions become 
most dangerous when they fail to recognise their own nature as social constructions; 
when they turn from creating representation to providing recognition.  
In Ishiguro, the failure of institutions comes from the same desire for an 
impossible union and a consequent rejection of institutions as institutions, which are 
replaced by institutions based on the fantasy of their own destruction (as ironically 
reflected in the actual final abandonment of Hailsham). Using Arendt as a frame to 
critique Edelman, and noting the literary examples from Ishiguro’s characters, we 
can observe that if the death drive and the queer function to create the space for 
politics by rejecting the union of the political and the natural, then this space as a 
physical and temporal reality - rather than as a theoretical conceit - can only be 
created by attending to institutions. This depends, however, on accepting the future 
as unknown and unrecognisable but nevertheless at present in the form of the child, 
demanding representation even where recognition is necessarily refused.  
One implication of this is that the visual display of affective content can no 
longer be the precondition for access to the form of institutions and of 
representation. There is an example of the absurdity of this precondition when in 
The Unconsoled, where Ryder enters a city over-saturated with institutions – and, 
through a single performance, he is expected to transform them, to redeem them in 
fact. This is a utopian vision, an expectation that a single representative and a single 
representation can redeem the diverse whole (much as Tommy thought that his 
artwork might represent, and thereby temporarily preserve, his life). The city 
authorities who have engaged Ryder to perform refuse to allow him any rehearsal 
time, but rather continually expect him to appear at events where he is asked to 
reveal some sort of salvation through meaning. The absurdity of this scenario is that 
content is always demanded before form, and as the precondition for the access to 
civic institutions and a political platform that Ryder is so readily granted. Of course, 
no content is ever actually revealed or generated (the performance does not even 
take place), and the real child is repeatedly displaced in favour of the 
representational child within.  
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Ishiguro radically proposes that we should instead allow content to follow 
form, that is for the full lives of individuals to follow their access to institutional 
protections rather than for that access to depend on them putting their lives on 
display. In Orphans, he draws a parallel between this expectation in literary criticism 
and in broader political culture, exposing a ‘politics of reading’ at work across both.  
The final problem with Edelman’s formulation of the queer and the death 
drive is that in their emphasis on the affirmation of the queer, they make its political 
potential depend on a prior display of a certain experience or quality (the experience 
he, following Lacan, terms jouissance). He insists on prioritising content before form; 
for him, the only form that matters is a symbolic order that will reliably and regularly 
produce content. What, though, if jouissance itself only occurs within certain 
physical and historical preconditions, and cannot be retrieved through revelation or 
affirmation? What if form must precede content? Then we no longer gain authority 
merely by reading to recognise it, but rather only by reading to create it, that is, to 
expand access to it.  
The Line of Beauty is so compelling in part because of the analogy it draws 
between political action and seduction, between Thatcher and her devotees on one 
side, and the world of unbounded sexuality amongst the gays. Both forms of desire 
hint at the death drive in their emphasis on repetition, on reproduction without 
meaningful change. Yet, of course, the repeated life thus established (in the cult of 
Thatcher and in the endless sex-and-coke sessions, respectively) ultimately works 
against its own containment. It is in this context that another aspect of Edelman’s 
argument becomes telling for what it omits. He aligns Lacanian jouissance with the 
death drive, and both with the queer. Yet jouissance, as marked by what is excessive 
in desire, appears in The Line of Beauty as ultimately constrained by Nick’s lifestyle 
and by its High Thatcherite context; in seeking to contain excess within an image of 
excess, as part of an anti-political politics, Thatcherism ultimately works against 
jouissance, which is implicated in creativity as much as in the death drive.  
This version of jouissance derives from the pleasurable suffering provoked by 
the Other who throws the self out of alignment with its own identity, but which 
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requires not the permanent submission of the self to the death drive, but rather 
makes demands on the subject’s capacity for imagination, which itself derives 
inextricably from the death drive.21 This demand is itself for figuration, in fact. A 
submission to the death drive (such as that which Edelman proposes) would treat 
the death drive as a permanent retreat from the excessive demands of the Real, 
which it finally cannot provide, except (as Edelman recognises) as a point in the 
structure of the social order. Ishiguro’s novels indicate, though, that this point 
cannot be realised as an actual place to live, in any meaningful sense; attempts to 
realise it produce authoritarian and violent attempts at social control. Precisely 
because the death drive arises in response to an excess of the Real and to the 
creation of jouissance, it must attempt to overcome that excess, which it cannot do 
(see Borch-Jacobsen’s discussions of the contradictions of the Lacanian death drive, 
103-104, 134-135). This is manifested in Ishiguro’s novels through the farcical 
failures of characters to live at a fixed representational point in the world, despite 
their often earnest desire to do so.  
Mr Stevens, for example, tries to live in total submission to Lord Darlington, 
projecting both his capacities for pleasure and his political agency on to the 
aristocrat. The isolation this provides is only temporary, not only because of the 
Second World War but also because of the arrival of Miss Kenton as a disruptive 
element at Darlington Hall, long before the war. Yet Miss Kenton’s attempted 
seduction of Stevens is perhaps itself prompted by his very privacy. Ultimately, then, 
the relation between jouissance and the death drive, and between the private life 
and politics, is too mutually contaminated for the death drive to provide the kind of 
refuge into the queer that Edelman proposes, in any meaningful sense. We have to 
understand the death drive as inextricably bound up in creativity, I propose, and 
thus in the child’s becoming other than the child.  
This confusion between the political and the aesthetic, between pleasurable 
excess and democratic participation, also hints at something circular in the relation 
between politics and the private. For if political (and aesthetic) representation 
emerges from the private life, the effect of that representation, if successfully 
realised, is often to expand the time and space for the private life in turn. This is a 
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notion literalised in Kathy and Tommy’s attempt to gain a “deferral” in Never Let Me 
Go; they claim a right to political recognition through putting their private lives on 
display, in order to extend the time available to them to live those lives. Similarly, in 
The Line of Beauty, the ability to appreciate aesthetic objects is made into a 
justification for the political dominance of the rich who own those objects, in order 
that they can continue to own them.  
This circularity draws attention to the absurdity of expecting someone to 
display or perform the value of their private life in order to gain political 
participation; as one constitutes the other, this kind of desired recognition does not, 
properly, make sense. To demand a performance for recognition will, like the 
abandoned child behind Orphans, lead to affective identification through and by a 
dominant Original who sets the terms of political representation and grants it only 
on the basis of recognition.  
The demand for the child, and for the subject more broadly, to perform and 
be recognised as the basis for entrance into authority is, of course, an attempt to 
control time. It seeks to assuage the adult’s awareness of time passing, and thus of 
his own mortality, with a performance on demand, at a time of his choosing. It is this 
demand which both Edward III and Miles disrupt so perfectly. They introduce a 
different kind of time; a time that is always premature or out of joint, that does not 
manifest itself on demand. A time that implies genuine difference between past and 
future.  
In Ishiguro’s texts, this time emerges from and within the difference between 
recognition and representation. Its tendency towards chaos – the absurd, yet often 
banal and bathetic, situations in which his characters frequently find themselves – 
itself implies an equality, a potential expansion of political participation, given the 
fragility of all existing representations, which gradually collapse (as with Mr Stevens) 
under their own contradictions and unreality.  
I am describing, evidently, an imperative to expand institutions, to open 
them both literally and intellectually, so that more people might access the time and 
space needed for (often banal) private life and thus, as Arendt argued, for political 
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freedom. The expectation of the hermeneutic and ecstatic encounter, the moment 
of revealing the self for affective identification, cannot work as a prior requirement 
for access. Rather we are in the world of images in The Line of Beauty – every one of 
them potentially creating the future, none guaranteed to do so, but simultaneously 
functioning as sites of pleasure precisely because they attract the child’s creativity, 
ambition and desire. It is from such private pleasures that political representation is 
created, but not on the terms or in the time of those currently in authority. The texts 
we’ve explored here suggest that the time and space to access such pleasures is 
worthy of both protection and expansion. Real politics might be the politics not of 
identity, but of pleasure - extended to the child, its consequences never wholly 
visible to the adult.  
Rather than allowing this fantasy of an atemporal and essential identity to 
govern our political life, and thus limit the possibilities of the future, Ishiguro and 
others discussed here indicative that we might better seek to act in history - which 
means operating in, through and upon institutions, not on the fantasy of their 
destruction in favour of a natural order. Whereas Edelman proposes that the ethical 
imperative of the authoritarian politics of our time is to affirm a principle, the 
principle of queerness, I propose rather that the imperative is to create space and 
time for the private life and thus for politics.  
As I indicate in quoting Freud early in the last chapter, our responsibility here 
may be most effectively realised through acceptance of its lack of effectiveness (at 
least, if effectiveness is considered in terms of predictability), and thus of the time 
and space needed for and by the child. As Adam Phillips argues (and as I noted in my 
introduction), Lacanian psychoanalysis (on which Edelman bases his own theoretical 
framework) may have underplayed the pleasure of creation and discovery in which 
the child is engaged. Certainly, at least, a real politics of pleasure would be one that 
works against authoritarianism, as Thatcherism’s conflicted attitude to pleasure so 
clearly demonstrates. As The Line of Beauty suggests, the pleasurable imagination, 
which ultimately derives from childhood and is expressed through the child’s 
ambition to be other than a child, works against its own containment. A politics of 
jouissance is one that refuses the demand to perform for others, for adults, but 
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which creates the possibility of acting for the Other, and for the future; because 
whilst doing so is (as the adult fears) traumatic, it is also (as the child perhaps knows) 
highly pleasurable.  
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Notes 
1 Arnott, whose work is cited in the Library of Congress entry on “Children’s Rights: 
International Laws”, describes a debate from the late nineteenth century onwards between 
traditionalists (who emphasised the rights of individual families in childrearing) and 
progressives (who advocated an enhanced role of the state in child protection). The 
Thatcher government’s policies on children can be read as an attempt to reconcile this 
conflict; whilst Thatcherism generally emphasised ‘the family’ and rhetorically deplored 
government overreach, in practice, in the ways discussed here, it significantly expanded the 
state’s role in the child’s upbringing (and notably introduced the first National Curriculum, in 
1988). The reconciliation was achieved through total identification of the interests of 
legitimate families with those of the state, hence Clause 28’s assertion of a right to non-
recognition of certain types of family. In this sense Thatcherism, despite its ‘privatisation’ 
agenda, was wholly opposed to any distinction between the public and the private, a point I 
develop further in Chapter 3.  
2 Jacqueline Rose describes (xi) how the fear of the unknown presented by evidence of child 
sexual abuse was displaced on to the bogeyman figure of the paedophile, as a way of 
evading the possibility of more general and structural social responsibility for the abuse. I 
suggest that one of the most traumatic aspects of the Savile exposure was that he now 
functioned as just such a bogeyman individual, but one who, ironically, simultaneously 
exposed the general, structural and political responsibility for his crimes.  
3 The joint MPS/NSPCC report into Savile’s crimes, Giving Victims a Voice, states that “of 
reported offending by Savile, 73% is against those aged under 18 years [...] the majority was 
in the 13 to 16 age group. […] Within the recorded crimes there are 126 indecent acts and 
34 rape / penetration offences.” (12) 
4 Davies’ opening chapter is entitled, “Apocalypse Now Then”, punning on both one of 
Savile’s catchphrases and the movie Apocalypse Now, Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 
adaptation of Heart of Darkness. In interview, Davies said: "I saw myself going up the river of 
[Savile’s] life and hopefully finding out everything on the way and then having a climactic 
final confrontation with him" (Cadwalladr, 1).  
5 As Cadwalladr comments, “The man who dressed like a paedophile was a paedophile” (1).  
6 At least some critics reacted with misgivings to the programme at the time. Davies quotes 
Catherine Storr’s comment that Jim’ll Fix It was “intolerably patronising […] an insult to the 
dignity possessed by a child in his natural environment” (qtd. 312).  
7 The newborn child is a central image in the closing scene of Streetcar, but its treatment 
varied between play and film. In the playtext, Williams has the rapist Stanley caress his wife 
Stella whilst Blanche is removed to an asylum and the child cries; in the film, a more 
moralistic Stella picks up the baby to leave her husband behind.  
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8 This is based on “Why should you love him whom the world hate so?, spoken by Mortimer 
at 4.76 in the Marlowe playtext.  
9 The whole novel is structured, much like Hawksmoor (1985), as a series of ironic 
juxtapositions and echoes between the Thatcherite and Elizabethan periods.  
10 Ishiguro has written screenplays for A Profile of Arthur J. Mason (Channel 4, 1984); The 
Gourmet (BBC, 1987); The Saddest Music in the World (IFC Films, 2004); The White Countess 
(Sony, 2005).  
11 This was an ‘end’ which the Korean War, for example, made a highly uncertain at the 
time. 
12 Given that the alien film genre was not well established by 1960, the resonance with the 
bomb may be more historically plausible than the reference to aliens.  
13 It is worth noting how the blocking of the climatic scene of John’s murder itself 
particularly creates the revelation of evil as a latent reality that was already known but 
repressed. It follows the formula Schneider identifies in discussing the similar denouements 
in Psycho, Don’t Look Now, and The Blair Witch Project (1999):  
[...] the protagonist slowly and tentatively approaches a seemingly 
familiar being with his or her back turned toward the camera, only to be 
shocked by a unanticipated revelation [...this] sheds valuable light on 
the horror that results from creatively combining suspense (following 
Hitchcock, and at the most basic level, when the viewer is forewarned 
about the danger facing the person or people being watched onscreen) 
and surprise (where such forewarning is lacking) in cinematic narratives. 
[...] Despite what may seem to be their mutual exclusivity, surprise can 
actually be mixed with suspense to produce horror if the forewarning 
given the viewer is too brief and/or too unspecific to prepare one 
adequately for the violent spectacle that follows.  
(145)  
14 “Loadsamoney” was a character created by comedian Harry Enfield as a cockney plasterer 
who boasted about his earnings. The character was explicitly used by Neil Kinnock and other 
leading Labour politicians as an example of the greedy and philistine culture allegedly 
promoted by Thatcherism (McSmith, 188).  
15 This Marlovian link is proposed by Ackroyd in several references to Faustus in the novel, 
including the child Dyer’s choice of Faustus as his own name.  
16 Historically, this might owe something to the significance of western pop music, 
particularly as transmitted by the American Forces Network, in providing illicitly accessed 
content for Eastern bloc citizens. Ishiguro is consistently interested in how the banal outputs 
of mass production can attain meaning and value in other contexts, as with the junk 
possessions of the clones in Never Let Me Go. Shameem Black discusses this point, in 
“Ishiguro’s Inhuman Aesthetics”, in terms of Ishiguro locating humane values in the 
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“inhuman” rather than in conventional sites of humanist aesthetics such as Romantic or 
neo-Romantic artworks.  
17 See also Borch-Jacobsen’s discussion of “affective identification” in a Lacanian context, 65.  
18 Bain does describe “the simultaneous absurdity and morbidity of [the] supposition that 
Diana is still alive” (258) at another moment in the novel, but does not question that Banks 
ultimately finds her in Hong Kong.  
19 Based on Christopher being at Cambridge in 1923 (3), the Banks’ 
disappearance occurred c.1908-1912. Banks travels to Hong Kong in 1958 (297). 
20 Suggestively, the 1993 film version of Remains opened with a shot panning across an 
architectural drawing of Darlington Hall’s façade, dwelling on the blank windows and doors 
and thus using the architecture as a visual metaphor for the film’s concern with public 
responsibilities and the enigma of the private.  
21 It will be apparent that I am using the Lacanian formulation of the death drive, which lies 
behind Edelman’s work, but am also attending to its contradictions. I agree with Borch-
Jacobsen that the relation between the death drive and creativity, between submission and 
imagination, is never finally convincingly worked through by Lacan.  
